🛡️ Sentinel: [CRITICAL] Fix Prototype Pollution Vulnerabilities - #132
🛡️ Sentinel: [CRITICAL] Fix Prototype Pollution Vulnerabilities#132ericbfriday wants to merge 1 commit into
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The custom assign polyfill had explicitly blocked prototype pollution keys (`__proto__`, `constructor`, `prototype`), but fell back to native `Object.assign` if available. The native `Object.assign` bypasses these checks and allows prototype pollution vectors from parsed user input. Removing the fallback ensures safe assignment.
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🚨 Severity: CRITICAL
💡 Vulnerability: The
assignpolyfill fell back to nativeObject.assign, which bypasses the explicit__proto__blocking in the polyfill. This allows prototype pollution via user-suppliedoptions.🎯 Impact: Prototype pollution can lead to arbitrary code execution, denial of service, or logic bypasses across the application.
🔧 Fix: Removed the fallback to native
Object.assignto ensure all object copies go through the secure polyfill.✅ Verification: Verified using a custom PoC script and ensuring tests pass.
PR created automatically by Jules for task 15230881737032077518 started by @ericbfriday