ADTP implements cryptographic authorization primitives. Vulnerabilities in this codebase can result in privilege escalation or authorization bypass in systems that depend on it. Reports are taken seriously and handled promptly.
| Version | Supported |
|---|---|
0.1.x-alpha |
Yes |
< 0.1.0 |
No |
ADTP is pre-1.0 alpha software. The wire format and delegation semantics may change between minor versions. It is not yet recommended for production use where a compromise would be materially damaging.
Do not open a public issue for security vulnerabilities.
Use GitHub's private vulnerability reporting: Report a vulnerability
Or email turelzahan10@gmail.com with subject line ADTP SECURITY.
Please include:
- Affected version or commit SHA
- A description of the vulnerability and its impact
- Reproduction steps or a proof-of-concept
- Any suggested remediation
| Stage | Target |
|---|---|
| Acknowledgement of report | 48 hours |
| Initial assessment and severity triage | 7 days |
| Fix or documented mitigation | 30 days for high/critical |
| Public disclosure | After a fix ships, or 90 days, whichever is sooner |
Coordinated disclosure timelines are negotiable where a fix requires longer. Reporters are credited in the advisory and release notes unless they request otherwise.
In scope
- The ADTP daemon (
adtpd) - Delegation chain validation, including chain-of-custody verification
- Ed25519 signature verification and key handling, including key generation
- RESTRICT mode enforcement — any path permitting attenuation to be bypassed or authority to be amplified
- Cascade revocation completeness — any descendant capability surviving revocation of an ancestor
- Credential issuance, delegation, and revocation logic
- Token parsing, canonicalization, and deserialization
- HTTP API authentication and authorization
- The protocol specification (
docs/PROTOCOL.md) - Replay, confused-deputy, and time-of-check/time-of-use conditions in the daemon
Out of scope
- Vulnerabilities in dependencies without a demonstrated exploit path through ADTP (report upstream; mention here if ADTP's usage is affected)
- Denial of service via resource exhaustion on unauthenticated endpoints where rate limiting is the deployer's responsibility
- Misconfiguration of a deploying system that ADTP does not control
- Attacks requiring prior compromise of the host or private key material
ADTP assumes:
- Private keys are held securely by their owners and are not exfiltrated
- The transport layer provides confidentiality where required (ADTP tokens are integrity-protected, not confidential)
- Clock skew between participants is bounded and roughly synchronized
ADTP does not assume that delegates are honest. Attenuation and revocation guarantees are intended to hold against a malicious delegate attempting to expand or retain authority.