[krassx]

Follow-up to #19. The automated review of #19 flagged (residual P2) that SymbolUploader.kt:147/158 still log credentials on the Kotlin path; checking those turned up more of the same.

Leaks fixed

Where	What was logged	When
SymbolUploader "App token is invalid"	the full app token at WARN	whenever the server answers ApplicationNotFoundError (e.g. a wrong token) — not gated on debug
SymbolUploader "Uploading to endpoint"	the presigned PUT URL incl. its signature query (valid for days)	debug=true
SymbolUploader "Upload step 2. Response"	the whole POST reply, whose endpoint is that presigned URL	debug=true
BaselineClient "fetching baseline from"	…/v2/apps/<token>/builds/baseline	debug=true

The wrong-token case is the one most likely to land in a shared CI log. BundleUploader already masks the same message (maskAppToken) and strips presigned queries (redactPresignedUrl); both are now internal and reused.

Verified

• New tests: wrong-token masking and both presigned-URL debug lines (in SymbolUploaderHttpTest, using the existing mock server and recording logger), and the baseline URL (BaselineClientLogTest). With the production changes reverted, all three fail; restored, they pass. The presigned-reply case was found by the test itself — I had only fixed the endpoint line at first.
• ./gradlew :test (full root suite): BUILD SUCCESSFUL.

Notes

• BundleUploader.redactPresignedUrl is made internal here and in fix(cli): mask the app token in debug output #19 with the identical one-line change, so the two PRs merge cleanly.
• Not covered: the token is still in the request URL path ($endpoint/apps/$appToken/symbols) of the Kotlin fallback itself, and is a Gradle @Input of the upload tasks (plain text in up-to-date fingerprints and the configuration cache). Both need design changes and are separate follow-ups.

🤖 Generated with Claude Code

[cursor]

Deep Code Review

Follow-up to #19: stop logging the app token and presigned PUT credentials on the Kotlin upload path. I reviewed the full SymbolUploader / BaselineClient / BundleUploader flow (callers, symbols protocol, sibling redaction, tests), not just the diff.

Files reviewed: SymbolUploader.kt, BaselineClient.kt, BundleUploader.kt, SymbolUploaderHttpTest.kt, BaselineClientLogTest.kt, plus callers (MappingUploadTask, NativeUploadTask), ApiEndpoint, ChunkedBundleUploader, and the symbols mock that documents the wire format.

Findings

No remaining P0–P3 in this PR’s scope.

I specifically checked and discarded:

• Nested {result: {endpoint}} redaction — redactedResponseForLog only rewrites a top-level endpoint. That matches the symbols protocol this client actually consumes: top-level {"code": 0, "endpoint": "..."}, explicitly not the v2 {result:...} envelope (MockBuildsServer.handleSymbolMetadata). Errors are the {ok:false, error:{...}} envelope already handled by isAlreadyExists / ApplicationNotFoundError. A wrapped success body would fail the PUT today (empty top-level endpoint); that is pre-existing and not introduced here.
• maskTokenIn vs percent-encoding — the baseline URL is ApiEndpoint.buildsUrl then URIBuilder.toASCIIString(), then literal replace(appToken, masked). Typical dashboard tokens are unreserved ([A-Za-z0-9._~-]), so they survive encoding and the replace hits. Empty token is a no-op (avoids Kotlin replace("", …)). Not a credible leak for real tokens.
• Second debug line — assertFalse(warnMessages.any { it.contains("SECRETSIG0123") }) covers both “Uploading to endpoint” and “Upload step 2. Response”, which is how the reply leak was found.

Author-noted residuals (out of scope, same threat model): token still appears in the Kotlin request URL path ($endpoint/apps/$appToken/symbols) and as a Gradle @Input; CLI argv debug dump is #19 (still open). Non-2xx / parse-failure take(200) bodies were already logged at WARN and are unchanged.

---

1. Overall risk: Low
2. Merge recommendation: Approve
3. Most important issues to fix: None in this PR. Land #19 for the CLI debug path so both uploaders stop printing credentials.
4. What looks good: The invalid-token line was the high-value fix (WARN, not debug-gated, typical wrong-token CI log). Reusing BundleUploader.maskAppToken / redactPresignedUrl (now internal) keeps one policy and merges cleanly with the identical visibility change in #19. Tests fail without the production change, including the POST-body case. PR CI build.sh --full is green.

  

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[claude]

Claude finished @krassx's task in 23s —— View job

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Deep code review of PR #24

• Read the PR diff, SymbolUploader, BaselineClient and BundleUploader.
• Checked the remaining log statements in both uploaders for credential leaks.
• Posted the review summary.

I read the code only. I did not run the build or the tests, so I can't confirm the test results claimed in the PR description.

Findings

No P0–P3 findings in the scope of this PR. I re-checked these and dropped them:

• Remaining logs in SymbolUploader. Every log call that carried a credential is now masked or redacted. The remaining lines don't interpolate the token or the presigned URL:
  • the metadata Body: $json line (no credential),
  • the error object line,
  • the non-2xx response bodies,
  • Upload complete.
• redactedResponseForLog only rewrites a top-level endpoint. This matches the flat {endpoint: ...} success shape that the code reads at line 141. If the server later wrapped the success reply, the upload would already fail on the empty endpoint. The take(200) fallback for non-JSON bodies is safe for the same reason.
• maskTokenIn and percent-encoding in BaselineClient. The URL goes through URIBuilder.toASCIIString() before the literal replace. A token with characters that get percent-encoded would not be masked. Real dashboard tokens are alphanumeric, so I don't see a credible leak. The empty-token guard is correct, because Kotlin's replace("", …) would otherwise insert the mask between every character.
• BaselineClient line 142 logs e.message. Connection and host-resolution exceptions don't normally embed the full request URL. Apache ClientProtocolException messages on redirects could include one. That is speculative, and the line is unchanged by this PR.
• Test reliability. BaselineClientLogTest relies on 127.0.0.1:1 refusing the connection. That is fine on Linux CI. The debug line is logged before the request, so the assertion holds whatever the network does.

The PR description already lists the token in the request URL path and as a Gradle @Input as out-of-scope follow-ups. I agree they need separate design changes.

Summary

1. Overall risk: Low.
2. Merge recommendation: Approve. I can't submit a formal approval, so that is a recommendation only.
3. Issues to fix: None in this PR. Land fix(cli): mask the app token in debug output #19 so the CLI debug path stops printing credentials too.
4. Positives:
   • The unmasked app token at WARN level was the most serious leak, and it is fixed. It was not gated on debug and appears for any wrong token.
   • BundleUploader.maskAppToken and redactPresignedUrl are reused instead of duplicated, so there is one redaction policy.
   • The visibility change is identical to fix(cli): mask the app token in debug output #19's, so the two PRs should merge cleanly.
   • The tests assert both that the secret is absent and that the masked form appears in place.
   • The PR description says the presigned-reply leak was found by the test itself.

This agrees with the earlier automated review from Cursor, and I found nothing to add to it.
· Branch: fix/symboluploader-credential-logs

[coderabbitai]

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📒 Files selected for processing: 2

• src/main/kotlin/com/bugsee/android/gradle/upload/SymbolUploader.kt
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• src/main/kotlin/com/bugsee/android/gradle/upload/SymbolUploader.kt

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📝 Summary

Summary by CodeRabbit

• Bug Fixes
  • Sensitive app tokens and presigned URL query parameters are masked in diagnostic logs, while upload paths remain visible to support troubleshooting.
  • Invalid-token warnings no longer reveal full app tokens. Logs also avoid displaying response body contents that could contain signatures, showing response length for non-JSON or malformed responses instead.

Baseline and symbol upload logs now mask app tokens. Symbol upload logs also redact presigned URL query strings. Metadata response logs redact JSON endpoint values and show only the character count for non-JSON responses. Malformed-JSON warnings report the response length without a body preview. Tests check baseline URL logging, token masking, and presigned URL and response redaction.

Priority: ⬇️ Low

Change: Bug fix

Merge Risk: ⚪ Minimal · up to 3e2ed

The inspected upload logs do not expose the presigned URL signature or malformed response body. No issue requiring a fix before merge was established.

Security architecture risk: 🔵 Low · up to 7e7ef

The changes reduce credential exposure without expanding network access or upload authority. Raw response logging remains in some failure paths, but comparison with the PR base shows that exposure predates this change.

Retained concerns
No architecture-level concerns identified.

Security review details

Security Blast Radius

• inferred — Credential disclosure through shared logs can transfer upload capability to a log reader. The supported authority is the app token's project-write capability or the returned presigned PUT capability; the evidence does not establish broader tenant, bucket, service, or environment access.

Security Findings and Attack Paths

• observed — The retained raw-response logging finding remains relevant but is not a demonstrated PR regression. A malformed successful response still reaches an unsanitized 200-character warning regardless of debug. At the base, debug logging also emitted the full response; the new fallback reduces that output to 200 characters. Credential exposure requires sensitive values in the logged content, and exploitation additionally requires access to those logs.

Trust Boundaries and Controls

• observed — Redaction is field-specific rather than a universal response-to-log control: it removes the top-level endpoint query while retaining other JSON fields, and existing non-2xx and malformed-response warnings remain outside that projection. Added tests assert token masking and signature removal for the targeted paths, not comprehensive sanitization of arbitrary responses.

Hardening Proposals

• proposed — As follow-up hardening, use an allowlisted diagnostic summary across successful, malformed, and error responses, omitting raw-body previews when safe parsing fails. This would strengthen the existing logging boundary beyond the targeted fixes.

Pre-merge checks: 4 · 1

Failed checks: 1 warning

Check name	Status	Explanation	Resolution
Docstring Coverage		Docstring coverage is 60.00% which is insufficient. The required threshold is 80.00%. Docstring coverage is scoped to functions touched by this diff. Analyzed 15 functions across 5 files.	Write docstrings for the functions missing them to satisfy the coverage threshold.

Passed checks: 4 passed

Check name	Status	Explanation
Title check		The title clearly and concisely describes the main change: preventing app-token and presigned-URL logging in the Kotlin upload path.
Description check		The description directly explains the credential leaks addressed, the affected components, the added tests, validation results, and known follow-up work.
Linked Issues check		Check skipped because no linked issues were found for this pull request.
Out of Scope Changes check		Check skipped because no linked issues were found for this pull request.

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[coderabbitai]

Actionable comments posted: 1

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• 🪄 Fix comments: Fix CodeRabbit comments on this PR

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Inline comments:
Review comments at
@src/main/kotlin/com/bugsee/android/gradle/upload/SymbolUploader.kt:
- Around line 188-195: Update redactedResponseForLog so its parse-failure path
does not return a raw preview of non-JSON content; remove the preview or replace
it with a URL-redacted summary before it reaches the warning log.

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[claude]

Claude finished @krassx's task in 28s —— View job

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Deep code review of PR #24 (re-review after push 3e2ed32)

• Read the new commit and the full PR diff against origin/main.
• Checked whether it fixes the open CodeRabbit finding.
• Re-checked the remaining log statements in SymbolUploader and BaselineClient.

I read the code only. I did not run the build or the tests, so I can't confirm the test results in the PR description.

What changed since the last review

3e2ed32 fixes the one open finding, CodeRabbit's note on the non-JSON reply path:

• Parse-failure warning: it no longer prints contentText.take(200). It logs only the length, (status=…, N chars).
• redactedResponseForLog: a body that isn't a JSON object now becomes <not a JSON object, N chars>. Before, it fell back to a raw preview.
• Tests: non-JSON 2xx body is never echoed into the log runs with debug=false and debug=true. Both use an HTML body that contains a presigned URL, and both assert that the signature never reaches the log.

That finding looks fixed. I checked that the helpers the tests use (setPostStatus, setPostBody) exist in the mock server.

Findings

No P0–P3 findings. I looked for these and dropped them:

• JSONException message in the parse-failure warning. The line still logs e.message. The org.json 20240303 parse errors only carry a position (at N [character … line …]) or a key name, never the body text.
• Array or scalar body. JSONObject("[…]") throws, so it takes the same length-only branch. The main parse at line 124 fails in the same way, so the two paths agree.
• Non-2xx response bodies (lines 92–95 and 170–173). These are still logged in full, and a proxy error page could echo the request URL. That URL contains the app token (POST path) or the presigned query (PUT). This was already the case before the PR, and the PR description lists the token in the URL path as a known follow-up. It's the only remaining place where a response body is logged. If you want the log to be consistent, apply the same length-only treatment there in the follow-up. I don't count it against this PR.
• redactedResponseForLog reorders JSON keys because JSONObject.toString() rebuilds the object. This only affects the debug line.
• Line length. SymbolUploader.kt:158 is 124 characters. I found no ktlint or detekt config in the repo, so nothing enforces a limit.

Summary

1. Overall risk: Low.
2. Merge recommendation: Approve. I can't submit a formal approval, so this is a recommendation only.
3. Issues to fix: None in this PR. Optionally, handle the non-2xx body logging in the follow-up that deals with the token in the URL. Land fix(cli): mask the app token in debug output #19 so the CLI debug path stops printing credentials too.
4. Positives:
   • The new commit closes the last place where a raw response body could reach the log.
   • The tests cover both the debug=false and debug=true paths.
   • The redaction helpers are reused from BundleUploader rather than duplicated.
     · Branch: fix/symboluploader-credential-logs