feat(secrets): wire POD_TOKEN_SIGNING_SECRET for stateless pod tokens (client-runtime#79)#205
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… (client-runtime#79) Chart side of the stateless signed pod-proxy token work (client-runtime#89). When the secret is present, the jobs-manager mints HMAC-signed tokens and the requests-proxy verifies them statelessly — no pod_tokens table, eliminating the token-revoke-while-live race class. - secrets.yaml: add POD_TOKEN_SIGNING_SECRET to the Opaque secret. Stable across upgrades via lookup (explicit value > existing stored value > generated random) so a token minted before an upgrade still verifies after. Only in the release-namespace secret (not the node-agents mirror). - jobs-manager-deployment.yaml: inject POD_TOKEN_SIGNING_SECRET (secretKeyRef) + POD_TOKEN_TTL_SECONDS (value, default 604800). - requests-proxy-deployment.yaml: inject POD_TOKEN_SIGNING_SECRET (secretKeyRef). - values.yaml: podTokenSigningSecret "" (auto-generate) + podTokenTtlSeconds. - Chart version/appVersion 1.4.5 -> 1.5.0. Secret is never injected into training pods. helm template + helm lint pass. Refs client-runtime#79, client-runtime#89. Closes #204. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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…206) feat(secrets): wire POD_TOKEN_SIGNING_SECRET for stateless pod tokens (client-runtime#79)
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Chart side of client-runtime#79 (stateless signed pod-proxy tokens, code in client-runtime#89). Deploying the signing secret is what flips the runtime from the legacy
pod_tokenstable into stateless mode — the jobs-manager mints HMAC-signed tokens, the requests-proxy verifies them by signature+expiry, and the token-revoke-while-live race class (#52–#58, #86) ceases to exist.Changes
secrets.yaml— addPOD_TOKEN_SIGNING_SECRETto the Opaque secret. Stable across upgrades vialookup: explicit.Values.podTokenSigningSecret> value already stored in the live Secret > freshly generatedrandAlphaNum 48. So a token minted before an upgrade still verifies after. Only added to the release-namespace secret (not the node-agents mirror, which exists solely for the resource-monitor's CLIENT_ID/PASSWORD).jobs-manager-deployment.yaml— injectPOD_TOKEN_SIGNING_SECRET(secretKeyRef) +POD_TOKEN_TTL_SECONDS(value).requests-proxy-deployment.yaml— injectPOD_TOKEN_SIGNING_SECRET(secretKeyRef), verify side.values.yaml—podTokenSigningSecret: ""(auto-generate) +podTokenTtlSeconds: 604800.Chart.yaml— 1.4.5 → 1.5.0.Safety / rollout notes
REQUESTS_PROXY_TOKENreaches them.podTokenSigningSecret(rotation invalidates live tokens → pods respawn).podTokenTtlSecondsto comfortably exceed the longest training-job duration (default 7d), else a long job 401s mid-run when its token expires.helm template+helm lintpass.Refs client-runtime#79, client-runtime#89. Closes #204.
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Note
Medium Risk
Changes authentication wiring for the requests-proxy path and secret stability across upgrades; rollout can briefly break in-flight pods using legacy tokens.
Overview
Helm chart 1.5.0 deploys the shared HMAC secret that switches pod-proxy auth from the legacy
pod_tokenstable to stateless signed tokens (jobs-manager mints, requests-proxy verifies by signature + expiry).secrets.yamladdsPOD_TOKEN_SIGNING_SECRETwith upgrade-stable resolution: explicitpodTokenSigningSecret→ existing Secret vialookup→randAlphaNum 48on first install. The key is not copied to the node-agents secret mirror.jobs-manager gets
POD_TOKEN_SIGNING_SECRETandPOD_TOKEN_TTL_SECONDS(default 7 days). requests-proxy gets the same signing secret env only.values.yamldocuments optional pin/rotation and TTL; mis-set TTL can 401 long-running jobs mid-run. In-flight pods with old UUID tokens may 401 until respawned after cutover.Reviewed by Cursor Bugbot for commit d06e846. Bugbot is set up for automated code reviews on this repo. Configure here.