fix-forward #2633: identity-only auth ignores the token rotation cutoff (tsk-sonaie) - #2799
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…sonaie) check_agent_identity verified the signature and the registry status but not token_min_iat, the cutoff that check_agent_scope and check_agent_scope_for_project both enforce. It is the ONLY auth on the surfaces that need no scope grant, so rotate-tokens -- the single lever for killing a leaked agent token without deleting the identity -- did not actually revoke anything on them: creating a scope request, the agent decisions routes, container-provisioning requests and the auth-request flow all still accepted a superseded token. Measured before the fix: a rotated token POSTing to .../scope-requests returned 200 and left a live pending row behind, on the one route whose whole purpose is asking for MORE privilege. Second symptom, same cause: the middleware's unknown-route branch asks check_agent_identity whether the caller is live before answering the wrong-URL 404, so a rotated token on an unrouted path was told its URL was wrong rather than that its credential was dead. Also fixes the test double that hid this. _request() in test_auth_middleware built req.headers as a plain dict, but a real Request's headers are case-insensitive: the middleware reads "authorization" while check_agent_identity reads "Authorization", so on a dict the real credential check saw no header and returned None. Every arm in that module had to patch check_agent_identity to observe anything. It now builds starlette Headers, and the two new arms run the real liveness chain unpatched -- one rotated (401) and one live (404), so narrowing cannot silently become removal.
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📝 WalkthroughWalkthroughChangesIdentity token rotation enforcement
Estimated code review effort: 3 (Moderate) | ~20 minutes Merge Risk: ⚪ Minimal · up to Token rotation now prevents superseded identity-only tokens from accessing protected flows while preserving the scope-request route’s existing credential-hiding response behavior. No actionable current-head merge risk remains. Suggested reviewers: 🚥 Pre-merge checks | ✅ 4 | ❌ 1❌ Failed checks (1 warning)
✅ Passed checks (4 passed)
Full details: Docstring CoverageExplanation Docstring coverage is 75.86% which is insufficient. The required threshold is 80.00%. Docstring coverage is scoped to functions touched by this diff. Analyzed 29 functions across 4 files. (2 skipped: 2 unsupported.)
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Code Review SummaryStatus: 2 Issues Found | Recommendation: Address before merge Overview
Issue Details (click to expand)WARNING
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Files Reviewed (6 files)
Fix these issues in Kilo Cloud Reviewed by minimax-m3:free · Input: 42.3K · Output: 10K · Cached: 539.9K |
Docs-Reviewed: merge only, no new installer behavior introduced by this branch
… document the iat/token_min_iat zero-default policy kilo-code-bot found the token_min_iat check copy-pasted into _verify_agent_scope, check_agent_identity, and check_agent_project_grants -- any future change to the cutoff semantics had to be applied in three places or one would silently disagree. Extracted _enforce_rotation_cutoff and pointed all three call sites at it, plus documented why a missing token_min_iat or iat defaults to 0 instead of being rejected outright. Docs-Reviewed: pure internal refactor, no behavior/agent-facing change -- the rotation-cutoff semantics documented in docs/agent-coordination.md are unchanged, only the implementation is now a single shared helper
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Fold pass 2026-09-06Merged Conflicts resolved (both intents kept):
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Inline comments:
In `@docs/agent-coordination.md`:
- Around line 759-760: Update the documentation around check_agent_identity to
state that rotation-superseded or dead credentials receive HTTP 401, replacing
the incorrect 404 reference while preserving the existing existence-hiding
behavior description.
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changelog.d/tsk-sonaie-identity-honours-token-rotation.mddocs/agent-coordination.mdtests/test_agent_scope_requests.pytests/test_token_rotation.pytinyagentos/agent_token_auth.py
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CARD TITLE (intent, not commit subject): fix-forward #2633: the dead-credential 404 fires on existing off-allowlist routes and the garbage-credential control is inert
Autonomous build of board card tsk-sonaie.
BASE:
origin/dev. Supersedes #2792 (and, transitively, the abandonedexec/tsk-iqk2bnline behind it).Read this first: most of the card is already fixed on
devThe card was written against
exec/tsk-iqk2bn, whose parent commits neverreached
dev. In the meantimedevsolved the same problem independently, viaae71bb203(fix-forwardtsk-okf4cz, PR #2716 on top of #2698/#2702). Measuredon clean
origin/dev@b8f7726ea:So, against current
dev:three guard tests are green, and
dev's_any_route_matchesconsults therouter before answering 404. It also handles
{x:path}converters, which theabandoned branch did not.
devhasno
_looks_like_registry_jwt; a garbage bearer reachescheck_agent_identity, which raises on a bad signature, so it 401s. Revokedidentities 401 too.
Rebasing the old branch would have re-landed a duplicate, dead second 404 branch
next to
dev's (the section-2 branch fires first for any registry JWT), so thisPR is cut fresh from
devand carries only the part of the chain that is stilla live defect.
What changed
check_agent_identitydid not honour the token rotation cutoff.check_agent_scope(agent_token_auth.py:115-119) andcheck_agent_scope_for_project(:291-294) both reject a token whoseiatpredates the identity's
token_min_iat.check_agent_identityverified thesignature and
status == "active"and stopped there.That function is the only auth on every surface that needs no scope grant:
POST /api/agents/registry/{cid}/scope-requests— the one route whose wholepurpose is asking for MORE privilege
routes/decisions.py:201,425)routes/container_requests.py:90,181,251,284)routes/agent_auth_requests.py:1059)rotate-tokensis the single lever for killing a leaked agent token withoutdeleting the identity, and on all of those it revoked nothing. Before this fix a
rotated token POSTing a scope request returned 200 and left a live
pendingrow behind.
Second symptom, same cause: the middleware asks
check_agent_identitywhetherthe caller is live before answering the wrong-URL 404, so a rotated token on an
unrouted path was told its URL was wrong rather than that its credential was
dead — the exact distinction this card chain exists to protect.
The test double that hid it.
_request()intests/test_auth_middleware.pybuilt
req.headersas a plaindict, but a realRequest's headers arecase-insensitive. The middleware reads
"authorization";check_agent_identityreads
"Authorization". On a dict the real credential check therefore saw noheader at all and returned
Noneinstead of raising — which is why every armin that module has to patch
check_agent_identityto observe anything. It nowbuilds
starlette.datastructures.Headers, and the two new arms run the realliveness chain unpatched.
RED FIRST (pasted)
At
origin/dev(b8f7726ea) with these tests applied andtinyagentos/agent_token_auth.pyuntouched:The real-caller arm is the one that shows the bite — a superseded token creating
a scope request anyway:
and the middleware arm:
Both controls were RED-checked in the same run and stay green throughout:
test_token_minted_after_bump_still_proves_identity(rotation must not lock outthe replacement) and
test_default_zero_cutoff_keeps_identity_valid(themigration default must not lock out live tokens).
The 404 side is guarded against over-correction by
test_live_registry_jwt_unknown_route_still_returns_404, which runs the sameunpatched liveness chain with a live record and still expects the wrong-URL 404
— narrowing must not become removal.
GREEN
Full suite (
pytest tests/ --ignore=tests/e2e -n auto, the CI invocation) is running locally; this section is updated with its summary line, and CI runs the same suite sharded 4 ways.Note on the route status: the rotated-token scope-request arm asserts 404,
not 401.
_authorize_scope_request_creationdeliberately folds everybad-credential outcome into the existence-hiding not-found body so that
(unknown target 404, existing target 401/403) cannot be used as an existence
oracle. The load-bearing assertion in that test is that nothing was created.
Docs
docs/agent-coordination.md, "Agent API surface (scoped registry JWT)" — therefused-request contract now states the three-way split explicitly: no route
matches -> 404; route exists but the token is not authorised -> 401; the
credential is dead (revoked, or superseded by
rotate-tokens) -> 401 on everypath. Anonymous callers get 401 everywhere, so status codes cannot enumerate
routes.
docs/agent-coordination.md, "Requesting more scope for an existing identity"— records that the bearer must be LIVE, and why it matters most on that route.
changelog.d/tsk-sonaie-identity-honours-token-rotation.md— new fragment(
### Security).python scripts/check_doc_gate.py invariants->doc-gate: clean.Scoped out of the card, with evidence
changelog.d/tsk-hbzm7l-*,tsk-vylg2y-*andtsk-iqk2bn-*exist only on the abandonedexec/tsk-iqk2bnbranch; none of them is ondev. There is nothing tocorrect here.
branch's
_looks_like_registry_jwttests, which have no counterpart ondev.The equivalent path on
dev(check_agent_identityraising on a badsignature) is exercised by the arms in
TestRegistryJwtRouteResolution.Summary by CodeRabbit
Bug Fixes
Documentation