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* Fix: Prevent newline injection in connect command prompts Escape control chars and handle comments to prevent hidden commands from bypassing the confirmation prompt. Attackers with Can Edit on shared records could exfiltrate device credentials without operator visibility. * Add word-boundary check for shell comments; cover with 3 regression tests
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sshrushanth-ks
marked this pull request as ready for review
September 30, 2026 12:24
sk-keeper
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Sep 30, 2026
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Summary
Escape control characters instead of deleting them, and properly handle shell comments to expose multi-statement payloads in the confirmation prompt. Attackers with Can Edit on shared records could inject commands that execute silently, exfiltrating device credentials without operator visibility.
Changes
keepercommander/commands/connect_prompts.py:unit-tests/test_connect_security.py: