Classification
COOL IDEA™ — defense-in-depth beyond Git object publication.
Idea
Reuse the machine-local path policy for pull-request, issue, comment, and review metadata. The current pre-commit, pre-push, and CI guards protect working-tree content and Git objects; GitHub-authored metadata lives outside that boundary and can still disclose workstation layout.
Capability boundary
A GitHub event workflow can detect a leak after metadata is published and can block a merge, alert maintainers, or initiate an authorized redaction path. It cannot prevent the first publication. Prevention therefore also needs a supported outbound writer or preflight command that scans proposed GitHub text before gh or an API client sends it.
Proposed shape
- Expose the existing policy as a reusable text preflight for PR, issue, comment, and review bodies.
- Provide a supported repository command or wrapper that checks outbound GitHub metadata before publication.
- Add a least-privilege GitHub event backstop for PR titles and bodies, issue bodies, comments, and reviews.
- Make a detected PR-surface leak a required merge-blocking check.
- Report only the surface identifier and field name; never echo matching content.
- Define an explicit, authorized redaction workflow rather than silently rewriting user-authored text.
- Keep fork-triggered execution safe and avoid evaluating untrusted repository code with elevated permissions.
Acceptance
- Representative metadata fixtures cover workstation-home paths on major platforms and private temporary-workspace paths.
- Safe portable placeholders remain admitted.
- The local preflight rejects unsafe text before an outbound test double is invoked.
- The GitHub backstop identifies unsafe metadata without reproducing the secret text.
- The permission model and the after-publication limitation are documented.
Related implementation boundary: #838.
Classification
COOL IDEA™ — defense-in-depth beyond Git object publication.
Idea
Reuse the machine-local path policy for pull-request, issue, comment, and review metadata. The current pre-commit, pre-push, and CI guards protect working-tree content and Git objects; GitHub-authored metadata lives outside that boundary and can still disclose workstation layout.
Capability boundary
A GitHub event workflow can detect a leak after metadata is published and can block a merge, alert maintainers, or initiate an authorized redaction path. It cannot prevent the first publication. Prevention therefore also needs a supported outbound writer or preflight command that scans proposed GitHub text before
ghor an API client sends it.Proposed shape
Acceptance
Related implementation boundary: #838.