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OAI-006 covers the Python path-safety case; the TypeScript half was missing. Mirrors CSDK-012, including its coarse-signal caveat — it flags any filesystem write rather than only unnormalized paths, because TS path-normalization analysis is not yet wired. The guardrail story does not cover this, which is the point worth making in an SDK built around guardrails: OAI-101 concerns input guardrails on the agent, which screen what enters the conversation, not what a tool does with an argument once the model has produced it, and a call reaching execute() has already passed whatever guardrails were configured. Tools here also typically run in the same server process as the request handler rather than a sandbox.
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Thanks @bradAGI, this is a clean one. Checked against the schema on One property I would like written down, ideally in the rationale doc: because the match is just A new rule also needs a rationale doc in |
Engine half of a coordinated pair with trustabl/agent-reliability-rules#95, on a branch of the same name so the rules-sync job resolves the matching pack rather than main. Neither half should merge alone — check-rules-sync.sh fails if they do. Mirrors openai_sdk/path_safety.yaml into testdata/rules-fixture and adds a fire and a silent case to policyRuleCases, as TestPolicyRules_AllRulesCovered requires. OAI-006 covers the Python path-safety case; the TypeScript half was missing. The silent case applies the remediation the fix text prescribes for the common shape — derive the name server-side rather than accepting a path from the model — instead of merely removing the write.
OAI-006 covers the Python path-safety case; the TypeScript half was missing. Mirrors CSDK-012 — the TS half of the Claude SDK pair — including its coarse-signal caveat, stated in the explanation so the finding is honest about itself: it flags any filesystem write, not only unnormalized paths, because TS path-normalization analysis isn't wired yet. Confidence 0.5 to match.
In an SDK built around guardrails, the point worth making is that the guardrail story doesn't cover this. OAI-101 is about input guardrails on the agent — they screen what enters the conversation, not what a tool does with an argument once the model has produced it. A tool call that reaches
execute()has already passed whatever guardrails were configured. Anyone reading this finding and thinking "we have guardrails" would be wrong, so the rule says so directly.Tools here also typically run in the same server process as the request handler rather than a sandbox, so the write inherits the application's own filesystem permissions.
The fix names the stronger remedy for the common case: derive the filename server-side from an id rather than accepting a path from the model at all.
Verification — engine built at
main:Fire (
writeFileSync(notePath, body)withnotePathfrom the parameters schema):OAI-029, OAI-202Silent (server-derived id, no model-supplied path):
OAI-202(OAI-202 is the pre-existing missing-CLAUDE.md repo rule.)
No new predicates, so no
schema_versionbump.