@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+---
+'@objectstack/platform-objects': patch
+---
+
+feat(platform-objects): the platform identity actions an agent may reach declare it — additive acts exposed, destructive lifecycle acts exposed behind confirmation, credential and ownership acts human-only
+
+Clause-②: no
+Metadata-protocol: none
+
+The `sys_*` identity objects' actions now carry the ADR-0011 `ai` block by risk, as ADR-0011's 2026-10-30 addendum records (58 actions assessed, 38 declared):
+
+- **Exposed (21).** Additive or self-scoped acts declare `ai: { exposed: true, description }`: the four `invite_user` mirrors, resending and accepting an invitation, adding a member to an organization or a team, creating, editing and renaming a team or an organization, switching the active organization, re-enabling an OAuth application, enabling two-factor authentication, updating your own profile, resending the verification email, and requesting SSO domain verification.
+- **Exposed, confirmation required (17).** Destructive or privilege-changing lifecycle acts also declare `requiresConfirmation: true`, so MCP `run_action` refuses them `428 ACTION_CONFIRMATION_REQUIRED`, with nothing run, until the call carries `confirm: true`: banning, unbanning and unlocking a user, setting a user's manager, revoking an API key or a session, signing out other devices, cancelling or declining an invitation, removing a member or a team member, deleting a team, an OAuth application or an SSO provider, disabling an OAuth application, leaving an organization, and unlinking a sign-in provider.
+- **Human-only (20).** Acts that mint a credential or a session, change ownership, a role or a sign-in factor, or destroy an account or an organization (impersonating a user, setting a password, creating a user or an API key, transferring ownership, changing a member's role, deleting an organization, and the rest the addendum names) declare no `ai` block and are not listed over MCP. `sys_invitation.copy_invitation_link` declares none either; it was not part of the assessment.
+
+Over MCP these actions are listed and run behind every existing gate: the capability gate, the installation's action switch, the param contract, the confirmation gate and the identity route's own authorization. They are `type: 'api'` actions forwarded to identity routes that accept a signed-in session only, so an agent connected over OAuth sees them listed and is refused at the route when it runs one.
@@ -261,6 +261,20 @@ can reach is the **default exposure policy (v1)**:
   The stored-metadata tables (`sys_metadata`, `sys_metadata_history`) stay
   refused even when flagged. Each action `list_actions` returns carries
   `aiExposed: true`, the server's attestation of that opt-in.
+- **The platform's own identity actions declare it by risk.** Additive acts
+  (inviting someone, adding a member to a team, creating or renaming a team or
+  an organization, re-enabling an OAuth application) are exposed. Destructive
+  lifecycle acts (banning a user, revoking a session or an API key, removing a
+  member, deleting a team, leaving an organization) are exposed with
+  `ai.requiresConfirmation: true`, so `run_action` refuses them until the call
+  carries `confirm: true`. Acts that mint a credential or a session, change
+  ownership or a sign-in factor, or destroy an account or an organization
+  (impersonating a user, setting a password, creating an API key, transferring
+  ownership, deleting an organization) declare nothing and are not listed. The
+  full list is ADR-0011's 2026-10-30 addendum. These actions forward to
+  identity routes that accept a signed-in session only, so an agent connected
+  over OAuth sees them listed, but a call that reaches the identity route is
+  refused there (`401`) and changes nothing.
 
 <Callout type="info">
 This is the default policy, not a ceiling. A finer, **metadata-declared** exposure
 
@@ -305,6 +305,86 @@ ships next.
 
 ---
 
+## Addendum (2026-10-30): the platform identity actions an agent may reach
+
+> Status of this addendum: **ruled** (ruling of record `6523087116` on #27900, letter A+), executing
+> parameter 2 of ruling `6513869839` on #27681. The maintainer, verbatim:
+> 「所以我说评估标准对象的意思，就是允许放开的动作，是不是就应该把申明加上」.
+> It changes no rule of this ADR: it records how the platform's own `sys_*` identity actions apply the
+> opt-in, and the declarations that follow from it.
+
+The opt-in binds the platform's `sys_*` actions exactly as it binds an app's: an action reaches an
+agent only when it declares `ai: { exposed: true, description }`. The named actions on the twelve
+identity objects in `packages/platform-objects/src/identity/` were assessed once, as one set, into
+three buckets, and the declarations were written in the same change as this addendum.
+
+| Bucket | Test | What the action declares |
+|:--|:--|:--|
+| **H** human-only | it mints a credential or a session, changes who owns or who can sign in, or destroys an account or an organization | no `ai` block. ⛔ No `ai.exposed` on one of these without a maintainer ruling that names the action. |
+| **C** exposed, confirmed | a destructive or privilege-changing lifecycle act that is reversible or bounded | `ai: { exposed: true, description, requiresConfirmation: true }`. ⛔ The confirmation is never relaxed. |
+| **E** exposed | an additive or self-scoped act with no credential and no privilege escalation | `ai: { exposed: true, description }`; confirmation is the author's choice (none is declared today). |
+
+**H — human-only (20):** `sys_user.impersonate_user` · `sys_user.set_user_password` ·
+`sys_user.create_user` · `sys_user.delete_my_account` · `sys_user.change_my_password` ·
+`sys_user.change_my_email` · `sys_user.disable_two_factor` · `sys_user.generate_backup_codes` ·
+`sys_two_factor.disable_two_factor` · `sys_two_factor.regenerate_backup_codes` ·
+`sys_api_key.create_api_key` · `sys_api_key.restore_api_key` ·
+`sys_oauth_application.create_oauth_application` · `sys_oauth_application.rotate_client_secret` ·
+`sys_sso_provider.register_sso_provider` · `sys_sso_provider.register_saml_provider` ·
+`sys_sso_provider.verify_domain` · `sys_member.transfer_ownership` · `sys_member.update_member_role` ·
+`sys_organization.delete_organization`.
+
+**C — exposed, confirmed (17):** `sys_user.ban_user` · `sys_user.unban_user` · `sys_user.unlock_user` ·
+`sys_user.set_user_manager` · `sys_api_key.revoke_api_key` · `sys_session.revoke_session` ·
+`sys_session.revoke_my_other_sessions` · `sys_invitation.cancel_invitation` ·
+`sys_invitation.reject_invitation` · `sys_member.remove_member` · `sys_team_member.remove_team_member` ·
+`sys_team.remove_team` · `sys_oauth_application.disable_oauth_application` ·
+`sys_oauth_application.delete_oauth_application` · `sys_sso_provider.delete_sso_provider` ·
+`sys_organization.leave_organization` · `sys_account.unlink_account`.
+
+**E — exposed (21):** `sys_user.invite_user` · `sys_invitation.invite_user` ·
+`sys_organization.invite_user` · `sys_member.invite_user` · `sys_invitation.resend_invitation` ·
+`sys_invitation.accept_invitation` · `sys_member.add_member` · `sys_team_member.add_team_member` ·
+`sys_team.add_team_member` · `sys_team.create_team` · `sys_team.update_team` ·
+`sys_organization.create_organization` · `sys_organization.update_organization` ·
+`sys_organization.rename_organization` · `sys_organization.set_active_organization` ·
+`sys_oauth_application.enable_oauth_application` · `sys_user.enable_two_factor` ·
+`sys_two_factor.enable_two_factor` · `sys_user.update_my_profile` ·
+`sys_user.resend_verification_email` · `sys_sso_provider.request_domain_verification`.
+
+That is 58 actions and 38 `ai` blocks. The card's bucket headers read H 19 and E 22; its name lists,
+which the ruling adopted, hold 20 and 21, and the names are the record.
+
+**Not assessed.** `sys_invitation.copy_invitation_link` was added after the assessment (the link-only
+invitation delivery). It declares no `ai` block, which is this ADR's default, and it is not assessed
+until a maintainer ruling names it.
+
+**No automatic check.** The maintainer struck the pin test the assessment proposed:
+「自动检查 有必要吗？每一个元数据应用都有类似的问题，后续都要检查吗」. This table lives only here; a reviewer
+of `packages/platform-objects/src/identity/**` reads it. A customer app governs its own actions with
+the same key and the platform's defaults: the opt-in, the confirmation default, and the ADR-0126
+activation switch.
+
+**How the declarations reach an agent.** Over MCP, a `sys_*` action is listed and run only when the
+action itself declares `ai.exposed: true` — ADR-0066 D4's 2026-10-30 note records that mechanism
+(`packages/runtime/src/action-execution.ts#systemObjectActionExposureError`). As of this addendum the
+38 E and C actions above are the platform `sys_*` actions that declare it. Every gate after admission
+still runs: ADR-0066 D4's capability gate, the ADR-0126 §8 activation switch, the
+`ai.requiresConfirmation` gate (a C action is refused `428 ACTION_CONFIRMATION_REQUIRED`, nothing run,
+until the call carries `confirm: true`; `packages/runtime/src/action-execution.ts#actionConfirmationRefusal`),
+and the target's own authorization.
+
+**Declared is not yet runnable for an OAuth-connected agent.** All 38 are `type: 'api'` actions that
+forward to an identity route: 37 to the better-auth routes under `/api/v1/auth/`, and
+`sys_api_key.revoke_api_key` to the REST data route. Those targets accept a signed-in session, and the
+forward of an OAuth-connected agent's call is answered `401` there. Which credentials a forward
+target accepts is not decided here; it is the open decision on #28178. Until that lands, an
+OAuth-connected agent lists these actions, a C action is still refused `428` until the call is
+confirmed, and a call that reaches the identity route is answered `401` there, with nothing changed.
+A signed-in session's same call is served.
+
+---
+
 ## References
 
 * ADR-0003 — Package as first-class citizen (where actions live)
 
@@ -105,9 +105,13 @@ describe('#7309 — an action that collects params opens ONE dialog', () => {
     // `ai.description` is the LLM-facing contract (≥40 chars, required when
     // `ai.exposed`) — the same word one level down. Putting the question there
     // would arm a tool description while the dialog fell back to its generic line.
+    // An action ADR-0011's 2026-10-30 addendum exposes carries its own
+    // `ai.description`, written for the model — never the dialog question.
     for (const [name, obj] of OBJECTS) {
       for (const action of CONVERTED[name] ?? []) {
-        expect(byName(obj, action).ai?.description, `${name}.${action}.ai.description`).toBeUndefined();
+        const a = byName(obj, action);
+        expect(a.description, `${name}.${action}.description`).toBeTruthy();
+        expect(a.ai?.description, `${name}.${action}.ai.description`).not.toBe(a.description);
       }
     }
   });
 
@@ -74,6 +74,14 @@ export const SysAccount = ObjectSchema.create({
       params: [
         { name: 'accountId', field: 'id', defaultFromRow: true, required: true },
       ],
+      // ADR-0011 identity-actions note, bucket C: exposed, and the
+      // confirmation is never relaxed.
+      ai: {
+        exposed: true,
+        description:
+          'Unlink an external sign-in provider from the user\'s account (the record; param: its accountId): they can no longer sign in with that provider until they link it again. Ask the human to confirm before calling.',
+        requiresConfirmation: true,
+      },
     },
   ],
 
 
@@ -160,6 +160,14 @@ export const SysApiKey = ObjectSchema.create({
       confirmText: 'Revoke this API key? Any clients using it will immediately lose access.',
       successMessage: 'API key "{{ record.name }}" revoked',
       refreshAfter: true,
+      // ADR-0011 identity-actions note, bucket C: exposed, and the
+      // confirmation is never relaxed.
+      ai: {
+        exposed: true,
+        description:
+          'Revoke an API key (the record): every client using it loses access immediately. It can be restored later. Ask the human to confirm before calling.',
+        requiresConfirmation: true,
+      },
     },
     {
       name: 'restore_api_key',
 
@@ -106,6 +106,12 @@ export const SysInvitation = ObjectSchema.create({
         // field, so the gate narrows this dialog and no other picker.
         { field: 'role', required: true, options: [...INVITATION_ROLE_OPTIONS], helpText: MEMBERSHIP_ROLE_PARAM_HELP },
       ],
+      // ADR-0011 identity-actions note, bucket E: exposed by plain declaration.
+      ai: {
+        exposed: true,
+        description:
+          'Invite a person by email address to join the current organization with a role (params: email, role). They join when they accept the invitation. Use when the user asks to invite someone who is not a member yet; the role options are only the roles the caller may grant.',
+      },
     },
     {
       name: 'cancel_invitation',
@@ -122,6 +128,14 @@ export const SysInvitation = ObjectSchema.create({
       confirmText: 'Cancel this invitation? The recipient will no longer be able to accept it.',
       successMessage: 'Invitation canceled',
       refreshAfter: true,
+      // ADR-0011 identity-actions note, bucket C: exposed, and the
+      // confirmation is never relaxed.
+      ai: {
+        exposed: true,
+        description:
+          'Cancel a pending invitation (the record), so its recipient can no longer accept it. Ask the human to confirm before calling.',
+        requiresConfirmation: true,
+      },
     },
     {
       name: 'resend_invitation',
@@ -152,6 +166,12 @@ export const SysInvitation = ObjectSchema.create({
         { field: 'email', required: true, defaultFromRow: true, carryOver: true },
         { field: 'role', required: true, defaultFromRow: true, carryOver: true },
       ],
+      // ADR-0011 identity-actions note, bucket E: exposed by plain declaration.
+      ai: {
+        exposed: true,
+        description:
+          'Send a pending invitation (the record) again (params: its email and role, copied from the invitation; the stored role is kept). Its expiry date starts over. Use when the invitee lost the invitation or never received it.',
+      },
     },
     {
       // [#27843, ruling E on #27797] The pending invitation's accept link, for
@@ -216,6 +236,12 @@ export const SysInvitation = ObjectSchema.create({
       visible: "has(record.email) && record.email == ctx.user.email && has(record.status) && record.status == 'pending'",
       successMessage: 'Invitation accepted',
       refreshAfter: true,
+      // ADR-0011 identity-actions note, bucket E: exposed by plain declaration.
+      ai: {
+        exposed: true,
+        description:
+          'Accept an invitation addressed to the current user (the record), joining its organization with the invited role. Works only on a pending invitation sent to the caller\'s own email address.',
+      },
     },
     {
       name: 'reject_invitation',
@@ -230,6 +256,14 @@ export const SysInvitation = ObjectSchema.create({
       confirmText: 'Decline this invitation? The inviter will be notified and you will need a new invitation to join.',
       successMessage: 'Invitation declined',
       refreshAfter: true,
+      // ADR-0011 identity-actions note, bucket C: exposed, and the
+      // confirmation is never relaxed.
+      ai: {
+        exposed: true,
+        description:
+          'Decline an invitation addressed to the current user (the record). The inviter is notified, and joining later needs a new invitation. Ask the human to confirm before calling.',
+        requiresConfirmation: true,
+      },
     },
   ],
 
 
@@ -130,6 +130,12 @@ export const SysMember = ObjectSchema.create({
         // field, so the gate narrows this dialog and no other picker.
         { field: 'role', required: true, options: [...INVITATION_ROLE_OPTIONS], helpText: MEMBERSHIP_ROLE_PARAM_HELP },
       ],
+      // ADR-0011 identity-actions note, bucket E: exposed by plain declaration.
+      ai: {
+        exposed: true,
+        description:
+          'Invite a person by email address to join the current organization with a role (params: email, role). They join when they accept the invitation. Use when the user asks to invite someone who is not a member yet; the role options are only the roles the caller may grant.',
+      },
     },
     {
       // Admin-only: directly attach an existing user to the active org,
@@ -200,6 +206,12 @@ export const SysMember = ObjectSchema.create({
         { field: 'role', required: true, helpText: MEMBERSHIP_ROLE_PARAM_HELP },
         { name: 'organizationId', field: 'organization_id' },
       ],
+      // ADR-0011 identity-actions note, bucket E: exposed by plain declaration.
+      ai: {
+        exposed: true,
+        description:
+          'Add an existing user straight into an organization with a role, without an invitation (params: userId, role, and optionally organizationId, which defaults to the active organization). Platform administrators only.',
+      },
     },
     {
       name: 'update_member_role',
@@ -245,6 +257,14 @@ export const SysMember = ObjectSchema.create({
       confirmText: 'Remove this member from the organization? They will lose access to all org resources.',
       successMessage: 'Member removed',
       refreshAfter: true,
+      // ADR-0011 identity-actions note, bucket C: exposed, and the
+      // confirmation is never relaxed.
+      ai: {
+        exposed: true,
+        description:
+          'Remove a member (the record) from the organization: they lose access to all of its resources. Ask the human to confirm before calling.',
+        requiresConfirmation: true,
+      },
     },
     // Make Owner is `update-member-role` with role=owner, and better-auth's
     // `updateMemberRole` writes the TARGET's role and nothing else: the caller
 
@@ -113,6 +113,14 @@ export const SysOauthApplication = ObjectSchema.create({
       params: [
         { name: 'client_id', field: 'client_id', defaultFromRow: true, required: true },
       ],
+      // ADR-0011 identity-actions note, bucket C: exposed, and the
+      // confirmation is never relaxed.
+      ai: {
+        exposed: true,
+        description:
+          'Disable an OAuth application (the record; param: its client_id): its tokens are rejected and integrations using it stop working until it is re-enabled. Platform administrators only. Ask the human to confirm before calling.',
+        requiresConfirmation: true,
+      },
     },
     {
       name: 'enable_oauth_application',
@@ -134,6 +142,12 @@ export const SysOauthApplication = ObjectSchema.create({
       params: [
         { name: 'client_id', field: 'client_id', defaultFromRow: true, required: true },
       ],
+      // ADR-0011 identity-actions note, bucket E: exposed by plain declaration.
+      ai: {
+        exposed: true,
+        description:
+          'Re-enable a disabled OAuth application (the record; param: its client_id), so token issuance, authorization and introspection resume for that client. Platform administrators only.',
+      },
     },
     {
       name: 'create_oauth_application',
@@ -246,6 +260,14 @@ export const SysOauthApplication = ObjectSchema.create({
       params: [
         { name: 'client_id', field: 'client_id', defaultFromRow: true, required: true },
       ],
+      // ADR-0011 identity-actions note, bucket C: exposed, and the
+      // confirmation is never relaxed.
+      ai: {
+        exposed: true,
+        description:
+          'Permanently delete an OAuth application (the record; param: its client_id): all tokens and consents issued to it are invalidated and its integrations stop working. This cannot be undone. Ask the human to confirm before calling.',
+        requiresConfirmation: true,
+      },
     },
   ],