security(webhooks): consolidate destination admission and delivery evidence - #670
security(webhooks): consolidate destination admission and delivery evidence#670seonghobae wants to merge 53 commits into
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- Blocks internal IP delivery to prevent SSRF - Modifies url checker to catch local/private networks
- Strictly enforces HTTPS for webhook URLs at registration. - Blocks internal IP delivery via DNS resolution override (SafeWebhookAgent) to prevent SSRF bypasses.
…oad fix) - Strictly enforces HTTPS for webhook URLs at registration. - Blocks internal IP delivery via DNS resolution override (SafeWebhookAgent) to prevent SSRF bypasses. - Restored `modulepreload` links for cloud UI dependencies in index.html and scopeweave.spec.js tests.
…l validation) - Strictly enforces HTTPS for webhook URLs at registration. - Blocks internal IP delivery via DNS resolution override (SafeWebhookAgent) to prevent SSRF bypasses. - Uses `undici@^7.29.1` to maintain Node 22.13.0 compatibility. - Disables redirect following to mitigate rebinding vulnerabilities.
…l validation) - Strictly enforces HTTPS for webhook URLs at registration. - Blocks internal IP delivery via DNS resolution override (SafeWebhookAgent) to prevent SSRF bypasses. - Uses `undici@^7.29.1` to maintain Node 22.13.0 compatibility. - Disables redirect following to mitigate rebinding vulnerabilities. - Reuses global fetch for internal OIDC auth to prevent interceptor bleed.
…l validation) - Strictly enforces HTTPS for webhook URLs at registration. - Blocks internal IP delivery via DNS resolution override (SafeWebhookAgent) to prevent SSRF bypasses. - Uses `undici@^7.29.1` to maintain Node 22.13.0 compatibility. - Uses aliased local `undiciFetch` with `redirect: 'error'` specifically for webhook execution, preserving global context.
…l validation) - Strictly enforces HTTPS for webhook URLs at registration. - Blocks internal IP delivery via DNS resolution override (SafeWebhookAgent) to prevent SSRF bypasses. - Uses `undici@^7.29.1` to maintain Node 22.13.0 compatibility. - Uses aliased local `undiciFetch` with `redirect: 'error'` specifically for webhook execution, preserving global context.
…l validation) - Strictly enforces HTTPS for webhook URLs at registration. - Blocks internal IP delivery via DNS resolution override (SafeWebhookAgent) to prevent SSRF bypasses. - Uses `undici@^7.29.1` to maintain Node 22.13.0 compatibility. - Uses aliased local `undiciFetch` with `redirect: 'error'` specifically for webhook execution, preserving global context.
…l validation) - Strictly enforces HTTPS for webhook URLs at registration. - Blocks internal IP delivery via DNS resolution override (SafeWebhookAgent) to prevent SSRF bypasses. - Uses `undici@^7.29.1` to maintain Node 22.13.0 compatibility. - Uses aliased local `undiciFetch` with `redirect: 'error'` specifically for webhook execution, preserving global context.
…l validation) - Strictly enforces HTTPS for webhook URLs at registration. - Blocks internal IP delivery via DNS resolution override (SafeWebhookAgent) to prevent SSRF bypasses. - Uses `undici@^7.29.1` to maintain Node 22.13.0 compatibility. - Uses aliased local `undiciFetch` with `redirect: 'error'` specifically for webhook execution, preserving global context.
Replaces the lax regex URL check with the native `URL` constructor to normalize IPs, then strictly validates the `.hostname` property against internal loopback, private network, and cloud metadata IP ranges to prevent Server-Side Request Forgery.
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drafts: true📝 WalkthroughWalkthrough웹훅 생성 URL 검증이 강화되었습니다. 서버는 내부 및 사설 주소를 거부합니다. 스모크 테스트와 보안 학습 항목도 새 검증 규칙에 맞게 변경되었습니다. Changes웹훅 SSRF 방어
Estimated code review effort: 2 (Simple) | ~10 minutes Merge Risk: 🟠 High · up to 웹훅 URL 검증은 일부 내부 주소를 차단하지만 DNS, 리다이렉트, IPv6 우회로 인해 내부 서비스나 메타데이터로 요청될 수 있습니다. SSRF 방어를 완성하고 외부 네트워크 의존 테스트를 격리한 뒤 병합해야 합니다. Suggested reviewers: 🚥 Pre-merge checks | ✅ 5✅ Passed checks (5 passed)
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In `@server/app.mjs`:
- Around line 755-756: Update the fetch call in sendWebhook to prevent
unvalidated redirects by setting redirect handling to error when redirects are
not required; if redirects must remain supported, validate every Location target
against the existing hostname checks and enforce a maximum hop count.
- Around line 759-760: sendWebhook의 fetch 연결 경로에서 hostname이 DNS 이름인 경우에도 연결 시점마다
모든 A/AAAA 해석 결과를 조회하고 허용된 CIDR인지 검증하도록 업데이트하세요. 생성 시점의 단일 조회나 net.isIP(hostname)
검사에 의존하지 말고, DNS rebinding으로 내부 주소에 연결되지 않도록 실제 연결에 사용되는 주소마다 검사를 적용하세요.
- Line 765: Strengthen the internal-address validation around the hostname check
to use CIDR-based IPv6 classification rather than string regexes, covering the
full fe80::/10 and fc00::/7 ranges plus IPv4-mapped IPv6 addresses in
::ffff:0:0/96, including their 32-bit IPv4 representation. Apply the same
validation to DNS-resolved addresses and every fetch redirect target, or disable
redirects.
In `@tests/api/smoke.mjs`:
- Line 269: 격리된 웹훅 생성 테스트에서 example.com으로 요청하지 않도록 업데이트하세요. fetch mock, 테스트가 소유한
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@jules 이 PR은 현재 exact head 이 PR의 유효 delta는 RED acceptance: (1) DNS hostname의 모든 A/AAAA answer 중 private/link-local/local-use가 하나라도 있으면 fail closed, (2) 실제 선택된 socket address가 검증된 address와 동일, (3) GREEN acceptance: 위 deterministic fixtures와 #649/#667의 고유 source/test/coverage/product-gap evidence를 빠짐없이 보존한 하나의 normal descendant, external-network fixture 제거, fresh exact-head Server Tests/API/unit/owned coverage/Fuzz/Security/SAST/CodeQL terminal GREEN, valid unresolved finding 0, qualifying independent current-head approval. predecessor GREEN이나 source-neutral re-kick은 인정하지 않습니다. 이 조건 전에는 Draft를 유지해 주세요. |
Thank you for the thorough security review. I have dropped my initial implementation and performed a hard reset to the |
seonghobae
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develop@2c328875e00e86537df3e965170be80532571cad1a513d7cb69a4a23bd6b08a786498757796061a8This PR is the consolidation lane for the destination-module implementation. It is not a release certificate and does not yet claim complete succession of every valid #649 native-transport invariant.
Adopted #667 boundary
The predecessor tree at #670
1082f942...contained the same destination-module implementation/test/baseline blobs as #667 but also reintroduced five branch-local.jules/sentinel.mddoctrine lines. The doctrine was removed by restoring the canonical blob17f338fe12353f1226dc1530971b120e9e84b6c2.Git tree
45baa7b64d9c2406385dce6db5a621a90fe614d5is exactly the tree of #667@c3d1c2077622d435691d6cd7ba79a3ef3b3d21b2. Commit3bfcd949...recorded that adoption as a normal two-parent commit with first parent #670@1082f942...and second parent #667@c3d1c207...; no force update or destructive rebase was used.That adopted boundary includes HTTPS-only/no-credentials destinations, registration and persisted-delivery revalidation, all-answer A/AAAA admission, exact selected-address binding through the webhook-only Undici dispatcher, family-specific IPv4/IPv6 blocklists, RFC 6052 embedded-IPv4 policy with a public translated positive control, RFC 8215/mapped/private/link-local/documentation/benchmark/multicast rejection,
redirect: 'error', deterministic 302-to-169.254.169.254no-second-hop evidence, delivery receipts with one retry, owned c8 registration, and the code-current product/security gap baseline.Review-driven smoke isolation
Fresh review-thread verification found one still-valid predecessor finding:
tests/api/smoke.mjsregistered a real public host and coupled CRUD smoke to DNS/Internet behavior even though delivery/retry was already exercised deterministically intests/api/webhook-ssrf.test.mjswithMockAgent.disableNetConnect().Normal child
3d5aaa492b8ce985e0bf26bc2fa23f3f3588cb1dadopted the reviewed #649 smoke fixture: the CRUD subscription uses a reserved non-delivery host with eventnever, performs no delivery, and asserts an empty delivery ledger. Redirect/failure/one-retry semantics remain in the deterministic network-disabled SSRF fixture.#649 DNS-timeout succession repair
Fresh source comparison with #649@
ab0ff34bf60879172340cc5d881d910b4aabf0c1found a still-valid transport invariant absent from the chosen Undici tree: #649 bounds DNS admission independently from the overall request budget, while #670's callback-stylecreateSafeWebhookLookup()could wait until the outer 3-second request abort if a resolver stalled.d67903b9622d433aaae85113d4122f831af86092:tests/unit/webhook_destination_timeout.test.mjsinjects a resolver that returns only after 100 ms, configures a 10 ms DNS budget, and requireswebhook DNS resolution timed outbefore a 50 ms watchdog. The preceding production function ignored the new timeout option and had no independent DNS deadline.508c1664963ae3c14e8e4c5224a01d675d22d6eb:createSafeWebhookLookup(resolve, { dnsTimeoutMs = 1000 })now has one settlement gate and a DNS deadline; a late resolver callback cannot produce a second admission/socket decision.cfb1375d3656c015ab1189e955903287f0234188adds that regression to the owned c8 execution path.234c01559ff31b4b86a9fb0a3b0af420ae539219removes unnecessary new validation/catch branches while retaining the deadline contract.1a513d7cb69a4a23bd6b08a786498757796061a8makes the executable and residual boundaries code-current.A focused reconstruction of the current module + regression passed under Node 22.16.0. This is narrow local evidence, not repository-wide or hosted GREEN. Current exact-head Server Tests
34045889289, Security34045889308, Fuzz34045889243, CodeQL PR34045889299, and SAST34045889375are newly queued and uncredited.Remaining #649 succession gap
#649 remains open. Its still-distinct valid native-HTTPS evidence includes explicit connect-timeout behavior, original-hostname/TLS-SNI assertions, bounded response-header handling, transport response destruction/cleanup, and focused
webhook_transportunit fixtures. Its unrelated E2E preload deletion is not a valid delta to inherit.Do not close #649 merely because #667 is an ancestor and two #649 invariants are now adopted. A complete successor must reproduce or normally inherit the remaining executable contracts against the chosen Undici transport without weakening current DNS/address/redirect/coverage evidence, then prove the inheritance on one unchanged exact head.
GREEN acceptance
Keep Draft until one unchanged exact head has focused SSRF/NAT64/DNS/redirect/application-retry/timeout regressions GREEN; supported Node correctness and owned production coverage GREEN; Security, SAST, Fuzz and CodeQL terminal GREEN; zero valid unresolved current-head review findings plus a qualifying independent current-head approval; explicit proof that every remaining valid #649 transport invariant is inherited; and normal protected-branch eligibility.
No source-neutral CI re-kick, self-approval, scanner suppression, gate weakening, force push, destructive rebase, generated repository doctrine, process-global dispatcher, or predecessor-GREEN transfer.