🔒 Fix Integer Overflow and DoS in ImageData.Read - #88
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- Add check for positive dimensions - Ensure total calculated pixels size does not exceed 1 GB footprint - Prevent out-of-bounds/memory exhaustion DoS when parsing crafted files Co-authored-by: johnstrand <11484777+johnstrand@users.noreply.github.com>
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ImageData.Readwhere unchecked dimension inputs (widthandheight) could lead to excessive memory allocation or integer overflow when calculating array sizes. Added validation for positive dimensions and a 1GB memory limit. Added unit tests for these cases.width * heightto overflow into a small integer (bypassing size constraints leading to OOB access/crashes) or result in arbitrary large memory allocations (causing a Denial of Service via Out-Of-Memory exceptions).widthandheightare strictly greater than zero. Evaluated total pixel count (width * height) in a 64-bit integer (long) to prevent 32-bit overflow, and asserted that it does not exceed67,108,864(1GB footprint at 16 bytes per Vector4 pixel). ThrowsInvalidDataExceptionwhen constraints are violated.PR created automatically by Jules for task 6442766256719529994 started by @johnstrand