[markankamaransheogarat-sys]

Summary

Resolves #212.

Implements a cryptographic two-phase commit-reveal claim scheme with an enforced challenge delay window for competitive payroll bounties on Stellar/Soroban. This mechanism prevents mempool frontrunning bots from observing valid bounty solutions/proofs, extracting preimages, and frontrunning legitimate contributors with higher gas fees.

---

Architectural Design & Threat Model

 Phase 1: COMMIT
 Contributor (Alice)           Mempool / Frontrunner (Bob)           Soroban Contract
       │                                   │                                │
       ├────── commit_bounty_claim ───────►│                                │
       │       (Alice, hash)               │                                ├─ Stores commitment
       │                                   │                                │  commit_ledger = seq
       │                                   ├─ Observes commitment           │
       │                                   ├─ Copies hash under Bob's addr  │
       │                                   ├─ commit_bounty_claim(Bob, hash)┼─ Bob commits
       │                                   │                                │
       ▼                                   ▼                                ▼
 ~~~~~ Enforce CHALLENGE DELAY WINDOW (>= 5 ledgers / ~25s) ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
       ▲                                   ▲                                ▲
 Phase 2: REVEAL                           │                                │
 Contributor (Alice)                       │                                │
       │                                   │                                │
       ├────── reveal_bounty_claim ───────►│                                │
       │       (Alice, proof, salt)        ├─ Intercepts proof/salt in tx   │
       │                                   ├─ Attempts reveal(Bob, proof)───┼─► REJECTED:
       │                                   │                                │   Preimage mismatch
       │                                   │                                │   SHA256(Bob||proof) !=
       │                                   │                                │   stored commitment
       │                                   │                                │
       ├───────────────────────────────────┴───────────────────────────────►├─► VERIFIED & PAID:
       │                                                                    │   1. delay >= 5 ledgers
       │◄──────── Transfer reward payout (50 USDC) ─────────────────────────┤   2. Preimage matches
       │                                                                    │   3. Target hash matches
       │                                                                    │   4. Marked claimed

1. Commit Phase (commit_bounty_claim):

   • Contributor submits commitment_hash = SHA256(claimant || proof || secret_salt).
   • Contract records BountyCommitment { claimant, commitment_hash, commit_ledger } with state extension TTL.
   • Frontrunning bots inspecting mempool payloads only see an opaque hash preimage bound cryptographically to claimant. Even if a bot attempts to copy the commitment hash under the bot's address, the preimage check will fail upon reveal.

2. Challenge Delay Window (BOUNTY_CHALLENGE_DELAY_LEDGERS = 5):

   • Requires current_ledger >= commitment.commit_ledger + 5 (~25 seconds).
   • Prevents same-block or immediate frontrunning when a solution is committed.

3. Reveal Phase (reveal_bounty_claim):

   • Contributor submits proof and secret_salt.
   • Contract enforces:
     1. Commitment exists for claimant and commitment.claimant == claimant.
     2. Challenge delay window (5 ledgers) has elapsed.
     3. Preimage integrity: SHA256(claimant || proof || secret_salt) == commitment.commitment_hash.
     4. Solution verification: SHA256(proof) == bounty.solution_hash.
   • Dispatches token reward directly to claimant, marks bounty claimed, and emits bounty_claimed event.

4. Lifecycle & Reclamation (reclaim_bounty, get_bounty, get_bounty_commitment):

   • Creator can reclaim funds from expired, unclaimed bounties after expiration_timestamp.
   • Transparent public getters and helper function compute_bounty_commitment_hash for off-chain and frontend dApp integration.

---

Acceptance Criteria Checklist

• Two-phase commit-reveal process prevents mempool copy-paste frontrunning: Tested and verified (test_frontrunning_bot_mempool_copy_fails).
• Reveal submissions before challenge delay window are rejected: Tested and verified (test_reveal_bounty_claim_before_challenge_delay_fails, test_bounty_reveal_challenge_delay_panics_with_message).
• Invalid preimages or mismatched claimant addresses panic: Tested and verified (test_tampered_proof_or_salt_panics, test_invalid_solution_hash_fails, test_bounty_reveal_invalid_preimage_panics_with_message, test_bounty_reveal_without_commitment_panics).
• Double-claim and expired reclaim safety: Tested and verified (test_bounty_cannot_be_claimed_twice, test_bounty_reclaim_after_expiration).
• Comprehensive unit tests in contracts/soroban/src/test.rs: 8 dedicated tests covering full commit-reveal lifecycle, challenge delay, attack vectors, and edge cases.
• cargo test passes cleanly: All 134 tests pass 100% green (134 passed; 0 failed; 0 ignored).

[vercel]

@markankamaransheogarat-sys is attempting to deploy a commit to the Abdqoharr Olayiwola's projects Team on Vercel.

A member of the Team first needs to authorize it.