Restore PWA contact request on add

Author: code4bones

pwa/package-lock.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@code4bones/branch-pwa",
-  "version": "0.1.0-beta.141",
+  "version": "0.1.0-beta.142",
   "private": true,
   "type": "module",
   "scripts": {

pwa/package.json

@@ -10,9 +10,11 @@ import { formatChatListTimestamp } from "./format-time.js";
 import { DeliveryStateIcon } from "./MessageLog.js";
 import { chatPath, MESSAGE_REQUESTS_PATH, SETTINGS_PATH } from "./paths.js";
 import { pwaReleaseVersion } from "./pwa-release.js";
+import { sendContactRequest } from "../connectivity/seal-and-send.js";
 import { useBranchID } from "../identity/use-branch-id.js";
 import { useChatList, useContactDiscoveries, useContactFolders, useContactPresence, useContactTyping, useContacts, useIdentity, useInboundAttachmentOffer, useIncomingMessageRequests, useTransportStatus, type ChatListEntry } from "../state/hooks.js";
 import { filterChatListByFolder } from "../state/contact-folder-filter.js";
+import { useAppStoreApi } from "../state/StoreProvider.js";
 import { parseBranchID } from "@code4bones/branch-core";
 
 export function ChatListSidebar(): React.JSX.Element {
@@ -286,6 +288,8 @@ function IncomingAttachmentBadge({ peerId }: { readonly peerId: string }): React
 function AddContactModal({ open, onClose }: { readonly open: boolean; readonly onClose: () => void }): React.JSX.Element {
   const contacts = useContacts();
   const discovery = useContactDiscoveries();
+  const identity = useIdentity();
+  const storeApi = useAppStoreApi();
   const [branchId, setBranchId] = useState("");
   const [error, setError] = useState<string | null>(null);
 
@@ -303,8 +307,28 @@ function AddContactModal({ open, onClose }: { readonly open: boolean; readonly o
 
   const add = (row: typeof discovery.rows[number]): void => {
     if (row.displayName === null || row.peerId === null || row.hpkePublicKey === null) return;
-    if (!contacts.contacts.some((contact) => contact.peerId === row.peerId)) contacts.upsertContact({ contactId: crypto.randomUUID(), displayName: row.displayName, peerId: row.peerId, hpkePublicKey: row.hpkePublicKey, lastRouteHint: null });
+    if (contacts.contacts.some((contact) => contact.peerId === row.peerId)) {
+      discovery.remove(row.branchId);
+      return;
+    }
+    contacts.upsertContact({ contactId: crypto.randomUUID(), displayName: row.displayName, peerId: row.peerId, hpkePublicKey: row.hpkePublicKey, lastRouteHint: null });
     discovery.remove(row.branchId);
+    const localIdentity = identity.identity;
+    if (localIdentity === null || localIdentity.displayName === null) return;
+    void sendContactRequest({
+      senderPeerId: localIdentity.peerId,
+      senderHpkePublicKey: localIdentity.hpkePublicKey,
+      senderDisplayName: localIdentity.displayName,
+      recipientPeerId: row.peerId,
+      recipientHpkePublicKey: row.hpkePublicKey
+    }).then(() => {
+      storeApi.getState().recordTransportTrace("contact request: sent");
+    }).catch(() => {
+      // The contact card is still useful locally. A missed live request is
+      // neither a rejection nor an offline-delivery promise, so do not queue
+      // or fabricate an invite outcome.
+      storeApi.getState().recordTransportTrace("contact request: not sent");
+    });
   };
 
   return (

pwa/src/app/ChatListSidebar.tsx

@@ -35,6 +35,34 @@ export interface PresenceControlOptions {
   readonly pingId: string;
 }
 
+export const contactRequestBody = "Contact request";
+
+// Contact discovery deliberately returns only the recipient's signed card to
+// the requester.  Adding that card locally must not silently make the other
+// endpoint a known contact.  Send one explicit, live-only legacy first-contact
+// payload so the recipient's existing Message Requests UI can ask for consent.
+// This is not an outbox entry: there is no offline invite queue, retry, or
+// delivery claim when the recipient has already left the live route.
+export async function sendContactRequest(options: {
+  readonly senderPeerId: string;
+  readonly senderHpkePublicKey: string;
+  readonly senderDisplayName: string;
+  readonly recipientPeerId: string;
+  readonly recipientHpkePublicKey: string;
+}): Promise<void> {
+  await sealAndSendPayload({
+    senderPeerId: options.senderPeerId,
+    recipientPeerId: options.recipientPeerId,
+    recipientHpkePublicKey: options.recipientHpkePublicKey,
+    deliveryId: createDeliveryID(),
+    plaintext: encodeBetaPwaMessagePayload({
+      body: contactRequestBody,
+      replyHpkePublicKey: options.senderHpkePublicKey,
+      senderDisplayName: options.senderDisplayName
+    })
+  });
+}
+
 // Seals a visible user message and tracks only its relay-forward outcome.
 // Control envelopes use the same HPKE boundary but deliberately have no
 // message-log state and no delivery claim.

pwa/src/connectivity/seal-and-send.ts

@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ import {
 } from "@code4bones/branch-core";
 
 import { openIncomingEnvelope } from "../src/connectivity/open-envelope.js";
-import { createDeliveryID } from "../src/connectivity/seal-and-send.js";
+import { contactRequestBody, createDeliveryID } from "../src/connectivity/seal-and-send.js";
 import { encodeChatTextApplicationPayload } from "../src/connectivity/application-payload.js";
 import {
   applicationCapabilitiesControlDescriptor,
@@ -572,6 +572,27 @@ void test("PWA classifies an authenticated unknown sender as a local message req
   assert.throws(() => { classifyIncomingMessage({ plaintext, senderPeerId: "bad", knownContactId: null }); });
 });
 
+void test("adding a discovered contact emits one live consent request without an outbox", async () => {
+  const senderPeerId = Buffer.alloc(32, 8).toString("base64url");
+  const replyHpkePublicKey = Buffer.alloc(32, 9).toString("base64url");
+  const plaintext = encodeBetaPwaMessagePayload({ body: contactRequestBody, replyHpkePublicKey, senderDisplayName: "Alice" });
+  const sidebar = await readFile(chatListSidebarPath, "utf8");
+  const sender = await readFile(sealAndSendPath, "utf8");
+
+  assert.equal(contactRequestBody, "Contact request");
+  assert.deepEqual(classifyIncomingMessage({ plaintext, senderPeerId, knownContactId: null }), {
+    kind: "message_request",
+    senderPeerId,
+    senderHpkePublicKey: replyHpkePublicKey,
+    senderDisplayName: "Alice",
+    body: contactRequestBody
+  });
+  assert.match(sidebar, /sendContactRequest/);
+  assert.match(sidebar, /contact request: sent/);
+  assert.match(sender, /export async function sendContactRequest/);
+  assert.match(sender, /This is not an outbox entry/);
+});
+
 void test("PWA presence controls are strict encrypted ping-pong payloads and never invite unknown traffic", () => {
   const senderPeerId = Buffer.alloc(32, 8).toString("base64url");
   const pingId = Buffer.alloc(16, 13).toString("base64url");