sudo-mcp gives an AI model root access to your system. There is no way to make this safe. The blocklist is a speed bump, not a barrier.

By using this tool, you accept that:

• Your system could be destroyed
• Your data could be deleted or exfiltrated
• Malware could be installed
• The AI could do anything root can do

If you don't understand and accept these risks, don't use this tool.

The blocklist cannot prevent a determined or creative attacker. Common bypass techniques include:

# Command substitution
$(echo "rm -rf /")

# Variable expansion
cmd="rm -rf /"; $cmd

# Absolute paths
/bin/rm -rf /

# Flag reordering
rm -r -f /

# Long-form flags
rm --recursive --force /

# Writing and executing scripts
echo "rm -rf /" > /tmp/x.sh && bash /tmp/x.sh

# Base64 encoding
echo "cm0gLXJmIC8=" | base64 -d | bash

The blocklist uses regex patterns which:

• Can have edge cases
• Cannot anticipate all obfuscation techniques
• Cannot prevent indirect execution
• Cannot stop multi-step attacks

Using --no-blocklist removes all command validation. The AI has completely unrestricted root access.

Only use this in disposable environments where you don't care what happens.

On macOS, sudo-mcp uses sudo -A with an osascript-based askpass helper to prompt for authentication via a native macOS password dialogue. This is the macOS analogue of polkit's graphical auth dialogue on Linux.

Key differences from Linux:

• Credential caching: macOS sudo caches credentials for a configurable timeout period (default 5 minutes). During this window, subsequent commands execute without prompting. This means the user may only see one password dialogue per session.
• No polkit: macOS has no polkit/pkexec. Privilege escalation is handled entirely through sudo.
• SIP protection: macOS System Integrity Protection prevents modification of /usr/bin/ and other protected paths. The binary installs to /usr/local/bin/ instead.
• Askpass script: A temporary shell script is created at runtime that invokes osascript to display the password dialogue. The script is stored in a temp directory with user-only permissions (0700) and persists for the process lifetime.
• Graphical session required: The osascript dialogue requires a graphical session. Running sudo-mcp via SSH or in a headless environment will fail to display the prompt.

On Windows, sudo-mcp uses the built-in sudo command introduced in Windows 11 24H2 to execute commands via sudo cmd /c <command>. A UAC (User Account Control) elevation prompt appears for each invocation.

Key considerations:

• New feature, less battle-tested: Windows sudo is a relatively recent addition (24H2+) and has not undergone the decades of hardening that Unix sudo and polkit have. Expect rough edges.
• UAC auto-approval risk: If an administrator account has UAC disabled (a known Windows misconfiguration), elevation prompts will not appear and commands will execute silently with full privileges. Ensure UAC is enabled.
• cmd /c shell: Commands are executed through cmd /c, so blocklist patterns must account for Windows command syntax (e.g., format, diskpart, reg, bcdedit). Users can still invoke PowerShell from within cmd /c.
• No fine-grained policy control: Windows has no equivalent of polkit's per-command policy rules. UAC is all-or-nothing per elevation request — you cannot selectively allow certain commands while denying others at the OS level.
• Credential caching: UAC may remember elevation consent for the duration of a session, meaning subsequent commands may not prompt the user again.

This tool is intentionally dangerous by design. If you find a blocklist bypass, that's expected. There is no security contact because there is no expectation of security.

Open a GitHub issue if you want, but don't expect it to be treated as a vulnerability.

This software is provided under the MIT License with NO WARRANTY.

You are solely responsible for any damage, data loss, or security breaches that occur from using this tool.