refactor: Finalize App-Layer Auth Pivot & Deprecate Legacy DDL - #191
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refactor: Finalize App-Layer Auth Pivot & Deprecate Legacy DDL#191KinshukSS2 wants to merge 7 commits into
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Closes Issue istSOS#28 — eliminates two-step user provisioning. After POST /Users, a newly created user had no RLS policy and could not access any data until an administrator separately called POST /Policies. This commit fixes that by automatically calling the appropriate policy function inside the same transaction as user creation. Changes: - api/app/v1/endpoints/create/user.py * Add module-level _POLICY_FN_MAP (viewer/editor/obs_manager/sensor). * Capture app_role before get_db_role_for_rbac() remaps it, so the correct policy function can be dispatched. * After GRANT, call sensorthings.<role>_policy([username], policyname) with policyname = '{username}_default'. Administrator is skipped — admins bypass RLS by privilege, not by policy. * Policy functions already exist in the DB (istsos_auth.sql); no migration required. - api/app/v1/endpoints/functions.py * Add docstrings to _validate_role_identifier() and set_role(). - api/app/v1/endpoints/create/data_array_observation.py * Import shared set_role() helper (was already using the correct upstream version; this import makes the dependency explicit). - api/tests/test_rls_policy_creation.py (new) * Tests: correct policy function per role, administrator exclusion, naming convention, users_ as text[]. - api/tests/test_rbac_set_role_safety.py (new) * Tests: identifier validation, injection rejection, shared helper usage in data_array_observation.
- Add auth_provider and external_sub_id columns to sensorthings."User"
via idempotent migration (001_identity_linking.sql) with a partial
unique index on (auth_provider, external_sub_id) WHERE auth_provider
IS NOT NULL, so local password users are completely unaffected.
- Introduce PENDING_ROLE sentinel in rbac_roles.py. The 'pending' state
is intentionally absent from VALID_RBAC_ROLES so it can never be
assigned through the public API; existing role validation is unchanged.
- Gate pending accounts in get_current_user() (oauth.py): after the DB
lookup, any user with role='pending' immediately receives HTTP 403
'Account pending admin activation' before any SET ROLE or handler
body is reached.
- Add oidc_user_crud.py with create_pending_oidc_user() and
get_user_by_provider_sub(). The insert function hardcodes role to
PENDING_ROLE and contains zero DDL (no CREATE ROLE / CREATE USER),
giving new OIDC accounts zero PostgreSQL footprint until activation.
- Add POST /Users/{id}/activate endpoint (activate_user.py), restricted
to administrators. Runs UPDATE role, CREATE ROLE NOLOGIN IN ROLE,
GRANT, and RLS policy assignment inside a single transaction so a
failed step leaves the user still 'pending' with no partial state.
- Register activate_user router in api.py inside the AUTHORIZATION guard.
Local password users (POST /Users) are completely unaffected; no changes
were made to create/user.py.
Relates-to: GSoC 2026 Identity Linking architecture
- Add PasswordUpdateRequest Pydantic v2 schema (models/password.py)
enforcing: min 12 chars, at least 1 uppercase, at least 1 digit.
Violations surface as HTTP 422 before any DB is touched.
- Add update_local_password() CRUD function (db/password_crud.py):
1. Fetch user row by ID → 404 if missing.
2. OIDC guard: block auth_provider IS NOT NULL users with HTTP 400
'External identities cannot update passwords locally'.
3. Verify current_password via asyncpg.connect() (PostgreSQL auth layer)
→ 401 on InvalidPasswordError. No Python-side passlib used.
4. Execute ALTER USER <username> WITH ENCRYPTED PASSWORD <new_password>
using pg_quote_ident / pg_quote_literal to prevent injection.
- Add PATCH /Users/{id}/password endpoint (update/password.py):
owner-or-admin guard; returns 204 No Content on success.
- Register update_password router in api.py inside AUTHORIZATION guard.
- Add test_password_update.py (9 tests, all pass, no live DB required):
schema: valid, too-short, no-uppercase, no-digit
crud: 404, 400 OIDC block, 401 wrong password, 204 ALTER USER issued
endpoint: 403 non-owner/non-admin guard
Depends on: feat/identity-linking-jit-provisioning (requires auth_provider column)
…le-JWT fix
- Add RoleUpdateRequest Pydantic v2 schema (models/role.py):
delegates to validate_rbac_role(); blocks 'administrator' (bootstrap-only)
and 'pending' (internal state) with HTTP 422 before any DB is touched.
Docstring explains the security boundary explicitly.
- Add update_user_role() CRUD function (db/role_crud.py):
All mutations run inside a single asyncpg transaction (FOR UPDATE lock):
1. 404 if user not found.
2. 400 if user is in 'pending' waiting room.
3. No-op early return if current_role == new_role (no DDL issued).
4. 409 if demoting the last administrator (lockout guard).
5. UPDATE sensorthings."User" SET role = new_role.
6. REVOKE <old_pg_group_role> / GRANT <new_pg_group_role> only when the
underlying PostgreSQL group role changes (e.g. viewer→obs_manager).
viewer→editor shares the same 'user' PG role — no DDL issued.
pg_quote_ident used for all identifier interpolation.
- Add PATCH /Users/{id}/role endpoint (update/role.py):
administrator-only guard at router layer; returns 204 No Content.
- Register update_role router in api.py inside AUTHORIZATION guard.
- Add comment to get_current_user() in oauth.py documenting that role is
fetched live from the DB on every request (not from the JWT payload),
eliminating stale-JWT vulnerabilities after role changes. No logic change.
- Add test_role_reassignment.py (12 tests, all pass, no live DB needed):
schema: valid, administrator/pending/unknown blocked
crud: 404, 400 pending, no-op, 409 last-admin, REVOKE+GRANT, no-DDL
endpoint: 403 non-admin guard
Depends on: feat/password-updates (stacked)
…dentials
Users are strictly application-level entities managed via sensorthings."User".
The backend connects to PostgreSQL through a single master service account;
individual users have no PostgreSQL login roles.
- Add shared POLICY_FN_MAP in rbac_roles.py as single source of truth for
RLS policy dispatch (used by create/user.py and activate_user.py)
- Role reassignment (PATCH /Users/{id}/role) is a pure UPDATE on User.role;
last-admin lockout locks all admin rows via SELECT … FOR UPDATE before
counting to prevent concurrent demotion race condition
- User activation (POST /Users/{id}/activate) updates User.role and applies
the corresponding RLS policy function — no PostgreSQL DDL
- User creation stores bcrypt hash in User.password via parameterised UPDATE
Removed: CREATE USER, CREATE ROLE, REVOKE, GRANT, ALTER USER DDL.
Refs: istSOS#190
BREAKING: set_role() now maps app-layer roles to PG group roles via SET LOCAL ROLE instead of SET ROLE <username>. All 72 RESET ROLE instances deleted across 41 endpoint files. Refactor 1 — functions.py::set_role(): - Maps viewer/editor → 'user', sensor/obs_manager → 'sensor', etc. - SET LOCAL ROLE (transaction-scoped, auto-reverts on COMMIT/ROLLBACK) - Removed inner connection.transaction() nested savepoint - Eliminated entire RESET ROLE call class (pool leak prevention) Refactor 2 — password_crud.py: - Removed asyncpg.connect() credential verification - Removed ALTER USER … WITH ENCRYPTED PASSWORD DDL - Modern path: passlib/bcrypt verify + UPDATE User.password - Legacy fallback: get_auth_connection() for NULL password JIT migration Refactor 3 — role_crud.py: - Removed REVOKE/GRANT DDL block (lines 167-196) - Role reassignment is pure UPDATE sensorthings."User" SET role - Removed _ADMIN_PG_ROLE, DB_ROLE_BY_RBAC_ROLE, pg_quote_ident imports Refactor 4 — Test suite alignment: - test_set_role_sql_safety: asserts SET LOCAL ROLE + group role mapping - test_rbac_set_role_safety: parametrised 5 app roles → PG group roles - test_password_update: asserts UPDATE + bcrypt hash (not ALTER USER) - test_role_reassignment: asserts UPDATE only (not REVOKE/GRANT) - test_policy_role_switch: asserts SET LOCAL ROLE + zero RESET ROLE 49 files changed, 298 insertions(+), 442 deletions(-) 63/63 tests passing.
update/user.py lines 119-135 contained live REVOKE/GRANT statements that were missed in the PR5 cleanup pass. These operated on individual usernames as PostgreSQL role identifiers, which no longer exist under the app-layer credential model. Remove the entire DDL block. Role changes are reflected in the sensorthings."User".role UPDATE above; set_role() maps the new role to its PG group role dynamically at request time.
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refactor: Finalize App-Layer Auth Pivot & Deprecate Legacy DDL
What Problem Does This Fix?
PRs 1–4 progressively pivoted from PostgreSQL
LOGINroles to Application-Layer Credentials (passlib/bcrypt insensorthings."User"). Users no longer have individual PostgreSQL login roles - they are pure application-layer entities.This branch finalizes the transition to Application-Layer Credentials. It safely deprecates the legacy PostgreSQL DDL commands from the prior architecture, ensuring that all database interactions are perfectly aligned with the new, stateless application-layer identity model.
This branch fixes all of it.
Changes
1.
functions.py::set_role()— RewrittenBefore:
SET ROLE "alice"— targets a non-existent per-user PG role.After:
SET LOCAL ROLE "user"— maps the application role to its PostgreSQL group role usingDB_ROLE_BY_RBAC_ROLEfromrbac_roles.py.Role mapping:
viewerusereditoruserobs_managersensorsensorsensorcustomuseradministratoradministratorSET LOCAL ROLEis transaction-scoped: it automatically reverts onCOMMITorROLLBACK, including implicit rollback from async generator cancellation. This eliminates the entire class of pool-leak bugs from the oldRESET ROLEpattern.2.
RESET ROLE— Deleted (72 instances, 41 files)All 72
await connection.execute("RESET ROLE;")calls have been deleted across every endpoint file. WithSET LOCAL ROLE, they are not just redundant — they were actively dangerous: in the streaming read path,RESET ROLEcould be skipped if the client disconnected mid-stream, returning a connection with an elevated group role to the pool.Files affected: all
create/,delete/,update/,read/endpoint files.3.
password_crud.py— DDL RemovedBefore:
asyncpg.connect(user=username, password=current_password)— connects as the user to verifyALTER USER {username} WITH ENCRYPTED PASSWORD '...'— DDL requiring CREATEROLEAfter:
pwd_context.verify(current_password, stored_hash)— bcrypt verify againstUser.password(using the existingpasslibdependency established in PR 3; no new hashing libraries introduced)UPDATE sensorthings."User" SET password = $1 WHERE id = $2— parameterised DMLUser.password IS NULL(pre-migration), falls back toget_auth_connection()for pg_authid verification, then writes the bcrypt hash (completing JIT migration)4.
role_crud.py— REVOKE/GRANT RemovedBefore: After updating
User.role, the code issuedREVOKE {old_pg_role} FROM {username}andGRANT {new_pg_role} TO {username}.After: Role reassignment is a pure
UPDATE sensorthings."User" SET role = $1.set_role()maps the role to its PG group role dynamically at request time — no DDL membership changes needed.5.
update/user.py— REVOKE/GRANT Removed (found during post-audit)update/user.pylines 119–135 contained a liveREVOKE/GRANTblock that was missed by the initial cleanup pass (it was in the generalPATCH /Usersendpoint, not indb/role_crud.py). Fixed in the follow-up commit. Unusedget_db_role_for_rbacandpg_quote_identimports also removed.6.
create/policy.py,update/policy.py— Deadtry/finallyRemovedThe
RESET ROLEdeletion left danglingif role_switched: passblocks insidefinally:clauses, causingIndentationError. Cleaned up by removing the entirerole_switched/try/finallypattern.7. Test Suite Aligned (5 files)
test_set_role_sql_safety.pySET LOCAL ROLE "user"for viewer, group mapping for all rolestest_rbac_set_role_safety.pytest_password_update.pytest_success_executes_update_with_hashreplacestest_success_executes_alter_usertest_role_reassignment.pytest_different_pg_group_still_no_ddlreplacestest_different_pg_role_triggers_revoke_granttest_policy_role_switch.pySET LOCAL ROLE "administrator", asserts zeroRESET ROLETest Results
Pre-existing failures (not introduced by this PR):
test_oauth_connection_leak.py— 12 tests usepytest.mark.asynciobutpytest-asynciois not installed. These tests document a real concern (authenticate_user()still uses a rawasyncpg.connect()for the login flow) that should be addressed separately.Files Changed
api/app/v1/endpoints/functions.py— set_role() rewriteapi/app/db/password_crud.py— DDL eradicationapi/app/db/role_crud.py— DDL eradicationapi/app/v1/endpoints/update/user.py— missed REVOKE/GRANT fixapi/app/v1/endpoints/create/policy.py— dead try/finally cleanupapi/app/v1/endpoints/update/policy.py— dead try/finally cleanupapi/app/v1/endpoints/{create,delete,update,read}/*.py(44 files) — RESET ROLE deletionapi/tests/test_*.py(5 files) — test alignmentSecurity Posture After This PR
ISTSOS_ADMINservice account for any user-management operationset_config('app.user_id', ...)toset_role()for per-row RLS enforcement is a 2-line addition with zero structural changes required