Trustabl is a static analyzer for agent reliability. It parses an agent-SDK repository (Claude Agent SDK, OpenAI Agents SDK, Google ADK, MCP, LangChain / LangGraph, CrewAI, AutoGen / AG2, Pydantic AI, and the Vercel AI SDK), models the tools, agents, subagents, skills, slash commands, and plugin manifests it declares, and checks them against a catalog of reliability and safety rules. It reports the weaknesses it finds — each with an explanation, a suggested fix, and a confidence score — as a human-readable summary, JSON, or SARIF 2.1.0, plus a per-surface reliability score and a CI-friendly exit code. It ships as a single Go binary with no hosted service: it runs as a CLI, or as a local stdio MCP server (trustabl mcp) that exposes the same scan to MCP clients without opening a network port.

The rest of this document explains what Trustabl reasons about and how the scan works, then covers building and running it. For the full implementation reference see ARCHITECTURE.md; for the at-a-glance SDK coverage matrix see COVERAGE.md.

Trustabl does not treat a repository as one undifferentiated blob. Every rule is classified into exactly one of five scopes, and each scope receives a different typed input:

• tool — fires once per tool definition. Input: a ToolDef (a @function_tool / @tool / @claude_tool function, a Claude TS tool(name, description, schema, handler) factory call, a FunctionTool(fn) ADK wrapper, an @server.tool MCP registration, or a bare shell-invoking function) plus its parsed file. Catches a missing docstring, an HTTP call with no timeout, untyped parameters, or an unnormalized path flowing into open(). (Hosted tools like WebSearchTool() are agent-scope edge data, captured as HostedToolDef, not ToolDef.)
• agent — fires once per agent declaration. Input: an AgentDef — a Python Agent(...) / SandboxAgent(...) / AgentDefinition(...) call, a Claude TS typed-const AgentDefinition, a Claude TS sub-agent inline in options.agents, or the Claude TS query(...) main-thread agent (QueryMainAgent) — with every constructor kwarg captured and its edges to tools, handoffs, and guardrails resolved. Catches an agent with shell tools and no input_guardrails, tool_use_behavior="stop_on_first_tool" paired with filesystem-touching tools, or a main-thread agent with unrestricted allowedTools.
• subagent — fires once per Claude Code subagent markdown declaration. Discovery is hybrid: canonical .claude/agents/*.md (any path depth, monorepo-safe) PLUS a frontmatter-shape fallback over all markdown files (gated on name + tools/model) that catches flat-collection repos which ship subagents under categories/*.md, plugins/<x>/agents/*.md, or similar layouts. Input: a SubagentDef parsed from frontmatter — name, description, tools[] (verbatim) + ToolGrants[] (parsed permission grammar), disallowedTools, model, permissionMode (incl. bypassPermissions), mcpServers, skills, isolation, hasHooks. Catches a subagent granted the built-in Bash tool despite a read-only description (CSDK-110). Subagent presence alone contributes claude_agent_sdk to SDKsDetected, so the Claude pack loads and CSDK-110 fires on pure-markdown subagent collections.
• skill — fires once per Claude Code skill (SKILL.md, any path depth). Input: a SkillDef parsed from frontmatter — name, description, allowed-tools → ToolGrants[], disable-model-invocation — plus body facts (dynamic-context exec commands, external URLs, prompt-injection markers) and a bundled-file inventory. Catches a skill that auto-approves unrestricted Bash (CSKILL-001), runs a dynamic-context command that performs network egress or reads secrets before the model sees it (CSKILL-003), or is model-invocable while granting side-effecting tools (CSKILL-050). Skills are markdown, so skill rules carry no language:; the claude_skill pack loads whenever a SKILL.md is present.
• repo — fires once per scan against the whole inventory. Catches project-wide gaps such as the OpenAI Agents SDK being present with no custom trace processor configured.

A repo can declare zero, one, or many agents, across one or more SDKs. Two agents in the same repo can be in completely different security postures — one wired with input/output guardrails, the other not. Agent-scoped findings therefore attribute to a specific agent at its constructor call site; flattening them to a single repo-level verdict would lose that attribution and be wrong. Discovery builds a small per-repo graph (tools, agents, subagents, and the edges between them) so agent-scope and subagent-scope rules can query it.

A Claude-SDK rule and an OpenAI-Agents-SDK rule that detect the same conceptual problem (a missing timeout, say) are two separate rules with SDK-specific explanation and fix text — there is no cross-SDK casting. When a repo declares agents from multiple SDKs side by side, each agent is checked only against the rules for the SDK that declared it. The same holds across languages: a language: python rule will not fire on a TypeScript agent.

trustabl scans in four steps. Each step's output is the typed input to the next, with no shared state between runs — and the inventory the early steps build is what makes policy selection data-driven rather than statically configured.

The binary ships with no embedded rules. Before the pipeline runs, Trustabl resolves its detection rules from a separate git repository (trustabl-rules) — fetching the latest, caching the clone locally, and falling back to the cache when the network is unreachable. This decouples rule updates from binary releases: rules can be added or changed without rebuilding the scanner. The resolved rules commit is recorded in the result and folded into the ScanID, so a scan is honest about which rules produced it. If no rules can be fetched and none are cached, the scan exits 2 and tells you to run trustabl rules pull — Trustabl never runs rule-less.

flowchart LR
    target[("Agent repo<br/>(local path or GitHub URL)")]
    recon["Recon<br/>files · SDK deps"]
    inv["Inventory<br/>Python + TS AST:<br/>tools · agents ·<br/>subagents · MCP servers"]
    pol["Policy selection<br/>load rules per<br/>detected SDK ·<br/>META findings"]
    ana["Analysis<br/>tool · agent · subagent ·<br/>repo detectors"]
    score["Scoring<br/>per-surface score ·<br/>overall readiness"]
    out[("ScanResult<br/>findings · scores<br/>(human / JSON / SARIF)")]

    target --> recon --> inv --> pol --> ana --> score --> out

1. Recon — walk the repo and answer "what's in here" cheaply, without parsing any source language: languages present (by extension), SDK dependencies declared in manifests (pyproject.toml / requirements.txt / Pipfile / poetry.lock / package.json for the claude-agent-sdk / @anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk / openai-agents / @openai/agents / google-adk / @google/adk needles), the file inventory, and discovered agent components (MCP configs, hook scripts, CLAUDE.md and AGENTS.md guidance docs, .claude/agents/*.md subagents at any depth, SKILL.md skills, slash commands at both .claude/commands/*.md and <plugin-root>/commands/*.md, .claude-plugin/{plugin,marketplace}.json manifests, sandbox policies). No tree-sitter parses happen here — this step decides whether the expensive AST work is even worth attempting.
2. Inventory — for each language Recon cleared, do the AST work and extract a typed inventory: ToolDefs with their config and body facts, AgentDefs with all kwargs captured, SubagentDefs / SkillDefs / SlashCommandDefs / PluginManifests parsed from markdown and JSON frontmatter, MCPServerDefs, guardrails, sessions, and the resolved edges between agents and the tools/guardrails they reference. Detectors read fields off these structs — they never re-parse raw source.
3. Policy selection — load only the rule packs for SDKs actually observed in code. An SDK seen in code with no shipped pack emits a META-001 info finding ("Trustabl does not currently audit this SDK") — silence on an unknown SDK is wrong. A dep declared but never used in code emits a different info finding flagging the drift.
4. Analysis — run the selected scope-aware detectors against the inventory. Findings carry the scope they fired at and attribute to the right location: tool file/line, agent call site, subagent markdown file, or the manifest.

Three properties fall out of this staging, by design:

• Performance. A repo with no Python skips Python AST work; a repo with only Claude TS code skips Python AST work AND OpenAI policy loading.
• Honest coverage. An "unaudited SDK" info finding is louder than a zero-findings clean bill of health on an SDK Trustabl doesn't know. A META-004 finding further distinguishes "audited and clean" from "could not audit — discovery extracted nothing a rule targets."
• Determinism is a contract. Same inputs → same ScanID, and the report is byte-stable across runs (findings sorted by (RuleID, FilePath, Line), inventory slices sorted deterministically). CI consumers can diff scans without spurious churn.

See ARCHITECTURE.md § 2 for the full diagram with typed inputs at each step.

Tool/agent AST discovery is wired for:

• Python — Claude Agent SDK (decorators), OpenAI Agents SDK, Google ADK, LangChain / LangGraph, CrewAI, AutoGen / AG2, and Pydantic AI. Discovery extracts tool definitions, agent constructors, hosted tools, MCP servers, guardrails, sessions. The bare Agent(...) constructor shared by OpenAI / ADK / CrewAI / Pydantic AI is import-gated per SDK so the classes never cross-match, and the shared @tool decorator is routed to the owning SDK by its import binding.
• TypeScript — Claude Agent SDK (the tool() factory, the query() main-thread QueryMainAgent, inline-in-query() sub-agents, typed-const AgentDefinitions, createSdkMcpServer and the four options.mcpServers config literals), OpenAI Agents SDK (the tool({...}) factory, new Agent({...}) and Agent.create({...}), 9 hosted-tool factories, MCP server classes across 3 transports plus the MCPServers wrapper, 4 defineX guardrail factories, and the MemorySession / OpenAIConversationsSession / OpenAIResponsesCompactionSession session classes — gated on imports from @openai/agents, @openai/agents-core, or @openai/agents-openai), and Google ADK (the new FunctionTool({...}) constructor, 5 agent constructors — new LlmAgent({...}) / SequentialAgent / ParallelAgent / LoopAgent / RoutedAgent — 13 hosted-tool classes, and subAgents edges — gated on imports from @google/adk), LangChain / LangGraph (the tool(fn, {...}) factory, DynamicStructuredTool / DynamicTool, and createReactAgent / createAgent / new AgentExecutor — gated on the @langchain/* / langchain / langgraph ecosystem), and the Vercel AI SDK (the tool({...}) / dynamicTool({...}) single-object factory, the call-based generateText / streamText / generateObject / streamObject agents and the class ToolLoopAgent / Experimental_Agent, with tools walked as an object/record, plus the <provider>.tools.*() hosted tools — gated on the bare ai import). Handles .ts / .tsx / .mts / .cts plus JavaScript .js / .jsx / .mjs / .cjs with the tree-sitter-typescript and tree-sitter-tsx grammars (JavaScript routes to the tsx grammar — a JS superset — and is audited by the same language: typescript rule packs). TypeScript rule packs ship for the Claude Agent SDK (CSDK-010/011/012/013/014/016 tool rules; CSDK-120/130/131 agent rules), OpenAI Agents SDK (OAI-016/017/019/022/024 tool rules; OAI-105 agent rule), Google ADK (ADK-013/015/016 tool rules; ADK-109 agent rule), MCP (MCP-011/012/013/014 tool rules), LangChain (LC-010/011/012/013/014 tool rules; LC-111 agent rule), and the Vercel AI SDK (VAI-001..008 tool/agent rules; VAI-012 repo rule). A TS repo for any of these no longer produces a blanket META-004; see COVERAGE.md for the full matrix.

JavaScript (.js / .jsx / .mjs / .cjs) is AST-parsed through the shared TypeScript-family pipeline: its tools and agents are discovered, tagged javascript, and audited by the language: typescript rule packs (both ES import and CommonJS require() bindings are recognized). Go has tree-sitter-go discovery for MCP tools (mark3labs/mcp-go and the official modelcontextprotocol/go-sdk), audited by the language: go rules in the MCP pack. C# has tree-sitter-c-sharp discovery for the official ModelContextProtocol SDK's [McpServerTool] methods, audited by the language: csharp rules. PHP has tree-sitter-php discovery for #[McpTool]-attributed methods (official mcp/sdk and community php-mcp/server), audited by the language: php rules. Rust has tree-sitter-rust discovery for the official rmcp crate's #[tool]-attributed methods (descriptions read from the description = "..." arg or the /// doc comment), audited by the language: rust rules; other Go, .NET, PHP, and Rust SDKs are recognized as files by Recon but not yet AST-parsed. The rule schema's language: field gates per-language rule sets.

• LLM enrichment is a separate post-scan step (trustabl enrich). Rule-based detection (trustabl scan) makes no network call — there is no LLM involved in the scan itself. trustabl enrich reads the scan output and calls Anthropic with BYOK (key stored via trustabl llm key set at ~/.config/trustabl/keys.json, mode 0600). The Anthropic call carries a request timeout, and --apply rewrites a file only when its current contents still match what the model reviewed (writing a .trustabl.bak backup first) — a stale scan is skipped, never mis-applied.
• Confidence scores are heuristic, not LLM-judged, and not yet calibrated against a labelled real-agent corpus — treat findings as signal to investigate.
• The CLI is the surface. No web app, API server, or hosted service: pipe --format json or --format sarif into your own automation. On GitHub Actions, trustabl/trustabl-action wraps the scan and uploads SARIF to the Security tab for you; for any other CI, --format sarif --output <file> produces a SARIF 2.1.0 report that feeds github/codeql-action/upload-sarif or any SARIF-aware step.

Trustabl is a detect-and-report tool: it does not write or modify any files in the scanned repo. Each run produces a ScanResult containing:

• Findings — one per rule hit, each with severity, confidence, an explanation, a suggested_fix, and the location it fired at (tool file/line, agent call site, subagent file, or the manifest).
• Per-surface readiness scores (one per discovered tool, agent, subagent, or the repo as a whole) and an overall score (a breadth-aware, badness-weighted mean — weak surfaces pull it down harder, but a single poor surface does not zero it; the score is a triage signal, not the CI gate).
• The discovered inventory — tools, agents, hosted tools, MCP servers, subagents, skills, slash commands, plugin manifests, and Claude settings — surfaced at the top level for CI consumers.

The human format honestly separates the three things people commonly conflate:

Tool definitions:   2  (custom tools with function bodies — scored below)
Agent tool grants: 14  (tool names the agent may call — audited by agent-scope rules)
Hosted tools:       1  (...)

Only the "Tool definitions" category flows through tool-scope rules (they have function bodies a rule can read). Agent grants and hosted instances are inputs to agent-scope rules, not unanalyzed — they just don't appear in the per-surface readiness table.

--format human (default) renders a human summary to stdout and live progress to stderr — an animated spinner and progress bar on an interactive terminal, or plain [phase] summary lines when piped (CI-friendly).

--format json marshals the full ScanResult for piping into your own automation.

--format sarif emits a SARIF 2.1.0 document, suitable for github/codeql-action/upload-sarif and other SARIF-aware tools. The suggested fix is carried at the rule level (help.text); Trustabl emits no per-result fixes[], so the document passes GitHub Code Scanning's schema validator (which rejects a fix that lacks artifactChanges).

--json-out <file> and --sarif-out <file> write the JSON / SARIF document to a file independent of --format — one scan can print the human summary to stdout while persisting both machine artifacts. The file bytes are identical to the matching --format stdout output.

--bom-out <file> additionally writes a byte-stable CycloneDX 1.5 BOM of the dependencies the repo declares across every supported language — requirements.txt / pyproject.toml / Pipfile (pip), package.json (npm), go.mod (Go), composer.json (Composer), *.csproj (NuGet), Cargo.toml (Cargo). It is pure inventory of DECLARED direct deps and makes no network call.

--vuln-scan turns that BOM into a vulnerability verdict: it matches the repo's concretely-pinned dependencies against a pinned OSV snapshot and reports each affected package as a finding carrying the advisory ID (CVE / GHSA / PYSEC / …), a CVSS-derived severity, and the first fixed version — so a vulnerable dependency fails the scan through the normal severity gate and exit codes and lands in the JSON / SARIF output alongside the rule findings, on ScanResult.vulnerabilities. Unlike the rest of a scan it is opt-in and online: the OSV snapshot is fetched from osv.dev on first use, cached under your user cache directory, and then cache-first — a later --vuln-scan reuses the cached database (no re-download) until it is older than 24h, so repeated scans are fast and offline-capable. trustabl vulndb pull refreshes the cache on demand; --no-rules-update pins to the cache at any age (fully offline). Only concretely-pinned versions are matched — a declared range (^1.0, >=2) can't be resolved to one version without a lockfile, so it is left unmatched rather than guessed. The snapshot version is folded into the ScanID only when --vuln-scan is on, so the result is honest about which vulnerability data produced it while a default scan stays byte-identical to before.

Combining --vuln-scan with --bom-out upgrades the CycloneDX document from a plain inventory into a BOM plus VEX: the matched advisories are emitted as a CycloneDX 1.5 vulnerabilities[] array — each with the advisory ID, an OSV source, a severity rating, an upgrade recommendation, and an affects[] reference linking it to the affected component's bom-ref — so a single trustabl scan ./repo --vuln-scan --bom-out bom.json produces a standards-based artifact that any CycloneDX-aware tool can ingest. Without --vuln-scan the vulnerabilities[] array is omitted and the BOM stays pure inventory.

--format json and --format sarif are progress-silent and byte-stable across identical-input runs (pure functions of the ScanResult). The human format is not byte-stable by design: its ANSI color is auto-detected from the terminal (TTY vs pipe, NO_COLOR), so the same scan can render with or without color. Use --no-color, or diff the JSON/SARIF output, when byte-stability matters.

--verbose (-v) narrates the scan on stderr: rule provenance (repo, ref, resolved SHA, and any cache fallback), per-phase discovery counts (languages, tools, agents, detected SDKs, loaded detectors, unaudited SDKs), output destinations, and a final result summary (scan ID, score, findings by severity, exit code). --debug adds everything --verbose shows plus per-phase timing and capped per-entity / per-finding detail (each discovered tool/agent and each finding with its file:line).

Both are global flags — they work on scan, mcp, and rules pull, and may appear before or after the subcommand (trustabl -v scan … or trustabl scan -v …). --debug implies --verbose. Both write only to stderr, so they never perturb the report on stdout or the JSON/SARIF byte-stability contract: --format json --debug still emits a clean document on stdout while the diagnostics stream to stderr. Diagnostic color follows the same rules as the report (off under --no-color, NO_COLOR, or when stderr is not a terminal). Because an animated progress panel and interleaved log lines would corrupt each other on the same stderr, --verbose/--debug automatically render progress as plain [phase] lines instead of the live spinner.

Saving diagnostics to a file. There is no dedicated --log-file flag — because diagnostics are a separate stream (stderr), redirecting stderr is the intended mechanism:

# Report and diagnostics to separate files (stdout vs stderr)
trustabl scan ./repo --debug --format json >report.json 2>diagnostics.log

# Human report on screen, diagnostics to a file
trustabl scan ./repo --debug 2>diagnostics.log

# Everything (report + diagnostics) in one file
trustabl scan ./repo --debug &>everything.log

With --format json/sarif progress is off, so the stderr file is diagnostics-only; with --format human it also carries the plain [phase] progress lines.

Exit codes:

• 0 — no findings ≥ medium severity (or no findings at all).
• 1 — at least one finding ≥ medium severity, OR --strict with any finding present.
• 2 — scanner / I/O error, OR no usable rules found and none fetchable (run trustabl rules pull), OR a signed channel (--channel) that failed verification (bad signature, untrusted/expired key, channel confusion, an expired or rolled-back statement, or a digest mismatch) — Trustabl refuses to run unverified rules.

OpenShell surfaces are still discovered (shell-invocation functions, openshell/*.yaml policies) and reported on a Risk surfaces: openshell block in the human format: the count of shell-invoking functions, the first three file:line locations (deterministically sorted), a why: line stating the threat model (a prompt-injected agent that exposes one of these as a callable tool can run arbitrary commands), and a fix: line with concrete remediations (sandbox, allowlist, drop shell=True, keep shell logic out of agent-callable code). The OSH-* detection rules that audited these surfaces have moved to a closed-source companion project; with no OSH rules shipped, such repos fire no rule and no META finding — the block makes the unaudited risk legible without claiming an audit happened. OpenShell is a risk surface, not an SDK, so it is not flagged as "unaudited" the way an unknown SDK would be.

brew install trustabl/tap/trustabl

scoop bucket add trustabl https://github.com/trustabl/scoop-bucket
scoop install trustabl

docker run --rm -v "$PWD:/repo" ghcr.io/trustabl/trustabl:latest scan /repo

Grab a prebuilt archive for your platform from the Releases page. Each release includes a checksums.txt and a build-provenance attestation; verify with:

gh attestation verify <archive> --repo trustabl/trustabl

Requires CGO_ENABLED=1 because the AST parsers use tree-sitter (Python + TypeScript + TSX bindings), which is a C library:

# macOS / Linux
CGO_ENABLED=1 go build -o trustabl ./cmd/trustabl

# Cross-compile: pick a C toolchain for the target. zig is the easiest.
CGO_ENABLED=1 CC="zig cc -target x86_64-linux-gnu" \
  GOOS=linux GOARCH=amd64 go build -o trustabl-linux ./cmd/trustabl

This is the cost of using tree-sitter for accurate AST parsing. If a single-binary, no-CGO distribution becomes a hard requirement later, the swap target is github.com/go-python/gpython for Python (with lower fidelity on modern Python); TypeScript would need a separate replacement.

# Local repo
trustabl scan ./path/to/agent-repo

# GitHub repo (shallow clone to temp dir, removed on exit)
trustabl scan https://github.com/org/repo

# Restrict detectors
trustabl scan ./repo --detectors claude_sdk
trustabl scan ./repo --detectors openai_sdk
trustabl scan ./repo --detectors google_adk
trustabl scan ./repo --detectors claude_sdk,openai_sdk,google_adk
# --detectors openshell is accepted but selects zero rules (pack is closed-source now)

# Agent Skill security (SKILL.md) — flags unrestricted allowed-tools (a bare
# `Bash` grant), pre-model dynamic-context exec, bundled-script network egress /
# secret reads, committed secrets, hidden-Unicode prompt injection, and a
# description that claims read-only while granting side-effecting tools (the
# CSKILL-* rules). Skills are discovered and scanned automatically.
trustabl scan ./repo                              # scans skills alongside tools/agents/MCP
trustabl scan ./repo --detectors claude_skill     # only the Agent Skill (CSKILL-*) rules
trustabl scan ./path/to/my-skill                  # point straight at one skill's directory

# Dependency BOM (supply chain): export the repo's DECLARED deps across all
# supported languages (pip / npm / Go / Composer / NuGet / Cargo manifests) as a
# CycloneDX SBOM, to hand to OSV-Scanner / Dependabot / syft. Pure inventory —
# the scan itself does no CVE lookup.
trustabl scan ./repo --bom-out sbom.json

# Vulnerability scan (opt-in, online): match the repo's pinned deps against the
# OSV database and FAIL on known CVEs — advisory id, CVSS severity, fixed version.
trustabl vulndb pull                              # pre-download OSV (optional; --vuln-scan auto-fetches)
trustabl scan ./repo --vuln-scan                  # BOM inventory + CVE verdict in one pass
trustabl scan ./repo --vuln-scan --bom-out bom.json  # CycloneDX BOM + VEX (vulnerabilities[]) in one file

# JSON output for CI piping
trustabl scan ./repo --format json

# SARIF output for GitHub Code Scanning / SARIF-aware tools
trustabl scan ./repo --format sarif > trustabl.sarif

# Write the report to a file instead of stdout (any format). --output writes
# the file even when the scan exits 1 on findings, so a CI step can upload it.
trustabl scan ./repo --format sarif --output trustabl.sarif

# One scan, both machine artifacts written to files (human summary to stdout)
trustabl scan ./repo --json-out trustabl.json --sarif-out trustabl.sarif

# Exit 1 on any finding regardless of severity
trustabl scan ./repo --strict

# Download / refresh the detection rule packs into the local cache
trustabl rules pull

# Validate a local rule-pack directory against this build's schema (CI gate
# for the trustabl-rules repo — strict-loads every pack, fails on the first error)
trustabl rules validate ./trustabl-rules

# Use a custom rules repo, or pin a specific released ruleset (env: TRUSTABL_RULES_REPO).
# Default pulls the latest reviewed rules from trustabl-rules main; pin a tag for stability.
trustabl scan ./repo --rules-repo https://github.com/org/my-rules
trustabl scan ./repo --rules-ref v0.1.0

# Air-gapped / offline: skip the network fetch, use the cached rules only
trustabl scan ./repo --no-rules-update

# Progress output (human format): animated on a terminal, plain lines when piped
trustabl scan ./repo                 # spinner + bars on a TTY; "[phase] summary" lines when piped
trustabl scan ./repo --no-progress   # disable progress entirely

# Diagnostics on stderr (global flags; stdout/report unaffected)
trustabl scan ./repo --verbose       # -v: rule provenance, discovery counts, result summary
trustabl scan ./repo --debug         # + per-phase timing and per-entity/per-finding detail
trustabl scan ./repo --debug --format json > out.json   # clean JSON on stdout, diagnostics on stderr

# Run as a stdio MCP server so an MCP client (Claude Code, Cursor, Claude
# Desktop) can scan code an agent just wrote (see "Run as an MCP server" below)
trustabl mcp

# Configure LLM provider, then enrich a scan result with AI explanations and fixes
trustabl llm list                          # show configured providers with masked keys
trustabl llm key set                       # prompt securely for an API key
trustabl llm key set sk-ant-api03-...      # set key non-interactively
trustabl llm key get                       # show masked key for active provider
trustabl llm key delete                    # delete key with confirmation prompt
trustabl llm model set claude-sonnet-4-6   # change model for active provider
trustabl llm provider set openai           # switch active provider (auto-creates entry)
trustabl llm provider list                 # list configured providers

# Enrich a scan result (requires anthropic provider with a key set)
trustabl scan ./myrepo --format json | trustabl enrich --repo ./myrepo        # pipe scan into enrich (stdout)
trustabl enrich --input scan.json --repo ./myrepo --output enriched.json      # file in, file out
trustabl enrich --input scan.json --repo ./myrepo --diff                      # preview proposed fixes as a unified diff (stderr)
trustabl enrich --input scan.json --repo ./myrepo --diff --apply              # preview and apply fixes
trustabl enrich --input scan.json --repo ./myrepo --apply                     # apply fixes without previewing
trustabl enrich --input scan.json --repo ./myrepo --rule CSDK-010             # focus on one rule
trustabl enrich --input scan.json --repo ./myrepo --only-enriched             # CI: only enriched findings

Rules are cached under your OS cache dir (os.UserCacheDir(), e.g. %LocalAppData%\trustabl\rules\ on Windows, ~/.cache/trustabl/rules/ on Linux). The first scan (or an explicit trustabl rules pull) populates it; each subsequent scan checks for an update first (unless --no-rules-update), falling back to the cached rules if the fetch fails.

Signed rules channels (opt-in). --channel <name> resolves rules from a signature-verified release channel instead of cloning git: Trustabl verifies a signed channel statement against an embedded trust keyring, fetches the bundle it commits to, and refuses (exit 2) on any verification failure rather than running unverified rules. The default scan is unchanged — it still uses the git source. A scan that did not use blessed production rules (a pre-release --channel, or a custom --rules-repo source) is watermarked in the report and in the JSON rules_origin field, and its provenance is folded into ScanID. Signed channels require a build with published signing keys; until then --channel refuses with a clear message.

Two CI patterns are supported, and they compose:

• Gate the build. The exit code is the gate: 0 clean, 1 on a finding of medium severity or higher (--strict lowers the bar to any finding), 2 on an operational error. A bare trustabl scan ./repo in a job step fails the job when it should.
• Publish to GitHub Code Scanning. On GitHub Actions, the trustabl/trustabl-action runs the scan and uploads the SARIF to the repository's Security tab in a single step (upload-sarif defaults to true), with inline PR alerts and optional threshold gating — the recommended path, and the single source of truth for the workflow. Outside GitHub Actions, --format sarif --output <file> writes a SARIF 2.1.0 report that any github/codeql-action/upload-sarif or SARIF-aware step can publish. Because --output writes the file before the findings-based exit code is applied, the scan step can run with continue-on-error: true and the upload with if: always(), so a scan that finds issues still surfaces them instead of aborting the run with nothing uploaded.

The SARIF document is a pure function of the scan result: byte-stable across identical-input runs, repo-relative file URIs, and a stable partialFingerprints per finding so Code Scanning deduplicates alerts across runs rather than re-opening them.

trustabl mcp runs a Model Context Protocol (MCP) server over stdio, so an MCP client (Claude Code, Cursor, Claude Desktop) can scan a directory an agent just edited and read the findings back. It is the same scan as trustabl scan, exposed as an MCP tool — it opens no network port. The server speaks JSON-RPC on stdout, so it writes nothing else there; status lines and diagnostics go to stderr.

It exposes two tools:

• scan — input { "path": "<dir>", "rules_ref": "<branch-or-tag>"?, "vuln_scan": true? }. Scans path and returns the full scan result (findings, scores, discovered inventory) as JSON — the same shape as --format json. Set vuln_scan: true to also match declared dependencies against a pinned OSV snapshot and report known CVEs (mirrors --vuln-scan; off by default).
• version — reports the build version, commit, and date.

Register it with an MCP client by pointing the client at the binary with the mcp argument over stdio. For Claude Code:

claude mcp add trustabl -- trustabl mcp

Or configure it directly in a client's MCP config (the mcpServers stdio shape used by Claude Desktop / Cursor):

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "trustabl": {
      "command": "trustabl",
      "args": ["mcp"]
    }
  }
}

The rules-source flags (--rules-repo, --rules-ref, --no-rules-update) work on trustabl mcp exactly as on trustabl scan; a client may also pass a per-call rules_ref in the scan tool arguments, which overrides the command-level --rules-ref for that call.

Trustabl ships a Claude Code plugin under .claude-plugin/ with two skills that form a scan-and-fix loop:

• trustabl-scan — triggers right after agent, tool, subagent, or MCP-server code is written or changed and calls Trustabl's scan tool (the bundled MCP server, mcp__trustabl__scan) to self-audit it before committing, upstream of CI.
• trustabl-enrich — takes the output of a trustabl scan run (JSON, SARIF, or pasted terminal text) and applies each finding as a targeted code edit, guided entirely by the scan's own explanation and suggested_fix fields. It does not re-run the scanner; use trustabl-scan first, then invoke trustabl-enrich with the results.

Scanning runs through a bundled MCP server: .mcp.json registers a trustabl server whose command is a launcher (scripts/trustabl-mcp.sh) exposing the mcp__trustabl__scan tool. The launcher and a SessionStart hook (hooks/hooks.json → scripts/check-trustabl.sh) share install logic (scripts/lib-trustabl.sh) that downloads the pinned CLI version from GitHub Releases, verifies it against the release checksums.txt, and installs it into the plugin's private data directory ($CLAUDE_PLUGIN_DATA — no sudo, nothing outside that dir touched). The install is idempotent (re-runs only when the pin changes or the copy is missing/corrupt), and the launcher installs synchronously before starting the server, so there is no first-session race. The same binary is exposed as $TRUSTABL_BIN for the enrich skill's direct-CLI path. When auto-install cannot run (offline first session, an unsupported platform, or missing curl/tar) it falls back to whatever trustabl is on PATH; the system-wide install stays a consented step inside trustabl-scan. The plugin runs no network service of its own and modifies nothing outside the scan target.

Trustabl loads rules forward-compatibly. If the resolved pack targets a newer rule-schema version than your binary understands, the scan still runs: it evaluates every rule your build can understand and skips the rest, warning on stderr (and recording the skipped rule IDs on ScanResult.RulesSkipped):

warning: the rules target schema version 9 but this Trustabl build supports up to 8; 2 rule(s) newer than this build were skipped. Upgrade Trustabl to evaluate them.

The same per-rule skip happens for any individual rule that references a scope, an applies_to value, or a predicate your build does not understand — that rule is dropped while its siblings still run, so a newer rules release never forces a lockstep binary upgrade. Every skip is also surfaced in the report itself as a single META-005 info finding ("N rules require a newer Trustabl engine"), so a degraded scan is never mistaken for a clean one. A malformed rule your build does understand (a missing field, a bad value) is not forward-skipped — it still hard-fails the load, so real authoring errors are never silently dropped.

To evaluate the skipped rules, upgrade Trustabl to a build whose SupportedSchemaVersion (see internal/rules/schema_version.go) covers the pack. No action is needed if you're comfortable running the subset.

The scan only fails (exit 2) when nothing usable remains:

• "all rules require a newer engine schema" — every rule is too new for your build, so there is nothing to run. Upgrade Trustabl, or pin an older rules branch/tag your build fully understands (--rules-ref resolves branches and tags only, not raw commit SHAs, so a compatible ref must already exist):

  trustabl scan ./repo --rules-ref <branch-or-tag>

• "no usable rules manifest" — the pack's manifest.yaml is missing, unparseable, or declares a non-positive version (a corrupt/truncated pack). Run trustabl rules pull to refresh.

• "no usable rules found" — nothing cached and nothing fetchable (offline with a cold cache). Run trustabl rules pull while online.

Rule packs live in the separate trustabl-rules git repository (grouped {claude_sdk,openai_sdk,google_adk,mcp}/), resolved at scan time rather than embedded in the binary. Naming convention: CSDK-NNN for Claude Agent SDK rules (CSDK-0xx tool-scope, CSDK-1xx agent + subagent-scope), OAI-NNN for OpenAI Agents SDK rules, ADK-NNN for Google ADK rules, MCP-NNN for the dedicated MCP tool-scope pack. See ARCHITECTURE.md § 2 — steps 3–4 for the shipped rule table and COVERAGE.md for per-SDK recognition detail.

testdata/corpus/ holds real-world agent code (Claude SDK demos, OpenAI Agents SDK demos, Google ADK demos, a TS Claude SDK fixture) — a corpus, not a controlled fixture, so well-written agents won't trigger most rules and that's correct. See testdata/corpus/PROVENANCE.md for upstream sources and licenses of each example. Per-rule fire/silent correctness lives in internal/rules/policies_test.go; the end-to-end sweep in internal/scanner/scanner_test.go only asserts the scanner doesn't crash on real-world inputs. A labelled 20–40 real-agent-repo corpus is the detection-quality target (see ARCHITECTURE.md § 10); the current tests are regression coverage, not detection-quality measurement.

Join the Trustabl Discord to ask questions, share feedback, and follow development.

Apache-2.0. See LICENSE.