fix(pattern): correct cross-chain atomicity claims in ERC-7573 cards - #198
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oskarth wants to merge 1 commit into
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fix(pattern): correct cross-chain atomicity claims in ERC-7573 cards#198oskarth wants to merge 1 commit into
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The private PvP card finalised the paying leg, then claimed both escrows revert on failure and atomic settlement without time-locks. A settled payment cannot revert. Rewrite the recipe to the ERC-7573 shape: one leg locked, the other paid through the decryption contract, and an oracle key that releases or returns the locked leg. State the guarantee as conditional on the oracle. The DvP card offered a timeout reclaim that ERC-7573 does not define and that can fire after the buyer has paid. The permissioned-ledger card said a malicious coordinator can only stall; under two-phase commit it can split the outcome.
rymnc
reviewed
Sep 11, 2026
| ## Protocol | ||
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| 1. [user] Two institutions agree off-chain on the asset, quantity, payment token, amount, shared trade identifier `T`, and a latest time to settle or unwind. | ||
| 1. [user] Two institutions agree off-chain on the asset, quantity, payment token, amount, shared trade identifier `T`, and a target settlement time (ERC-7573 enforces no on-chain deadline). |
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| 1. [user] Two institutions agree off-chain on the asset, quantity, payment token, amount, shared trade identifier `T`, and a target settlement time (ERC-7573 enforces no on-chain deadline). | |
| 1. [user] Two institutions agree off-chain on the asset, quantity, payment token, amount, shared trade identifier `T`, and a target settlement time. |
| Threat model: | ||
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| - Honesty of the sync coordinator or relayer set. A malicious coordinator can stall commits but cannot unilaterally fabricate state. | ||
| - Honesty of the sync coordinator or relayer set. A crashed coordinator blocks domains that have already prepared. A malicious one can send different decisions to different domains, breaking atomicity, unless a Byzantine fault tolerant commit protocol prevents conflicting decisions. |
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| - Honesty of the sync coordinator or relayer set. A crashed coordinator blocks domains that have already prepared. A malicious one can send different decisions to different domains, breaking atomicity, unless a Byzantine fault tolerant commit protocol prevents conflicting decisions. | |
| - Honesty of the sync coordinator or relayer set. An unavailable coordinator prevents execution of transactions in its domains. A malicious one can send different decisions to different domains, breaking atomicity, unless a Byzantine fault tolerant commit protocol prevents conflicting decisions. |
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The private PvP card claimed "both legs settle or both revert, without relying on time-locks for safety." Its own recipe finalised the paying leg first (step 3) and then said both escrows revert on failure (step 6). A settled payment can't revert. Step 2 also had each escrow wait on the other leg, which can't release either.
What changes
Other sources: the authors' paper (arXiv 2311.05966), Zamyatin et al. on why cross-chain atomicity needs a trusted party or synchrony, and Gray and Lamport.
Checks
validate-patterns.jsandcheck-terminology.jspass in strict mode.