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fix: prevent timing attack in webhook signature verification #473

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fix: prevent timing attack in webhook signature verification #473

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20 changes: 16 additions & 4 deletions lib/utils/razorpay-utils.js
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Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -95,11 +95,23 @@ function validateWebhookSignature (body, signature, secret) {

body = body.toString();

var expectedSignature = crypto.createHmac('sha256', secret)
.update(body)
.digest('hex');
// Compute HMAC as raw bytes (32 bytes for SHA-256)
var expectedBuffer = crypto.createHmac('sha256', secret)
.update(body)
.digest();

// Decode incoming hex signature to raw bytes
// Note: Buffer.from(hex) returns empty/partial Buffer on invalid hex (no throw),
// which is caught by the length check below
var signatureBuffer = Buffer.from(signature, 'hex');

// Both should be 32 bytes (SHA-256 output)
if (expectedBuffer.length !== signatureBuffer.length) {
return false;
}

return expectedSignature === signature;
// Constant-time comparison to prevent timing attacks
return crypto.timingSafeEqual(expectedBuffer, signatureBuffer);
}

function validatePaymentVerification(params={}, signature, secret){
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