Security fixes target the latest tagged cecli release and the current master branch.
Do not include credentials, private memory dumps, exploit payloads, or personal data in public issues. Use a private security advisory in the authorized GitHub repository once it exists, or contact the repository owner through their verified GitHub profile.
- Use
ceclionly on systems and processes you own or are explicitly authorized to inspect. - Bind
ceserverto trusted interfaces and restrict access with host firewalls or authenticated tunnels. - Keep the optional
cebridgebound to loopback unless a firewall or authenticated tunnel restricts every permitted client. - On macOS, sign only the intended
ceclibinary withbuild/macos-debugger.entitlements; debugger permission is powerful, does not bypass SIP, and should not be added to unrelated binaries. - On Windows, elevate
cecli --nativeonly when the authorized target requires matching integrity; do not use elevation to probe unrelated or protected processes. - Treat process memory as sensitive data.
- Preview writes with
--dry-run, require--yes, and prefer--verify. - Do not run remote file, injection, debugger, or termination capabilities without an explicit review of target authorization and rollback behavior.
- Prefer
memory scan; usememory aobscan --yesonly when testing the server-side packet against the bundled patched server. Older unpatched servers contain an unsafe experimental scanner. - Review local paths before
remote put,remote get, orpipe write --file; those commands can transfer sensitive files and require explicit confirmation for mutation. ceclidoes not invoke a shell for command arguments. Paths, patterns, values, and pipe payloads are parsed locally or transmitted as protocol data, so normal filesystem syntax is not rejected as shell syntax.