[rdkdevpilot]

Automated Fix for Coverity Defects

Triggered by: GomathiShankar PS

Fixed Files

File	Line(s)	CIDs	Checker Types	Description
c_sourcecode/src/scanner/scanner.c	L610, L765	68705, 68698	OVERRUN, STRING_OVERFLOW	Destination buffer too small, Out-of-bounds access
c_sourcecode/src/ratelimit/ratelimit.c	L124, L200	68700, 68701	OVERRUN	Out-of-bounds read

Fix Summaries

c_sourcecode/src/scanner/scanner.c

Both changes correctly address the OVERRUN defect. The first change tightens the bounds check for pnamelen from sizeof(ProcessName) (512) to sizeof(containerName) (256), which is the actual source buffer size and the true upper bound of the pointer-difference calculation. The second change replaces an unsafe strcpy with a bounded strncpy plus explicit null termination to prevent potential buffer overrun when copying newfull into fullpath. Neither change introduces new defects or breaks existing logic.

c_sourcecode/src/ratelimit/ratelimit.c

The fix correctly addresses the out-of-bounds read defect by reordering the loop conditions in both for-loops. In the original code, first_line_data[i] and buf[i] were accessed before the bounds check i < sizeof(...), which could result in an out-of-bounds read if the buffer was not null-terminated within bounds. By moving the bounds check i < sizeof(first_line_data) and i < sizeof(buf) to be evaluated first (short-circuit evaluation), the fix ensures the index is valid before accessing the array element. The change is minimal (only the condition ordering is changed), preserves all existing logic, introduces no new defects, and correctly resolves the Coverity OVERRUN defect. Both buffers are stack-allocated with known sizes, so sizeof() is appropriate here.

[Copilot]

🟡 Changes recommended

The renamed-path copy can write beyond smaller caller-owned buffers because it assumes a 512-byte destination.

1 open issue

• Prevent fullpath buffer overflow during rename updates · New

What changed in this PR

This PR addresses Coverity buffer-bound findings in crash scanning and upload rate-limit validation.

Changes:

• Bounds the process-name copy using the source buffer size.
• Replaces the renamed-path strcpy with a fixed-limit copy and explicit terminator.
• Checks array bounds before reading characters in two rate-limit validation loops.

File	Description
c_sourcecode/​src/​scanner/​scanner.c	Adjusts process-name bounds and renamed-path copying.
c_sourcecode/​src/​ratelimit/​ratelimit.c	Moves bounds checks ahead of array access.

_{Review effort: Balanced}

[Copilot]

🟢 Approval recommended

The bounds fixes and corresponding API updates are consistent, with no unresolved blocking issues identified.

No open issues 🎉

1 resolved since last review

• Prevent fullpath buffer overflow during rename updates

_{Review effort: Balanced}