🚨 [security] Update vitest 4.0.15 → 4.1.11 (minor) by depfu[bot] · Pull Request #16 · volverjs/satispay-node-sdk

depfu · 2026-09-08T22:22:00Z

⌛Your trial has expired ⌛

Thanks for testing out Depfu, we hope it has been useful and saved you some time! Your free trial for private repos has now expired. We're not just going to cut you off right away, but if you want to continue using Depfu, please upgrade your account as soon as possible.

Any questions or feedback, please let us know. Thanks for using Depfu!

🚨 Your current dependencies have known security vulnerabilities 🚨

This dependency update fixes known security vulnerabilities. Please see the details below and assess their impact carefully. We recommend to merge and deploy this as soon as possible!

Here is everything you need to know about this update. Please take a good look at what changed and the test results before merging this pull request.

What changed?

✳️ vitest (4.0.15 → 4.1.11) · Repo

Security Advisories 🚨

🚨 Vitest: Path Traversal / Arbitrary File Read via @vitest/mocker Redirect Mock

Summary

@vitest/mocker registers a redirect mock's target path without validating it
against the dev server's file-serving allowlist. An attacker who can reach the
dev server's WebSocket can register a redirect mock pointing outside the project
root; when the mocked module is requested, the plugin's load hook returns
readFile(<attacker path>) as the module source, disclosing local files.

This is exploitable without authentication only through the public
mockerPlugin / standalone interceptorPlugin exports (used by third-party dev
servers), which register the handler on Vite's unauthenticated HMR socket.
Vitest's own browser mode registers mocks over a token-authenticated RPC and
is not remotely reachable by default (see Scope).

Affected code

packages/mocker/src/node/interceptorPlugin.ts.

The load hook is the file-read sink:
if (mock.type === 'redirect') {
 return readFile(mock.redirect, 'utf-8')
}
mock.redirect is derived from client input at registration time with no
boundary check:
if (event.type === 'redirect') {
 const redirectUrl = new URL(event.redirect)
 event.redirect = join(server.config.root, redirectUrl.pathname)
}
registry.register(event)
There is no server.fs.allow / server.fs.deny check and no assertion that the
resolved path stays within the project root.

Registration paths and trust boundaries

Public mockerPlugin / interceptorPlugin (unauthenticated). In
configureServer, the plugin registers server.ws.on('vitest:interceptor:register', …)
on Vite's HMR WebSocket. That socket performs no token, Origin, or same-origin
check, so any client that can reach it can register a redirect mock. This is
the path the "unauthenticated" impact applies to.

Vitest browser mode (authenticated). Mocks register over the browser RPC
(registerMock), which sits behind a per-run token (isValidApiRequest, a
random api.token). The interceptor's configureServer socket is not used for
registration here (in v5 it does not run at all, as the plugin is injected per
environment). The same missing boundary check exists on the authenticated RPC
path, but reaching it requires the token, so it is not a remote-unauthenticated
read.

Path handling

new URL(redirect).pathname combined with join(root, pathname) does not
confine reads to the root:

Special/hierarchical schemes (file:, http:) are normalized by WHATWG URL,
so .. segments are collapsed and the result stays under the root. Payloads of
the form file:///../../etc/passwd do not escape.

A non-special (opaque) scheme preserves .. in pathname, so
join(root, "../../…/etc/passwd") resolves outside the root and reads an
arbitrary file.

Even without escaping the root, the missing server.fs check allows reading any
in-root file the dev server would otherwise refuse to serve (for example an
in-root .env or source that is denied by server.fs.deny).

Scope / preconditions

This is a development-server issue. The dev server binds to localhost by
default and is not reachable from the network unless the developer exposes it
(server.host / 0.0.0.0, a LAN bind, or a proxy).

A raw (non-browser) client against a reachable server bypasses browser origin
and CORS protections entirely and can both register the mock and read the
response.

A browser-based drive-by against a localhost server is substantially mitigated
by Vite defaults: the default CORS origin allowlist is limited to localhost
origins, and server.allowedHosts blocks DNS-rebinding, so a cross-origin page
cannot read the file contents back.

Impact

Disclosure of local files readable by the dev-server process (source, in-root
.env/secrets, and, via the opaque-scheme payload, files outside the project
root). No integrity or availability impact.

Affected versions

Present since @vitest/mocker was introduced.

Affected: @vitest/mocker >= 2.1.0 (shipped in vitest and
@vitest/browser >= 2.1.0), through 4.1.x and the 5.0.0 pre-releases.

Fixed: Vitest 4.1.11 and 5.0.0. Older majors (2.1.x, 3.x) are not
maintained and are not planned to receive the fix.

Fix

Validate the resolved redirect target against Vite's file-serving allowlist
(isFileLoadingAllowed) before registering it, at every registration site, and
stop registering the interceptor WebSocket events in Vitest's browser mode
(mocks there flow through the authenticated RPC).

🚨 When Vitest UI server is listening, arbitrary file can be read and executed

Summary

Arbitrary file can be read on Windows when Vitest UI server is listening, especially when exposed to the network.

Impact

Only users that match either of the following conditions are affected:

explicitly exposes the Vitest UI server to the network (using --api.host or api.host config option)

running the Vitest UI or Browser Mode on Windows

Details

The API handler for /__vitest_attachment__ uses the deprecated isFileServingAllowed incorrectly.
vitest/packages/ui/node/index.ts

Line 77 in eb1abf0
 <tbody>
if (!isFileServingAllowed(ctx.vite.config, fsPath)) {
The function expects the passed value to use cleanUrl after the check before file system related operation.
Because of this, it is possible to bypass the check by \\?\\..\\. This is not possible on Linux as Linux errors if a directory named ? does not exist.

A similar problem exists in other places as well.
vitest/packages/vitest/src/api/setup.ts

Lines 103 to 105 in eb1abf0
 <tbody>
 <tr class="border-0">
 <td id="L104" class="blob-num border-0 tmp-px-3 py-0 color-bg-default" data-line-number="104"></td>
 <td id="LC104" class="blob-code border-0 tmp-px-3 py-0 color-bg-default blob-code-inner js-file-line"> return undefined </td>
 </tr>

 <tr class="border-0">
 <td id="L105" class="blob-num border-0 tmp-px-3 py-0 color-bg-default" data-line-number="105"></td>
 <td id="LC105" class="blob-code border-0 tmp-px-3 py-0 color-bg-default blob-code-inner js-file-line"> } </td>
 </tr>
</tbody>
if (!isFileServingAllowed(testModule.project.vite.config, moduleId)) {
vitest/packages/vitest/src/api/setup.ts

Lines 119 to 121 in eb1abf0
 <tbody>
 <tr class="border-0">
 <td id="L120" class="blob-num border-0 tmp-px-3 py-0 color-bg-default" data-line-number="120"></td>
 <td id="LC120" class="blob-code border-0 tmp-px-3 py-0 color-bg-default blob-code-inner js-file-line"> return </td>
 </tr>

 <tr class="border-0">
 <td id="L121" class="blob-num border-0 tmp-px-3 py-0 color-bg-default" data-line-number="121"></td>
 <td id="LC121" class="blob-code border-0 tmp-px-3 py-0 color-bg-default blob-code-inner js-file-line"> } </td>
 </tr>
</tbody>
if (!testModule || !isFileServingAllowed(project.vite.config, moduleId)) {
vitest/packages/browser/src/node/commands/fs.ts

Lines 10 to 11 in eb1abf0
 <tbody>
 <tr class="border-0">
 <td id="L11" class="blob-num border-0 tmp-px-3 py-0 color-bg-default" data-line-number="11"></td>
 <td id="LC11" class="blob-code border-0 tmp-px-3 py-0 color-bg-default blob-code-inner js-file-line"> &amp;&amp; !isFileServingAllowed(path, project.vitest.vite) </td>
 </tr>
</tbody>
!isFileServingAllowed(path, project.vite)
vitest/packages/browser/src/node/plugin.ts

Lines 194 to 196 in eb1abf0
 <tbody>
 <tr class="border-0">
 <td id="L195" class="blob-num border-0 tmp-px-3 py-0 color-bg-default" data-line-number="195"></td>
 <td id="LC195" class="blob-code border-0 tmp-px-3 py-0 color-bg-default blob-code-inner js-file-line"> return next() </td>
 </tr>

 <tr class="border-0">
 <td id="L196" class="blob-num border-0 tmp-px-3 py-0 color-bg-default" data-line-number="196"></td>
 <td id="LC196" class="blob-code border-0 tmp-px-3 py-0 color-bg-default blob-code-inner js-file-line"> } </td>
 </tr>
</tbody>
if (!isFileServingAllowed(parentServer.vite.config, fsPath)) {
vitest/packages/browser/src/node/rpc.ts

Lines 115 to 121 in eb1abf0
 <tbody>
 <tr class="border-0">
 <td id="L116" class="blob-num border-0 tmp-px-3 py-0 color-bg-default" data-line-number="116"></td>
 <td id="LC116" class="blob-code border-0 tmp-px-3 py-0 color-bg-default blob-code-inner js-file-line"> if (!isFileServingAllowed(path, vite)) { </td>
 </tr>

 <tr class="border-0">
 <td id="L117" class="blob-num border-0 tmp-px-3 py-0 color-bg-default" data-line-number="117"></td>
 <td id="LC117" class="blob-code border-0 tmp-px-3 py-0 color-bg-default blob-code-inner js-file-line"> throw new Error( </td>
 </tr>

 <tr class="border-0">
 <td id="L118" class="blob-num border-0 tmp-px-3 py-0 color-bg-default" data-line-number="118"></td>
 <td id="LC118" class="blob-code border-0 tmp-px-3 py-0 color-bg-default blob-code-inner js-file-line"> `Access denied to "${path}". See Vite config documentation for "server.fs": https://vitejs.dev/config/server-options.html#server-fs-strict.`, </td>
 </tr>

 <tr class="border-0">
 <td id="L119" class="blob-num border-0 tmp-px-3 py-0 color-bg-default" data-line-number="119"></td>
 <td id="LC119" class="blob-code border-0 tmp-px-3 py-0 color-bg-default blob-code-inner js-file-line"> ) </td>
 </tr>

 <tr class="border-0">
 <td id="L120" class="blob-num border-0 tmp-px-3 py-0 color-bg-default" data-line-number="120"></td>
 <td id="LC120" class="blob-code border-0 tmp-px-3 py-0 color-bg-default blob-code-inner js-file-line"> } </td>
 </tr>

 <tr class="border-0">
 <td id="L121" class="blob-num border-0 tmp-px-3 py-0 color-bg-default" data-line-number="121"></td>
 <td id="LC121" class="blob-code border-0 tmp-px-3 py-0 color-bg-default blob-code-inner js-file-line"> } </td>
 </tr>
</tbody>
function checkFileAccess(path: string) {
That said, this isFileServingAllowed check does not actually prevent the API to be abused. Since the API has rerun feature and file write feature, it's possible to run arbitrary script by writing a script as a test file using saveTestFile and running it using rerun. This means exposing the API / Vitest UI is equivalent to giving script execution access.
On the browser mode side, there're readFile / writeFile / saveSnapshotFile. So exposing the browser mode is equivalent to giving file read / write access.

PoC

Run Vitest UI

Get the API token by curl http://localhost:51204/__vitest__/

Run curl "http://localhost:51204/__vitest_attachment__?path=C:\\path\\to\\project\\?\\..\\..\\secret.txt&contentType=text/plain&token=$TOKEN" (TOKEN is the API token)

curl shows the content of secret.txt that is outside the project directory

Mitigations

Vitest now ships two configuration flags, allowWrite and allowExec, that gate the privileged operations exploited by this vulnerability. Both are disabled by default whenever the API server is bound to a non-localhost host, ensuring that exposing the server to the network no longer implicitly grants write or execute capabilities to remote clients.

When these flags are disabled, the UI also enters a read-only mode: in-browser code editing and test file execution are turned off, removing the attack surface that allowed remote code execution. Many Browser Mode features are also disabled, like attachments, artifacts or snapshots. See browser.api.

Users who require the full interactive UI on a networked host must explicitly opt in by setting allowWrite and/or allowExec to true.

Release Notes

Too many releases to show here. View the full release notes.

Commits

See the full diff on Github. The new version differs by more commits than we can show here.

Depfu will automatically keep this PR conflict-free, as long as you don't add any commits to this branch yourself. You can also trigger a rebase manually by commenting with @depfu rebase.

All Depfu comment commands

@depfu rebase
Rebases against your default branch and redoes this update

@depfu recreate
Recreates this PR, overwriting any edits that you've made to it

@depfu merge
Merges this PR once your tests are passing and conflicts are resolved

@depfu cancel merge
Cancels automatic merging of this PR

@depfu close
Closes this PR and deletes the branch

@depfu reopen
Restores the branch and reopens this PR (if it's closed)

@depfu pause
Ignores all future updates for this dependency and closes this PR

@depfu pause [minor|major]
Ignores all future minor/major updates for this dependency and closes this PR

@depfu resume
Future versions of this dependency will create PRs again (leaves this PR as is)

Go to the Depfu Dashboard to see the state of your dependencies and to customize how Depfu works.

codecov · 2026-09-08T22:23:14Z

Codecov Report

✅ All modified and coverable lines are covered by tests.

📢 Thoughts on this report? Let us know!

sonarqubecloud · 2026-09-08T22:23:45Z

Quality Gate passed

Issues
0 New issues
0 Accepted issues

Measures
0 Security Hotspots
0.0% Coverage on New Code
0.0% Duplication on New Code

See analysis details on SonarQube Cloud

Update vitest to version 4.1.11

9c111fc

depfu Bot added the depfu label Sep 8, 2026

depfu Bot mentioned this pull request Sep 8, 2026

🚨 [security] Update vitest 4.0.15 → 4.1.8 (minor) #14

Closed

Navigation Menu

Repository navigation

🚨 [security] Update vitest 4.0.15 → 4.1.11 (minor) - #16

🚨 [security] Update vitest 4.0.15 → 4.1.11 (minor)#16
depfu[bot] wants to merge 1 commit into
developfrom
depfu/update/pnpm/vitest-4.1.11

depfu Bot commented Sep 8, 2026

Uh oh!

codecov Bot commented Sep 8, 2026

Uh oh!

sonarqubecloud Bot commented Sep 8, 2026

Uh oh!

Reviewers

Assignees

Labels

Projects

Milestone

Development

Uh oh!

0 participants

Conversation

depfu Bot commented Sep 8, 2026

What changed?

✳️ vitest (4.0.15 → 4.1.11) · Repo

🚨 Vitest: Path Traversal / Arbitrary File Read via @vitest/mocker Redirect Mock

Summary

Affected code

Registration paths and trust boundaries

Path handling

Scope / preconditions

Impact

Affected versions

Fix

🚨 When Vitest UI server is listening, arbitrary file can be read and executed

Summary

Impact

Details

PoC

Mitigations

Uh oh!

codecov Bot commented Sep 8, 2026

Codecov Report

Uh oh!

sonarqubecloud Bot commented Sep 8, 2026

Quality Gate passed

Uh oh!

Reviewers

Assignees

Labels

Projects

Milestone

Development

Uh oh!

0 participants