fix(security): validate redirect_uri in external token grant flow#212
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The external-application API-token grant page took redirect_uri verbatim from the query string and navigated window.location to it with the freshly minted token spliced in, allowing an attacker to exfiltrate a live token to an arbitrary origin via a crafted consent link. Add isValidTokenRedirectUri() which allows custom application schemes and loopback http(s) targets but rejects remote origins and dangerous schemes (javascript:/data:/...). Validate redirect_uri at parse time and encodeURIComponent the token when building the redirect target.
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why not, whitelist http* only? aren't we already doing that? |
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nvm we need custom protos, but we need to allow any host for http, not just localhost |
LucHeart
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Jun 18, 2026
LucHeart
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allow any host, not just localhost
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We do allow any host, but it must be https to not be localhost |
LucHeart
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Jun 19, 2026
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The external-application API-token grant page took redirect_uri verbatim from the query string and navigated window.location to it with the freshly minted token spliced in, allowing an attacker to exfiltrate a live token to an arbitrary origin via a crafted consent link.
Add isValidTokenRedirectUri() which allows custom application schemes and loopback http(s) targets but rejects remote origins and dangerous schemes (javascript:/data:/...). Validate redirect_uri at parse time and encodeURIComponent the token when building the redirect target.