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feat(daemon): record which MCP grant's caller acted (principal:v1) - #2098
The MCP HTTP adapter (rig mcp serve --http) already checks each caller's grant and gives every request its own daemon client, stamped with that grant's seat. The daemon has so far known only the seat. This PR has the adapter also tell the daemon whose grant it checked, and has the daemon record it on the rows that caller's actions write.
On the wire:
The per-request client sends X-OpenRig-Principal as JSON: {source, id, grant?, version?}.
A token-file grant is {"source": "file", "id": <grant name>}. No grant id or version is invented for it.
The value is never a credential or a stored verifier.
The header is sent only beside a seat the client was built for, and never to a remote daemon.
A caller's own X-OpenRig-Principal sent to the adapter goes no further.
In the daemon:
Migration 140 adds a nullable identity_principal column to the four stores migration 067 stamps (queue_transitions, inbox_entries, outbox_entries, stream_items) and to queue_transitions_archive, as 082 did for the stamp.
resolveRecordedIdentity records identity_provenance = principal:v1 plus the normalized principal only when all of these hold:
resolveRecordedProvenance says transport:v1: the seat came from this hop's transport header, not relayed, not of unknown origin, not claimed;
the TCP peer is loopback;
the header is exactly the closed shape: no extra fields, size-bounded.
Otherwise a row records exactly what it records today, with no principal. Nothing can strengthen a relayed, unknown-origin or claimed actor.
Where it's recorded: on the transitions of the request's own action (create, claim, update, unclaim, and a local handoff's close and successor) and on a send's outbox record.
What an action sets off elsewhere (wake intents, parked rows released, blockers moved) carries the seat's transport:v1.
Every other route records what it always has.
A cross-host handoff's body is unchanged, so the principal never leaves this host.
Writer guards: a writer given principal:v1 without a principal, or a schema without the column, records transport:v1. Retention moves a row's principal into the archive with it.
No backfill: earlier rows keep null.
Round 1 (fa1788e1):
A loopback peer isn't proof the caller is local. The daemon now takes the principal header only from a loopback peer that carries no forwarding header: Forwarded, X-Forwarded-For/-Host/-Proto, X-Real-IP or Via.
The client sends the header only to this host's own daemon. It uses the locality it already establishes for the sender header: no direct endpoint configured, or an endpoint that answers with this host's own instance id. A forwarded or remote OPENRIG_URL never receives it.
A send's principal is decided before the send and handed to the transport. A send the typing guard holds or retains now keeps it on the outbox row it writes, and a committed wake keeps its own attribution.
Round 2 (caa195f2):
The endpoint itself must prove it's this host's daemon. The client sends the header only when the endpoint answers /healthz with this host's own instance id, however the endpoint was chosen: OPENRIG_URL, or an explicit URL such as rig mcp serve --port, which can be a forwarded port. Round 1 also trusted the case with no OPENRIG_URL, which --port bypassed.
A draft-aware send keeps the principal on the outbox row it writes, as guarded and retained sends do since round 1.
Main merge, after #2096 (0e5a56a8, then 1c9ba7ba):
1c9ba7ba gives a Cloud grant its principal: the request path hands the daemon client what Cloud answered for the key, so a Cloud customer's rows record principal:v1 under the same locality and shape checks.
b893c29f sends a principal beyond Latin-1 as JSON escapes. A token-file grant's name may be any non-blank string, and fetch refuses a header value with a character past U+00FF, so until this commit a grant named in, say, Chinese failed every daemon request. The client now writes everything past ASCII in X-OpenRig-Principal as JSON's \u escapes, and the daemon's JSON.parse reads them back unchanged. Cloud's ids are ASCII by its grant contract.
with the hookup: the CLI tsc is clean, and 4 CLI files (73 tests) pass.
What it means: the trusted local adapter checked a grant and supplied this principal. It's attribution, not daemon authentication or a new credential. A process on the daemon's host can set the header, as it can set X-OpenRig-Session today. A remote MCP caller can't: the adapter builds every daemon request from its own checked grant, and a non-loopback peer never gets principal:v1.
Limits
A forwarder that adds no forwarding header can't be told apart from a local client on loopback. The daemon's port is meant to stay on loopback and unproxied.
The broadcast route keeps today's stamp: no principal.
One /healthz read per principal-bearing request: the client checks the endpoint's id before each such request, bounded at one second. It isn't cached.
Compatibility and rollback (traced at 0.7.2, 8b180689)
Opening the database: 0.7.2's migrate() applies only the migrations it's missing and ignores applied names it doesn't know, so a rolled-back daemon opens a database that has 140 without error.
Old readers:
Its readers project explicit columns, or map known fields from SELECT *, so the new column is ignored.
rowToTransition passes identity_provenance through as a string, so principal:v1 reaches readers as an unrecognized string, not a recognized value.
Its value comparisons:
queue-repository tests only for null;
workflow-runtime's known check compares the request's own derived value;
project-classifier.ts:408 rejects unknown provenance only for the classification request's own value from resolveRecordedProvenance (projects.ts:220). After a rollback that can only be one of the four old values, and stored classifications are read back without validation (:382).
In this PR the projects and workflow routes still use resolveRecordedProvenance, so they never see principal:v1.
Forwarding: stored provenance is never forwarded. Only mission control carries X-OpenRig-Provenance, from the request's own derivation.
The one loss on rollback: 0.7.2's retention copies identity_provenance but not identity_principal, so a row archived by a rolled-back daemon keeps principal:v1 and loses its principal. That's less detail, never a stronger claim and never an error.
Tests
packages/daemon/test/identity-principal.test.ts, 7 cases (round 1 adds forwarded requests, a retained send, and the send route's handoff to the transport):
The recording decision: loopback over v4, v4-mapped v6 and v6 records it. A remote peer, no socket, a relayed hop, an unknown origin, a claimed actor and no header don't.
The closed shape: extra fields, wrong types and oversize are refused.
The writer guards, including a schema from before 140.
Archival and history read-back.
Routes over a real socket:
create, claim, update, unclaim and handoff (source close and successor) carry it;
the handoff's wake intents don't;
relayed, unknown-origin and malformed requests get today's stamps.
packages/cli/test/client-principal-locality.test.ts (rounds 1 and 2, and b893c29f's case: a name beyond Latin-1 builds real fetch headers and parses back): the header goes to an endpoint that answers with this host's own id, configured or not, and never to a forwarded endpoint (another instance's id, or none) or a remote target.
packages/daemon/test/draft-aware-delivery.test.ts (round 2): a draft-aware send keeps the principal on its outbox row.
packages/cli/test/mcp-http-cloud-daemon.test.ts, 1 new case: a Cloud customer's create records principal:v1 with its Cloud principal, grant id and version. It fails on the merge commit alone (the row records transport:v1).
packages/cli/test/mcp-http-daemon.test.ts, 1 case: four concurrent creates by two token-file grants each carry their own principal, and a caller's forged header doesn't reach the daemon. Since round 2 the test daemon proves it's this host's own (its minted id is the one /healthz answers with).
Fail-before:
dropping the loopback check fails the decision test, and so does ignoring the provenance gate;
not sending the adapter's principal fails the CLI case;
with the side-effect rule removed, the writer guard alone still stores transport:v1. That's by design, two layers;
round 2: round 1's client sends the header to a --port endpoint that isn't this host's, and round 1's draft-aware writer drops the principal. Both fail, and pass with the fix (daemon 2 files, 99 tests; CLI 5 files, 57 tests; both tsc --noEmit clean).
Run locally: 19 daemon suites (306 tests), including every suite that asserts provenance with exact equality. Also 5 CLI suites (112 tests), the daemon build, the CLI tsc --noEmit and the docs guard.
Updated:archive-identity-provenance.test.ts (an old archive row now also gets identity_principal: null), and the shared test fixture declares 140 as an exclusion, like 067.
Queue transitions and message records can include the identity of a supported file- or cloud-authorized caller when requests arrive through an eligible local connection.
Caller identity details are retained in archived queue history and message delivery records.
Bug Fixes
Caller identity is recorded only when it is valid and the connection meets the required local-connection checks; other requests retain existing provenance behavior.
Existing records remain without caller identity details after the update.
The MCP HTTP adapter already checks each caller's grant and gives the
request its own daemon client. It now also tells the daemon whose grant it
checked, in X-OpenRig-Principal: the source (a token-file grant by name, or
an OpenRig Cloud grant by principal id with its grant id and version) and
never a credential. The daemon records it beside the P21 stamp, as
identity_provenance principal:v1 plus a new nullable identity_principal
column, on the stores migration 067 stamps (and the transitions archive).
It's attribution supplied by the trusted local adapter, not daemon
authentication. A row records it only when the request is direct and
attributed (the seat came from the transport header: not relayed, not of
unknown origin, not claimed), its peer is loopback, and the header is
exactly the closed shape. Otherwise every row records exactly what it did
before, and nothing can strengthen a relayed or claimed actor. It's
recorded on the transitions of the request's own action (create, claim,
update, unclaim, a local handoff's close and successor) and on a send's
outbox record; what that action sets off elsewhere (wake intents, parked
rows released, blockers moved) carries the seat's transport:v1, and every
other route records what it always did. Earlier rows are not backfilled.
A writer given principal:v1 without a principal, or a schema without the
column, records transport:v1 instead, and retention archives a row's
principal with it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Walkthrough
MCP grant identities now pass to eligible local daemon requests. The daemon validates principal headers and records accepted principals on queue transitions and outbox entries. Migration 140 adds nullable principal columns to five tables and enables principal history and archive handling.
Changes: Principal identity recording
Layer / File(s)
Summary
Principal input and validation packages/cli/src/client.ts, packages/cli/src/mcp-http.ts, packages/daemon/src/routes/require-sender-identity.ts
MCP file-token and Cloud grant requests provide a principal to the client. The client sends the principal header only when a principal, explicit session name, and locally verified endpoint are present. The daemon validates the header and records a principal only for eligible loopback requests.
Principal persistence and history packages/daemon/src/db/migrations/140_identity_principal.ts, packages/daemon/src/db/all-migrations.ts, packages/daemon/src/domain/queue-transition-log.ts, packages/daemon/src/domain/queue-repository.ts, packages/daemon/src/domain/outbox-handler.ts, packages/daemon/src/domain/queue-retention.ts
Migration 140 adds nullable principal columns to five tables. Queue transitions and outbox records store principals with principal:v1 provenance when supported. Missing principals or unsupported columns cause provenance to fall back to transport:v1. Queue side effects map principal provenance to transport provenance, and archive/history paths include the principal field.
Queue and send route integration packages/daemon/src/routes/queue.ts, packages/daemon/src/routes/transport.ts, packages/daemon/src/domain/session-transport.ts, packages/daemon/src/domain/draft-aware-delivery.ts
Queue operations and attributed sends pass resolved identity data to persistence and retained outbox records.
Principal recording tests packages/cli/test/client-principal-locality.test.ts, packages/cli/test/mcp-http-daemon.test.ts, packages/cli/test/mcp-http-cloud-daemon.test.ts, packages/daemon/test/identity-principal.test.ts, packages/daemon/test/archive-identity-provenance.test.ts, packages/daemon/test/helpers/test-app.ts, packages/daemon/test/draft-aware-delivery.test.ts
Tests cover principal locality, file and Cloud grant requests, parsing and recording, provenance fallback, queue operations, retained delivery, and archive history.
sequenceDiagram
participant McpHttp
participant DaemonClient
participant QueueRoute
participant IdentityResolver
participant QueueRepository
participant Database
McpHttp->>DaemonClient: pass authenticated caller principal
DaemonClient->>QueueRoute: send local request with principal header
QueueRoute->>IdentityResolver: resolve recorded identity
IdentityResolver-->>QueueRoute: return provenance and principal
QueueRoute->>QueueRepository: pass identity fields
QueueRepository->>Database: write transition provenance and principal
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Suggested reviewers:openrig-review
Merge Risk: Moderate · up to b893c
Principal attribution should not be trusted for merge until caller-supplied headers, endpoint changes between requests, and broadcast-send provenance are checked against the current implementation.
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The title clearly and concisely describes the main change: recording the MCP grant caller as principal:v1 in the daemon.
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Actionable comments posted: 1
🪄 Fix comments: Fix CodeRabbit comments on this PR
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Inline comments:
Review comments at @packages/cli/src/client.ts:
- Around line 194-195: Update the principal header construction to JSON-escape
non-ASCII characters so the header value remains valid for fetch and the daemon
can restore the principal. Keep the existing conditions for adding the header,
and ensure the escaped value stays within the daemon’s header-size limit so
attribution is not silently dropped.
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…send row
A loopback peer isn't proof the caller is local: a same-host reverse proxy
delivers remote callers from loopback, and OPENRIG_URL can be a loopback
port forwarded to another instance. So:
- the daemon takes the principal header only from a loopback peer that
carries no forwarding header (Forwarded, X-Forwarded-For/-Host/-Proto,
X-Real-IP, Via);
- the client sends it only to this host's own daemon, by the locality it
already establishes for the sender header: no direct endpoint configured,
or an endpoint that answers with this host's own instance id. A forwarded
or remote endpoint never receives it.
A send's principal is now decided before the send and handed to the
transport, so a send the typing guard holds or retains keeps it on the
outbox row it writes, as the audit record after an ordinary send already
did. A committed wake keeps its own attribution.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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⚠️ Outside diff range comments (1)
Major · Apply recorded principal identity to broadcast sends. · transport.ts:376
packages/daemon/src/routes/transport.ts:376 🗄️ Data Integrity & Integration | 🟠 Major | ⚡ Quick win
Apply recorded principal identity to broadcast sends.
When a direct loopback /broadcast request has an eligible principal, this route still passes transport:v1 to transport.broadcast(). Its per-recipient outbox records also use transport:v1 at Line 398. The broadcast therefore loses principal attribution while /send records it. Resolve the broadcast request’s identity once and use it for both the transport options and each outbox record.
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Review comment at @packages/daemon/src/routes/transport.ts at line 376:
Resolve the broadcast request’s identity provenance once in the `/broadcast`
route, then reuse it for both the options passed to `transport.broadcast()` and
each per-recipient outbox record; eligible principals must retain their recorded
identity instead of being attributed as `transport:v1`.
🔇 Additional comments: 1
packages/cli/src/client.ts-206-206: 1
206-206: Major · Data Integrity & Integration · Heavy lift
⚠️Unverified finding
Verification ran but could not confirm this finding. It is shown for review, not as a verified issue.
Probe locality for an explicit constructor URL.
If OPENRIG_URL is unset, senderHeaders() reports local: true without checking this.baseUrl. An embedder can construct DaemonClient with a remote or forwarded URL and a principal, so the client sends the principal to an endpoint that has not been identified as this host’s daemon. Treat an explicit constructor URL as a direct endpoint and require the same instance-ID check before sending the principal.
🪄 Fix comments: Fix CodeRabbit comments on this PR
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Inline comments:
Review comments at @packages/cli/src/client.ts:
- Line 195: Update fetch() to remove any caller-supplied X-OpenRig-Principal
header case-insensitively before adding headers from identityHeaders(),
including when identityHeaders() provides no principal override. Preserve the
remaining per-call headers.
---
Outside diff comments:
Review comments at @packages/daemon/src/routes/transport.ts:
- Line 376: Resolve the broadcast request’s identity provenance once in the
`/broadcast` route, then reuse it for both the options passed to
`transport.broadcast()` and each per-recipient outbox record; eligible
principals must retain their recorded identity instead of being attributed as
`transport:v1`.
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Major · Data Integrity & Integration · Quick win
Remove caller-supplied principal headers before sending.
When a client has a session but no configured principal, identityHeaders() returns no principal override. fetch() then retains X-OpenRig-Principal from per-call headers. On a direct loopback request, the daemon can record that caller-supplied value as principal:v1. Remove this header case-insensitively from request headers before adding the client-derived identity headers.
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only still-valid issues, skip the rest with a brief reason, keep changes
minimal, and validate.
Review comment at @packages/cli/src/client.ts at line 195:
Update fetch() to remove any caller-supplied X-OpenRig-Principal header
case-insensitively before adding headers from identityHeaders(), including when
identityHeaders() provides no principal override. Preserve the remaining
per-call headers.
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…t-aware rows keep it
The client sent the principal to any endpoint it took as local when no
OPENRIG_URL was set, including an explicit URL such as rig mcp serve --port
<port>, which can be a forwarded port reaching another instance. Every send
of the principal now needs the endpoint itself to answer /healthz with the
id this host's own daemon minted, however the endpoint was chosen. The
probe is the one the sender header already used for OPENRIG_URL, factored
out.
The draft-aware writer's fresh outbox row now carries the principal too,
like the transport's own retained rows; its committed-row branch keeps the
prior row as before.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Inline comments:
Review comments at @packages/cli/src/client.ts:
- Around line 196-197: Update the principal-header flow around this.identity and
endpointIsThisHost so locality is checked for every request that would carry
X-OpenRig-Principal, rather than reusing a cached principal header. Omit the
header whenever the current endpoint’s instance ID no longer matches.
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Major · Data Integrity & Integration · Quick win
Recheck locality before each request that carries a principal.
The first request caches these headers in this.identity. If the same URL later reaches a forwarded daemon, a second request sends the cached principal without checking /healthz again. A forwarded daemon that receives the request from loopback without forwarding headers can record the wrong principal attribution. Recheck the endpoint before each principal-bearing request, and omit the principal when the instance ID no longer matches.
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Review comment at @packages/cli/src/client.ts around lines 196 - 197:
Update the principal-header flow around this.identity and endpointIsThisHost so
locality is checked for every request that would carry X-OpenRig-Principal,
rather than reusing a cached principal header. Omit the header whenever the
current endpoint’s instance ID no longer matches.
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Resolution only, in packages/cli/src/mcp-http.ts, keeping both sides:
- the principal type beside the Cloud grant contract;
- clientFactory takes the principal, and the cloudGrants option stays;
- the request path is main's Cloud/token-file split, with the principal
declared and set by a token-file grant as before.
A Cloud grant gets no principal in this commit; that hookup follows on its own.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
A Cloud-granted request now hands the daemon client the principal Cloud
answered for its key: {source: "cloud", id, grant, version}, beside a
token-file grant's {source: "file", id}. The daemon records it as
principal:v1 only under its existing locality and shape checks. A version
that isn't a number is left out rather than spoil the principal.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
A token-file grant's name may be any non-blank string, and fetch refuses a
header value with a character past U+00FF, so a grant named in, say,
Chinese failed every daemon request once the principal header was added.
The client now writes everything past ASCII in X-OpenRig-Principal as
JSON's own \u escapes, which the daemon's JSON.parse reads back unchanged.
The Cloud hookup's comment no longer overstates what the daemon refuses.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…nance
No conflicts. #2095 also edits packages/cli/test/mcp-http-daemon.test.ts; this
merge runs both changes to that file together for the first time.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Approved at b3b597d. The daemon records which MCP grant's caller acted: an rig mcp serve --http request's checked principal (a token-file grant's name, or a Cloud customer's id, grant id and version) is kept as identity_provenance principal:v1 beside the rows it writes, only when the endpoint is proven to be this host's own daemon and only on direct hops. Claude (dev60-review) and Codex (review-r2) halves CLEAR through round 2; review-r2 also cleared the Cloud principal hookup and the header escaping that keeps non-Latin token-file names working. b3b597d only merges main into the reviewed head. Required CI passes at this head.
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What this does
The MCP HTTP adapter (
rig mcp serve --http) already checks each caller's grant and gives every request its own daemon client, stamped with that grant's seat. The daemon has so far known only the seat. This PR has the adapter also tell the daemon whose grant it checked, and has the daemon record it on the rows that caller's actions write.On the wire:
X-OpenRig-Principalas JSON:{source, id, grant?, version?}.{"source": "file", "id": <grant name>}. No grant id or version is invented for it.{"source": "cloud", "id": <Cloud's principal id>, "grant": <grant id>, "version": <grant version>}. A version that isn't a number is left out.X-OpenRig-Principalsent to the adapter goes no further.In the daemon:
identity_principalcolumn to the four stores migration 067 stamps (queue_transitions,inbox_entries,outbox_entries,stream_items) and toqueue_transitions_archive, as 082 did for the stamp.resolveRecordedIdentityrecordsidentity_provenance = principal:v1plus the normalized principal only when all of these hold:resolveRecordedProvenancesaystransport:v1: the seat came from this hop's transport header, not relayed, not of unknown origin, not claimed;transport:v1.principal:v1without a principal, or a schema without the column, recordstransport:v1. Retention moves a row's principal into the archive with it.Round 1 (
fa1788e1):Forwarded,X-Forwarded-For/-Host/-Proto,X-Real-IPorVia.OPENRIG_URLnever receives it.Round 2 (
caa195f2):/healthzwith this host's own instance id, however the endpoint was chosen:OPENRIG_URL, or an explicit URL such asrig mcp serve --port, which can be a forwarded port. Round 1 also trusted the case with noOPENRIG_URL, which--portbypassed.Main merge, after #2096 (
0e5a56a8, then1c9ba7ba):0e5a56a8merges main (7d4946e9, feat(mcp): grants from an external grant service for rig mcp serve --http #2096) into this branch. The only conflict waspackages/cli/src/mcp-http.ts, resolved to keep both sides: the principal type beside the Cloud grant contract,clientFactorywith the principal beside thecloudGrantsoption, and feat(mcp): grants from an external grant service for rig mcp serve --http #2096's Cloud/token-file request path with the token-file principal set as before.1c9ba7bagives a Cloud grant its principal: the request path hands the daemon client what Cloud answered for the key, so a Cloud customer's rows recordprincipal:v1under the same locality and shape checks.b893c29fsends a principal beyond Latin-1 as JSON escapes. A token-file grant's name may be any non-blank string, andfetchrefuses a header value with a character past U+00FF, so until this commit a grant named in, say, Chinese failed every daemon request. The client now writes everything past ASCII inX-OpenRig-Principalas JSON's\uescapes, and the daemon'sJSON.parsereads them back unchanged. Cloud's ids are ASCII by its grant contract.tsc --noEmitare clean, and 5 CLI files (80 tests, feat(mcp): grants from an external grant service for rig mcp serve --http #2096's Cloud suite included) and 3 daemon files (104 tests) pass;tscis clean, and 4 CLI files (73 tests) pass.What it means: the trusted local adapter checked a grant and supplied this principal. It's attribution, not daemon authentication or a new credential. A process on the daemon's host can set the header, as it can set
X-OpenRig-Sessiontoday. A remote MCP caller can't: the adapter builds every daemon request from its own checked grant, and a non-loopback peer never getsprincipal:v1.Limits
/healthzread per principal-bearing request: the client checks the endpoint's id before each such request, bounded at one second. It isn't cached.Compatibility and rollback (traced at 0.7.2,
8b180689)migrate()applies only the migrations it's missing and ignores applied names it doesn't know, so a rolled-back daemon opens a database that has 140 without error.SELECT *, so the new column is ignored.rowToTransitionpassesidentity_provenancethrough as a string, soprincipal:v1reaches readers as an unrecognized string, not a recognized value.queue-repositorytests only for null;workflow-runtime'sknowncheck compares the request's own derived value;project-classifier.ts:408rejects unknown provenance only for the classification request's own value fromresolveRecordedProvenance(projects.ts:220). After a rollback that can only be one of the four old values, and stored classifications are read back without validation (:382).resolveRecordedProvenance, so they never seeprincipal:v1.X-OpenRig-Provenance, from the request's own derivation.identity_provenancebut notidentity_principal, so a row archived by a rolled-back daemon keepsprincipal:v1and loses its principal. That's less detail, never a stronger claim and never an error.Tests
packages/daemon/test/identity-principal.test.ts, 7 cases (round 1 adds forwarded requests, a retained send, and the send route's handoff to the transport):packages/cli/test/client-principal-locality.test.ts(rounds 1 and 2, andb893c29f's case: a name beyond Latin-1 builds realfetchheaders and parses back): the header goes to an endpoint that answers with this host's own id, configured or not, and never to a forwarded endpoint (another instance's id, or none) or a remote target.packages/daemon/test/draft-aware-delivery.test.ts(round 2): a draft-aware send keeps the principal on its outbox row.packages/cli/test/mcp-http-cloud-daemon.test.ts, 1 new case: a Cloud customer's create recordsprincipal:v1with its Cloud principal, grant id and version. It fails on the merge commit alone (the row recordstransport:v1).packages/cli/test/mcp-http-daemon.test.ts, 1 case: four concurrent creates by two token-file grants each carry their own principal, and a caller's forged header doesn't reach the daemon. Since round 2 the test daemon proves it's this host's own (its minted id is the one/healthzanswers with).transport:v1. That's by design, two layers;--portendpoint that isn't this host's, and round 1's draft-aware writer drops the principal. Both fail, and pass with the fix (daemon 2 files, 99 tests; CLI 5 files, 57 tests; bothtsc --noEmitclean).tsc --noEmitand the docs guard.archive-identity-provenance.test.ts(an old archive row now also getsidentity_principal: null), and the shared test fixture declares 140 as an exclusion, like 067.Cost
principal:v1, on the five tables above only.🤖 Generated with Claude Code
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