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`reencrypt_credentials` and `reencrypt_search_tools` read every row holding a secret, decrypt it and re-encrypt it, and nothing pinned the write to what the loop had seen. A PATCH committing in that window was overwritten with a re-encryption of the value it replaced — a lost update on a credential, and a silent one (mozilla-ai#1127). Each row is now written with a conditional UPDATE matching the ciphertext that was read. Zero rows matched means someone else got there first, and the row is counted as skipped instead of clobbered. A Core UPDATE rather than a mutation on the loaded row, because the WHERE is the entire point and an ORM flush carries no condition at all. Skipped is reported rather than retried, and the count is additive on both response models. A rotation is hand-run with the operator watching, and a row whose value changed under them is already encrypted with the primary key by whoever wrote it — so the honest answer is "these were not mine to rewrite", not a loop that races the same edit again. Silently folding them into `reencrypted` would tell the operator the rotation was complete when it was not, which matters because the next step of the documented procedure is removing the old key. Both stores change together. Three stores with two shapes is worse than three with one, because the next person copies whichever they find first. The racing cells use a second real connection to the same SQLite database in WAL mode rather than a stand-in: the property under test is what the WHERE clause sees once someone else has committed, and a mock of "the row changed" would pass just as well against the bug. The competing commit is fired from inside the service's own `encrypt_secret`, which is precisely the window — the row has been read and decrypted, and its UPDATE has not run yet. This is the re-encryption half of mozilla-ai#1127 only. The transaction-ownership half is a convention-versus-code decision across all three stores and belongs to the maintainers, not to this PR.
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Included review availability: Your plan provides up to 2 included reviews per hour; 0 remain after this review. WalkthroughChangesThe rotation routes now report skipped rows. Provider and search-tool cache refreshes reload current database values. New tests cover concurrent updates, cache refresh, plaintext preservation, and undecryptable rows. ChangesCredential rotation
Priority: ⬇️ Low Estimated code review effort: 3 (Moderate) | ~25 minutes Change: Bug fix Suggested reviewers: Merge Risk: ⚪ Minimal · up to The rotation and cache-refresh changes have no remaining actionable issue in this review. 🚥 Pre-merge checks | ✅ 4 | ❌ 1❌ Failed checks (1 warning)
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✨ Finishing Touches🧪 Generate unit tests (beta)
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In `@src/gateway/services/provider_store_service.py`:
- Line 305: Ensure post-commit cache refreshes cannot reuse stale ORM objects
when synchronize_session=False and expire_on_commit is disabled: expire the
loaded provider state before refresh_provider_cache and apply the equivalent
protection before refresh_search_tool_cache, or make both refresh queries use
populate_existing. Preserve the existing update behavior while ensuring caches
reflect the committed database state.
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The rotation endpoint re-encrypts, commits and refreshes the overlay on the same session, and the session factory sets `expire_on_commit=False`. A row the identity map still holds is therefore handed back with the values it was loaded with — for a row a concurrent PATCH changed, that is the credential the PATCH replaced, coming back into the runtime cache while the database correctly keeps the new one. Nothing holds those rows alive that long today: the rotation's own list dies when it returns and the identity map is weak, so the reload happens by collection timing rather than by rule. `populate_existing` makes it a rule. Measured directly: holding the pre-race rows across the refresh serves the old ciphertext, releasing them serves the new one. The end-to-end cell asserts the route's outcome and says in its docstring that it passes either way, because a cell that reached into the rotation's locals to force the stale path would be testing the collector, not the service.
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Description
Rotating
OTARI_SECRET_KEYcould quietly destroy a credential someone changed while the rotation was running.reencrypt_credentialsandreencrypt_search_toolsread every row holding a secret, decrypt it, and re-encrypt it — and nothing pinned the write to the value the loop had read. A PATCH committing in that window was overwritten with a re-encryption of the value it replaced. The operator sees a successful rotation, the edit is gone, and nothing anywhere says so.Each row is now written with a conditional UPDATE matching the ciphertext that was read. Zero rows matched means someone else got there first, and that row is reported as skipped rather than clobbered.
Three things worth a reviewer's attention, because they are decisions:
reencryptedwould tell the operator the rotation was complete when it was not — which matters, because the next step of the documented procedure is removing the old key.skippedis additive on both response models with a default of0, so an existing client is unaffected. The OpenAPI spec is regenerated in this PR.How to test it locally
6 pass. The two racing cells use a second real connection to the same SQLite database in WAL mode, not a stand-in: the property under test is what the WHERE clause sees once someone else has committed, and a mock of "the row changed" would pass just as well against the bug. The competing commit is fired from inside the service's own
encrypt_secret, which is exactly the window — the row has been read and decrypted, and its UPDATE has not run yet.Each racing cell asserts both halves: the counts come back
(0, 0, 1), and the value left in the database decrypts to the competing edit's plaintext rather than the rotation's. Around them: an untouched row is re-encrypted, an undecryptable row is still left alone and counted unreadable, and one cell decrypts after a successful rotation to prove the ciphertext actually changed while the plaintext did not — a re-encryption that lost the value would pass every count-only assertion.Mutation-checked, all three caught:
PR Type
Relevant issues
Addresses the re-encryption half of #1127. The transaction-ownership half is deliberately not here: whether the three services should own their commits or whether the convention should record the current shape as an intentional exception is a maintainer's call, and answering it would mean rewriting how three routes turn an
IntegrityErrorinto a 409. Happy to do that once you have decided which way it goes.Raised in review on #1120: #1120 (comment)
Checklist
tests/unit,tests/integration).make lint,make typecheck,make test).ruff check src/gateway tests/unit/test_reencrypt_version_check.py— clean;scripts/check_architecture.py— no violations.mypyon the four changed source files — clean.pytest tests/unit— 3152 passed, 29 failed, and the 29 are the same ones that fail on an untouched tree (test_router_aggregate,test_mcp_loop_responses,test_deployment_bootstrap,test_usage_cache_tokensand friends); I diffed the two failure lists and no new failure appears. Two further files (test_inline_platform_cost.py,test_s3_file_store.py) fail to collect in my environment on a pydanticInputTokensDetailsfield. Environmental — but I would rather show the number than claim a green run I did not get.uv run python scripts/generate_openapi.py) — the diff is the twoskippedfields, nothing else.AI Usage
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Summary
skippedcounts to both API responses and updated the OpenAPI specification.Technical notes
Both stores use conditional updates that match the original ciphertext. A non-matching update is skipped instead of retried or counted as re-encrypted.