docs(decisions): Add ADR 0083-0085 pinning the npm CLI toolchain across build and publish stages

docs/decisions/0016-use-corepack-for-pnpm-and-yarn-build-stages.md

@@ -7,6 +7,8 @@ decision-makers: Yunseo Kim
 relations:
   - type: see-also
     target: ADR-0082
+  - type: see-also
+    target: ADR-0085
 ---
 
 # Use Corepack for pnpm and Yarn Build Stages

docs/decisions/0017-require-explicit-package-manager-version-enforcement.md

@@ -9,6 +9,8 @@ relations:
     target: ADR-0070
   - type: see-also
     target: ADR-0082
+  - type: see-also
+    target: ADR-0085
 ---
 
 # Require Explicit Package Manager Version Enforcement

docs/decisions/0024-use-oidc-trusted-publishing-without-publish-secrets.md

@@ -14,6 +14,8 @@ relations:
       before registry mutation by an early OIDC token exchange preflight; residual publish-time
       authorization failures are classified, and the absolute must-stop-before-registry-mutation
       wording is scoped to what the exchange and observation preflights can establish"
+  - type: see-also
+    target: ADR-0083
 ---
 
 # Use OIDC Trusted Publishing Without Publish Secrets

docs/decisions/0027-use-github-hosted-ubuntu-2404-and-node-24-runtime.md

@@ -12,6 +12,16 @@ relations:
       by the selected Node.js 24 toolchain, floating with the node-24 image); the Node.js 24 runtime
       selection, the runner and OS image constraints, the caller-input prohibitions, the build-stage
       npm clauses, and the floor check and actual-version recording clauses remain in force"
+  - type: partially-superseded-by
+    target: ADR-0085
+    scope:
+      "the toolchain resolution clause under which the exact Node.js patch version, and therefore
+      the bundled npm CLI, floats within the Node.js 24 major line between runs of the same builder
+      release; the Node.js 24 major selection, the runner and OS image constraints, the caller-input
+      prohibitions, the build-stage bundled-npm coupling, the npm floor check, and the
+      actual-version recording clauses remain in force"
+  - type: see-also
+    target: ADR-0084
 ---
 
 # Use GitHub-Hosted Ubuntu 24.04 and Node.js 24 Runtime

docs/decisions/0029-use-windlass-generated-slsa-provenance-for-npm-publish.md

@@ -22,6 +22,8 @@ relations:
     target: ADR-0071
   - type: see-also
     target: ADR-0082
+  - type: see-also
+    target: ADR-0083
 ---
 
 # Use Windlass-Generated SLSA Provenance for npm Publish

docs/decisions/0067-converge-repeated-runs-within-run-identity.md

@@ -34,6 +34,8 @@ relations:
     target: ADR-0075
   - type: see-also
     target: ADR-0076
+  - type: see-also
+    target: ADR-0085
 ---
 
 # Converge Repeated Runs Within Run Identity

docs/decisions/0076-use-observation-preflights-and-first-mutation-classification.md

@@ -28,6 +28,8 @@ relations:
       "the npm OIDC exchange success-response contract (unpinned in ADR-0076; pinned in ADR-0081 to
       the empirically observed shape) and the exchange-token lifetime assumption (the 'typically 1
       hour' documentation note cited in ADR-0076; the observed lifetime is 15 minutes)"
+  - type: see-also
+    target: ADR-0083
 ---
 
 # Use Observation Preflights and First-Mutation Classification

docs/decisions/0081-pin-npm-oidc-exchange-response-contract-and-correct-token-lifetime-assumption.md

@@ -13,6 +13,8 @@ relations:
       hour' documentation note cited in ADR-0076; the observed lifetime is 15 minutes)"
   - type: see-also
     target: ADR-0082
+  - type: see-also
+    target: ADR-0083
 ---
 
 # Pin the npm OIDC Exchange Response Contract to the Observed Shape and Correct the Token Lifetime Assumption

docs/decisions/0082-pin-publish-stage-npm-cli-version-with-integrity-verified-provisioning-and-reviewed-allowlist.md

@@ -20,6 +20,32 @@ relations:
     target: ADR-0029
   - type: see-also
     target: ADR-0081
+  - type: amended-by
+    target: ADR-0083
+    scope:
+      "the identification of the initial pinned publish-stage npm version: ADR-0082 records the
+      allowlist as initially a single version pinned when the #97 fix lands; ADR-0083 defines the
+      #97 remediation as adopting the upstream npm/cli#9882 fix and selects the initial pin as the
+      first reviewed npm release containing that fix. ADR-0082's provisioning,
+      integrity-verification, allowlist, and bump-procedure clauses are unchanged and remain in
+      force"
+  - type: partially-superseded-by
+    target: ADR-0084
+    scope:
+      "the designation of SHA-256 as the publish-stage npm distribution digest algorithm in the
+      provisioning clause ('one shared definition of version plus distribution SHA-256'): the pinned
+      digest is SHA-512 in SRI form, byte-identical to the registry-native dist.integrity field. The
+      pre-use digest-verification obligation, the single shared definition, the allowlist, and the
+      bump procedure are unaffected and remain in force"
+  - type: amended-by
+    target: ADR-0084
+    scope:
+      "the selection of the concrete publish-stage npm provisioning mechanism, which ADR-0082 left
+      unspecified: ADR-0082 mandates explicit provisioning before any npm invocation with the
+      distribution digest verified before first use but does not name the mechanism; ADR-0084
+      narrows the open choice to the digest-verified npm registry tarball mechanism"
+  - type: see-also
+    target: ADR-0085
 ---
 
 # Pin the Publish-Stage npm CLI Version with Integrity-Verified Provisioning and a Reviewed Allowlist

docs/decisions/0083-defer-npm-m1-publish-remediation-to-the-upstream-provenance-file-fix.md

@@ -0,0 +1,229 @@
+---
+parent: Decisions
+nav_order: 83
+status: accepted
+date: 12026-08-17
+decision-makers: Yunseo Kim
+relations:
+  - type: amends
+    target: ADR-0082
+    scope:
+      "the identification of the initial pinned publish-stage npm version: ADR-0082 records the
+      allowlist as initially a single version pinned when the #97 fix lands; ADR-0083 defines the
+      #97 remediation as adopting the upstream npm/cli#9882 fix and selects the initial pin as the
+      first reviewed npm release containing that fix. ADR-0082's provisioning,
+      integrity-verification, allowlist, and bump-procedure clauses are unchanged and remain in
+      force"
+  - type: see-also
+    target: ADR-0024
+  - type: see-also
+    target: ADR-0029
+  - type: see-also
+    target: ADR-0076
+  - type: see-also
+    target: ADR-0081
+  - type: see-also
+    target: ADR-0084
+  - type: see-also
+    target: ADR-0085
+---
+
+# Defer the npm M1 Publish Remediation to the Upstream provenance-file Fix and Adopt the Fixed Release as the Initial Publish npm Pin
+
+## Context and Problem Statement
+
+The fourth M1 dogfood
+([vers-js run 31840088262](https://github.com/windlasstech/vers-js/actions/runs/31840088262),
+tracked as [issue #97](https://github.com/windlasstech/slsa-builder/issues/97)) pinned the npm
+defect that blocks the JS/TS npm profile's publish path: npm trusted publishing auto-enables
+provenance and silently discards a caller-supplied `--provenance-file` bundle, publishing an
+npm-generated statement instead of the Windlass-signed Statement. The run published
+`@windlass/vers-js@0.1.2` with the foreign evidence; the fail-closed read-back rejected it exactly
+as designed, but only after the registry mutation had committed, and npm policy makes the burned
+version number permanently unreusable. The RCA identified three interacting layers: `oidc.js`
+auto-enables provenance whenever the `provenance` config is at its default, the inner
+`provenance === true` branch in libnpmpublish's `buildMetadata()` then never reaches the
+`verifyProvenance()` path that reads the supplied file, and every documented way to disable
+automatic provenance is unusable in combination with `--provenance-file` (config-layer mutual
+exclusivity, the env-layer carve-out, and publishConfig flatten timing).
+
+Two candidate remediations were on the table:
+
+1. A local workaround: suppress npm's CI/OIDC detection for the publish subprocess, inject the
+   self-exchanged trusted-publishing token into an isolated npmrc as the registry credential, and
+   enforce a closed `publishConfig` allowlist. This mechanism is source-dependent on npm internals —
+   exactly the verification surface ADR 0082 exists to close.
+2. The upstream fix. The project filed [npm/cli#9879](https://github.com/npm/cli/issues/9879)
+   (report) and [npm/cli#9882](https://github.com/npm/cli/pull/9882) (fix PR, OPEN at decision
+   time).
+
+ADR 0082 pinned the publish-stage npm provisioning mechanics and recorded the allowlist as
+"initially a single version, pinned when the #97 fix lands and re-verified there" — deliberately
+leaving open what the #97 fix is, and therefore which npm version opens the allowlist.
+
+A diff review of npm/cli#9882 establishes what the fixed npm does on the profile's exact path:
+
+- `lib/utils/oidc.js` skips auto-enabling provenance when `opts.provenanceFile` is configured; the
+  option already carries the value from every config source (CLI, env, npmrc, publishConfig) by the
+  time the OIDC flow runs, so all entry paths are covered. The OIDC exchange itself still runs —
+  trusted publishing continues to authenticate the publish.
+- libnpmpublish's `buildMetadata()` throws `EPROVENANCECONFLICT` when both `provenance: true` and
+  `provenanceFile` are set programmatically. The profile's pinned argv never sets `provenance=true`,
+  so this branch is unreachable on the profile's path.
+- The documentation updates state the precedence rule, and the PR's new CLI regression test asserts
+  the profile's exact scenario: OIDC trusted publishing with a `provenance-file` publishes the
+  packument with a sigstore attachment deep-equal to the supplied bundle, with provenance generation
+  never invoked.
+
+The residual review surface (the error-code naming for the conflict branch, docs wording) does not
+intersect the profile's path. The only outcome that would break the profile's path is a wholesale
+rejection of the precedence direction, which would contradict npm's own published documentation of
+`--provenance-file`.
+
+Two further facts frame the choice. First, ADR 0029 already decided that npm trusted publishing
+authenticates the registry mutation while the Windlass-signed bundle is the canonical provenance
+(building on ADR 0024's trusted-publishing authentication decision). The workaround would replace
+npm's own exchange with a self-performed exchange plus an injected credential — a defect-forced
+deviation from that accepted design, whose reason to exist disappears when the fix ships. Second,
+the wait is expected to cost little or no schedule time: npm 12.0.1 shipped two days after 12.0.0
+and 12.0.2 seventeen days later, while the workaround path requires a specification amendment, a TDD
+implementation across the publish boundary, and a dogfood run before it could land.
+
+## Decision Drivers
+
+- A mechanism that is never written is strictly cheaper than one that is written, verified, and
+  later retired; ADR 0082 already earmarks workaround retirement on fixed npm versions as a separate
+  later decision.
+- The workaround's dependence on npm internals (`oidc()` ordering, config exclusivity, publishConfig
+  flatten timing) is precisely the verification surface ADR 0082 closes; adopting the workaround
+  even temporarily would expand the surface that must be reviewed per bump.
+- The fix's semantics for the profile's argv are diff-verified today; the uncertain residue does not
+  intersect the profile's path.
+- Waiting restores the ADR 0024/ADR 0029 authentication design instead of entrenching a deviation
+  from it.
+- The ADR 0076 exchange preflight retains its value — early, mutation-free detection of
+  trusted-publishing misconfiguration — regardless of which party consumes the minted token, so ADR
+  0081's pinned exchange contract stays in force untouched.
+- Dependence on an external release schedule is the principal risk of waiting and must be bounded by
+  an explicit revisit trigger rather than left open-ended.
+
+## Considered Options
+
+1. Defer the #97 remediation to the first reviewed npm release containing npm/cli#9882; adopt that
+   release as the initial publish npm pin; authenticate the publish with npm-native trusted
+   publishing.
+2. Implement the #97 workaround now on a pinned npm 11.17.0; adopt the upstream fix later through
+   the ADR 0082 bump procedure.
+3. Hybrid: implement the version-agnostic ADR 0082 machinery now (the workflow provisioning step,
+   pin-data plumbing, and Go-side pin validation) and defer only the version selection and the
+   authentication-path finalization.
+
+## Decision Outcome
+
+Chosen option: "Defer the #97 remediation to the first reviewed npm release containing
+npm/cli#9882", because the fix's semantics on the profile's path are already diff-verified, because
+waiting restores the accepted authentication design rather than entrenching a deviation, and because
+waiting is expected to add little or no schedule cost compared with specifying, implementing, and
+dogfooding the workaround first.
+
+### Initial pin selection at adoption time
+
+When an npm release containing the #9882 fix ships, the initial allowlist entry is selected under
+the ADR 0082 bump procedure, preferring:
+
+1. an npm 11-line backport, if one is released — minimal internals delta from the dogfood-exercised
+   11.17.0 and alignment with the Node 24 LTS line; otherwise
+2. the first 12.x release containing the fix, with bundle-verification compatibility evidence
+   against its bundled sigstore-js major (v5) as an added acceptance criterion, because npm's
+   `verifyProvenance()` path has never been exercised live against a Windlass-signed bundle.
+
+The pin data (version, distribution URL, distribution SHA-256) is recorded in the JS/TS npm
+provenance and publish specification's allowlist per ADR 0082.
+
+### Publish authentication path
+
+With the fix in place, the publish job uses npm-native trusted publishing exactly as ADR 0024 and
+ADR 0029 intended: npm performs its own OIDC exchange inside `npm publish`, and the pinned argv is
+unchanged. No OIDC-environment suppression, no token injection into an isolated npmrc, and no
+`publishConfig` credential allowlist is specified or implemented. The ADR 0076 exchange preflight is
+retained as a non-mutating observation preflight for early detection of trusted-publishing
+misconfiguration; the minted token is discarded, not consumed. The fail-closed post-publish
+read-back remains the permanent safety net, unchanged.
+
+### Deferral scope and revisit trigger
+
+All #97 remediation implementation is deferred until the fixed release exists and is selected: the
+specification amendment (authentication path, publish-side pin validation replacing the
+build/publish npm-version equality check, the allowlist initial entry), the workflow provisioning
+step, the Go changes, and the compatibility fixtures.
+
+This decision is revisited — with option 2 (the workaround on a pinned npm 11.17.0) as the default
+fallback — when any of the following occurs:
+
+- npm/cli#9882 is closed unmerged;
+- npm/cli#9882 is merged with precedence semantics that differ materially for the profile's argv
+  (for example, automatic provenance taking precedence over a supplied `--provenance-file`);
+- npm/cli#9882 has not merged by 12026-10-01.
+
+### Relationship to existing decisions
+
+This ADR amends ADR 0082's identification of the initial pinned version only; ADR 0082's
+provisioning, integrity-verification, allowlist, and bump-procedure clauses are unchanged and remain
+in force. ADR 0024 and ADR 0029 are not modified — this ADR removes a planned deviation from them.
+ADR 0076 and ADR 0081 remain fully in force: the exchange preflight keeps its observation role and
+its pinned response contract.
+
+## Pros and Cons of the Options
+
+### Defer to the fixed release and adopt it as the initial pin
+
+- Good, because no workaround code, specification text, or fixtures are written up front for a
+  mechanism that becomes unnecessary if the fix ships before the initial pin is selected.
+- Good, because publish authentication returns to the ADR 0024/ADR 0029 design: npm trusted
+  publishing authenticates the registry mutation; the Windlass bundle is the canonical provenance.
+- Good, because the verification surface ADR 0082 must close stays minimal — one pinned npm whose
+  behavior includes first-class support for the profile's exact publish mode, covered by npm's own
+  regression test.
+- Good, because the decision is evidence-based today: the fix's behavior on the profile's path is
+  pinned by the reviewed diff, not by a guess about maintainer intent.
+- Bad, because npm M1 completion becomes dependent on the npm maintainers' review and release
+  schedule, which the project does not control; the revisit trigger bounds but does not eliminate
+  this dependence.
+- Bad, because the fixed release's line is unknown: if the fix ships only in npm 12.x, the initial
+  pin carries the sigstore-js v5 bundle-verification compatibility question and a larger internals
+  diff-review than an 11.x pin would require.
+
+### Implement the workaround now on pinned 11.17.0
+
+- Good, because npm M1 unblocks immediately on the project's own schedule, and 11.17.0 is the
+  dogfood-exercised version with live evidence.
+- Bad, because the workaround is specified, implemented, and dogfooded at a calendar cost comparable
+  to the expected wait, and it becomes dead weight if the fix ships before the initial pin is
+  selected.
+- Bad, because the workaround is source-dependent on npm internals across the allowed range and
+  entrenches a deviation from ADR 0029's authentication design, with its retirement already known to
+  require a separate later decision.
+
+### Hybrid: build version-agnostic machinery now
+
+- Good, because part of the wait becomes productive: the provisioning step and pin plumbing do not
+  depend on the selected version.
+- Bad, because the specification's authentication path and the pin-validation contract cannot be
+  finalized before the fixed release's behavior is confirmed, so a meaningful fraction of the work
+  risks rework, and a partial-implementation state is harder to reason about than a clean deferral.
+
+## More Information
+
+- Motivating incident and RCA: [issue #97](https://github.com/windlasstech/slsa-builder/issues/97)
+  and the fourth-attempt evidence in
+  [issue #30](https://github.com/windlasstech/slsa-builder/issues/30).
+- Upstream: [npm/cli#9879](https://github.com/npm/cli/issues/9879) (report),
+  [npm/cli#9882](https://github.com/npm/cli/pull/9882) (fix PR; OPEN and diff-verified as described
+  above at decision time).
+- Issue #97's fix-requirement section described the workaround; it is superseded by this ADR and
+  will be rewritten when the remediation implementation begins.
+- The burned `@windlass/vers-js@0.1.2` publication remains the foreign-conflict test target for the
+  publish read-back, and the preserved dogfood-4 bundle remains the reference bundle the fixed npm's
+  `verifyProvenance()` path must accept.
+- If this decision is revisited under the trigger above, the fallback selects npm 11.17.0 as the
+  initial pin per the analysis recorded in ADR 0082's context.