[OluwapelumiElisha]

Summary

This PR resolves issues #854, #859, #860, and #861 across the transaction, Soroban, wallet, and SEP-10 integration modules.

Closes #854
Closes #859
Closes #860
Closes #861

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Detailed Changes

1. #854: Prevent Fee Bump Downgrades in buildFeeBumpTransaction

• Problem: buildFeeBumpTransaction accepted any base fee without verifying that it exceeded the inner transaction's fee, allowing accidental fee downgrades that caused fee bumps to be rejected or ineffective.
• Solution: Validated bumpFee > innerFee immediately after parsing the inner transaction envelope. Rejects fees less than or equal to the original transaction fee with a descriptive TX_BUILD_FAILED error.
• Files: src/transaction/feeBumpTransaction.ts, src/transaction/feeBump.ts, src/tests/feeBumpTransaction.test.ts.

2. #859: Soroban Panic & VM Trap Decoder (SorobanErrorDecoder)

• Problem: Soroban VM traps and contract panics were returned in cryptic serialized formats and converted to generic "invocation failed" messages, hindering contract debugging.
• Solution: Implemented SorobanErrorDecoder and decodeSorobanPanic to decode panics into human-readable descriptions, integrated into decodeContractError.
• Formats Decoded:
  • WASM VM Traps:
    • unreachable -> WebAssembly unreachable instruction executed (assertion failure or explicit panic)
    • integer overflow / arithmetic overflow / overflow during arithmetic -> Arithmetic overflow or underflow
    • division by zero / remainder by zero -> Division or remainder by zero
    • out of bounds -> Memory or table index out of bounds
    • stack overflow / call stack exhausted -> WebAssembly call stack exhausted
    • unaligned memory -> Unaligned memory access
    • indirect call type mismatch -> Function signature mismatch on indirect call
  • Host Error Traps:
    • Error(WasmVm, Trapped) -> WebAssembly VM execution trapped
    • Error(Context, Trap) -> Soroban host context trap occurred
    • Error(Budget, ExceededLimit) -> Soroban compute or memory resource budget exceeded
    • Error(Storage, MissingValue) -> Missing or expired contract storage key
    • Error(Auth, Invalid) -> Contract authorization failed or invalid credentials
    • Error(Contract, #<code>) -> Custom contract error code extraction
  • Rust Panics: panicked at '...', src/lib.rs:line:col extracted with clean reason and source location.
  • Fallback: Graceful fallback to generic descriptive messages for unknown panic formats.
• Files: src/soroban/sorobanErrorDecoder.ts, src/soroban/contractErrors.ts, src/soroban/index.ts, src/tests/sorobanErrorDecoder.test.ts.

3. #860: Enforce Configurable Timeout & Cancellation on TransactionSigningSession

• Problem: Wallet signing requests had no timeout mechanism, causing applications to hang indefinitely if users left prompts open or if the wallet extension crashed.
• Solution: Introduced TransactionSigningSession and signTransactionWithSession with timeout tracking and active lifecycle control.
• Default Timeout: Default duration is 5 minutes (DEFAULT_SIGNING_SESSION_TIMEOUT_MS = 300,000 ms).
• How Callers Extend/Cancel:
  • session.extendTimeout(additionalMs): Adds additional milliseconds to the active session deadline while pending.
  • session.resetTimeout(newTimeoutMs): Resets the timeout duration from the current moment.
  • session.cancel(reason?): Immediately cancels the pending session and resolves the signing promise with a WALLET_SIGN_REJECTED error.
  • When the timeout expires, the session resolves cleanly with a SorokitErrorCode.OPERATION_TIMEOUT error.
• Files: src/wallet/transactionSigningSession.ts, src/wallet/index.ts, src/tests/transactionSigningSession.test.ts.

4. #861: Cryptographically Secure Random Nonces in SEP-10 Challenge Generation

• Problem: SEP-10 challenge generation risk of using predictable or static nonces allowed challenge pre-computation and replay attacks.
• Solution: Implemented generateSep10Nonce and generateSep10Challenge ensuring every challenge contains a unique cryptographically secure random nonce.
• Random Source: Environment CSPRNG via crypto.randomBytes(48) (Web Crypto API getRandomValues in browser, Node crypto.randomBytes in Node.js).
• Nonce Format: 48-byte cryptographically secure random buffer (384 bits of entropy) stored in the client account manageData operation (${homeDomain} auth), meeting the SEP-10 specification.
• Files: src/integration/sep10Auth.ts, src/integration/index.ts, src/tests/sep10ChallengeNonce.test.ts.

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