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Actions Query Fix: UntrustedCheckoutTOCTOU[High|Critical] ControlCheck model fix #22154

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Actions Query Fix: UntrustedCheckoutTOCTOU[High|Critical] ControlCheck model fix #22154

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6430802
Add UntrustedCheckoutTOCTOUX ControlCheck model fix
knewbury01 Jul 9, 2026
059aa2d
Add missing changenote
knewbury01 Jul 10, 2026
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4 changes: 4 additions & 0 deletions actions/ql/lib/change-notes/2026-07-09-environment-check-alteration.md
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Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
---
category: minorAnalysis
---
* Altered the logic of `EnvironmentCheck` to make sure it is a check that protects only for non-toctou. This change will result in more results being found by the queries: `actions/untrusted-checkout-toctou/high` and `actions/untrusted-checkout-toctou/critical`.
4 changes: 1 addition & 3 deletions actions/ql/lib/codeql/actions/security/ControlChecks.qll
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Expand Up @@ -144,9 +144,7 @@ class EnvironmentCheck extends ControlCheck instanceof Environment {
// Environment checks are not effective against any mutable attacks
// they do actually protect against untrusted code execution (sha)
override predicate protectsCategoryAndEvent(string category, string event) {
event = actor_is_attacker_event() and category = any_category()
or
event = actor_not_attacker_event() and category = non_toctou_category()
event = [actor_is_attacker_event(), actor_not_attacker_event()] and category = non_toctou_category()
}
}

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3 changes: 2 additions & 1 deletion actions/ql/src/Security/CWE-367/UntrustedCheckoutTOCTOUCritical.ql
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Expand Up @@ -23,7 +23,8 @@ where
// the checked-out code may lead to arbitrary code execution
checkout.getAFollowingStep() = step and
// the checkout occurs in a privileged context
inPrivilegedContext(checkout, event) and
inPrivilegedContext(checkout, event)
and
// the mutable checkout step is protected by an Insufficient access check
exists(ControlCheck check1 | check1.protects(checkout, event, "untrusted-checkout")) and
not exists(ControlCheck check2 | check2.protects(checkout, event, "untrusted-checkout-toctou"))
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2 changes: 2 additions & 0 deletions actions/ql/test/query-tests/Security/CWE-367/UntrustedCheckoutTOCTOUCritical.expected
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Expand Up @@ -99,6 +99,8 @@ edges
#select
| .github/workflows/comment.yml:58:9:60:2 | Run Step | .github/workflows/comment.yml:54:9:58:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/comment.yml:58:9:60:2 | Run Step | Insufficient protection against execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@). | .github/workflows/comment.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/comment.yml:68:9:68:43 | Run Step | .github/workflows/comment.yml:64:9:68:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/comment.yml:68:9:68:43 | Run Step | Insufficient protection against execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@). | .github/workflows/comment.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/deployment1.yml:27:10:30:7 | Run Step | .github/workflows/deployment1.yml:16:10:22:7 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/deployment1.yml:27:10:30:7 | Run Step | Insufficient protection against execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@). | .github/workflows/deployment1.yml:5:3:5:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
| .github/workflows/deployment1.yml:30:10:31:53 | Run Step | .github/workflows/deployment1.yml:16:10:22:7 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/deployment1.yml:30:10:31:53 | Run Step | Insufficient protection against execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@). | .github/workflows/deployment1.yml:5:3:5:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
| .github/workflows/test0.yml:58:9:60:2 | Run Step | .github/workflows/test0.yml:54:9:58:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test0.yml:58:9:60:2 | Run Step | Insufficient protection against execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@). | .github/workflows/test0.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/test0.yml:68:9:68:43 | Run Step | .github/workflows/test0.yml:64:9:68:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test0.yml:68:9:68:43 | Run Step | Insufficient protection against execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@). | .github/workflows/test0.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/test4.yml:85:7:88:54 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test4.yml:79:7:85:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test4.yml:85:7:88:54 | Uses Step | Insufficient protection against execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@). | .github/workflows/test4.yml:5:3:5:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
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