Report it privately with the "Report a vulnerability" button on the repository's Security tab. Please don't open a public issue for it.

Only the latest release gets fixes.

Quomodo is a hard fork of Komodo v2.3.3. It does not merge upstream. When Komodo publishes a security fix to code Quomodo still has, the fix is cherry-picked by hand into a new release. A Komodo advisory about something Quomodo removed (docker, compose, terminals, the inbound Periphery listener, Builds, Deployments) does not apply.

Know these before you deploy it:

• The agent is root. It writes /etc/containers/systemd, drives systemd and rootful podman, and runs a Stack's pre- and post-deploy commands as root. Anyone who can deploy a Stack to a Server, or edit the git branch that Stack reads, is root on that host. Give write access on Stacks, Servers and their repos accordingly. This applies to API keys and webhook secrets too.
• Agents only connect over TLS. The agent dials Core and both run a Noise handshake with their key pairs: Core checks the agent's public key against its Server, and the agent pins Core's key on first contact. The handshake authenticates but does not encrypt, and the session after it carries resolved secret values. So the agent only accepts wss:// addresses and refuses to start on ws:// or http://. It always verifies Core's certificate, against the system roots or a CA file you give it; there is no switch to turn verification off.
• Where secrets live. Secret values are never stored in mongo, in the repo clone, or in a file under /etc/containers/systemd. Core holds them in memory during a deploy and sends them to the agent. The agent creates podman secrets with podman's default file driver, which stores them unencrypted under /var/lib/containers/storage/secrets, readable by root. Core's own bootstrap secrets (database password, JWT secret, vault credentials) are root podman secrets on the Core host in the same way. When Core serves TLS itself, its private key is a file in the host directory you mount, so it can be renewed in place; keep that directory root-only.
• Core can read the vault. With the Vaultwarden provider, Core holds an API key and master password that decrypt every collection the service account can see. Limit that account to the collections Stacks use.
• Alerters send outbound. Core posts alerts to the endpoints you configure. Keep webhook tokens in the secret store with [[NAME]]; a token typed straight into an endpoint url is stored in mongo.
• Agents listen on nothing. There is no inbound port, passkey or terminal on an agent host.