cnjack
diff --git a/‎internal/command/web.go‎
Lines changed: 78 additions & 2 deletions b/‎internal/command/web.go‎
Lines changed: 78 additions & 2 deletions
diff --git a/‎internal/web/auth.go‎
Lines changed: 147 additions & 0 deletions b/‎internal/web/auth.go‎
Lines changed: 147 additions & 0 deletions
@@ -2,11 +2,14 @@ package command
 
 import (
 	"context"
+	"crypto/rand"
+	"encoding/base64"
 	"encoding/json"
 	"fmt"
 	"os"
 	"os/signal"
 	"path/filepath"
+	"strings"
 	"sync"
 	"sync/atomic"
 	"syscall"
@@ -61,17 +64,19 @@ func NewWebCmd() *cobra.Command {
 	var port int
 	var host string
 	var openBrowser bool
+	var authToken string
 	cmd := &cobra.Command{
 		Use:          "web",
 		Short:        "Start the web server",
 		SilenceUsage: true,
 		RunE: func(cmd *cobra.Command, args []string) error {
-			return runWebServer(port, host, openBrowser)
+			return runWebServer(port, host, openBrowser, authToken)
 		},
 	}
 	cmd.Flags().IntVar(&port, "port", 8080, "HTTP server port")
 	cmd.Flags().StringVar(&host, "host", "127.0.0.1", "HTTP server host")
 	cmd.Flags().BoolVar(&openBrowser, "open", true, "Open browser after server starts")
+	cmd.Flags().StringVar(&authToken, "auth-token", "", "Bearer token required when bound to a non-loopback host (auto-generated if empty). Can also be set via JCODE_WEB_TOKEN.")
 	return cmd
 }
 
@@ -97,7 +102,64 @@ func dropInteractiveTools(tools []tool.BaseTool) []tool.BaseTool {
 	return out
 }
 
-func runWebServer(port int, host string, openBrowser bool) error {
+// resolveWebToken decides the web auth token and whether auth must be enforced.
+//
+// Auth is required when the bind host is non-loopback (exposed to the network),
+// or when a token was explicitly supplied. Token source priority:
+//  1. --auth-token flag / JCODE_WEB_TOKEN env — session-scoped, never written to disk
+//  2. ~/.jcode/web_token — persisted (0600), reused across restarts
+//  3. auto-generated (32 random bytes, base64url) when exposed and none of the
+//     above; persisted to ~/.jcode/web_token so the token is stable across restarts
+func resolveWebToken(host, flagToken string) (token string, requireAuth bool, err error) {
+	explicit := flagToken
+	if explicit == "" {
+		explicit = os.Getenv("JCODE_WEB_TOKEN")
+	}
+	// Explicit token (flag/env): enforce auth, never touch disk (session-scoped).
+	if explicit != "" {
+		if !web.IsValidWSSubprotocolToken(explicit) {
+			return "", true, fmt.Errorf("auth token must be printable ASCII with no spaces or separators (it is sent as a WebSocket subprotocol)")
+		}
+		return explicit, true, nil
+	}
+	// Loopback bind with no explicit token: keep the existing no-auth behaviour.
+	if web.IsLoopbackBind(host) {
+		return "", false, nil
+	}
+	// Exposed bind, no explicit token: reuse a persisted token or generate one.
+	dir := config.ConfigDir()
+	path := filepath.Join(dir, "web_token")
+	if b, rerr := os.ReadFile(path); rerr == nil {
+		if t := strings.TrimSpace(string(b)); t != "" {
+			return t, true, nil
+		}
+	}
+	gen, gerr := generateWebToken()
+	if gerr != nil {
+		return "", true, fmt.Errorf("generate web token: %w", gerr)
+	}
+	// Ensure ~/.jcode exists before writing, otherwise a first remote start would
+	// fail with ENOENT and silently fall back to a session-scoped token.
+	if merr := os.MkdirAll(dir, 0o700); merr != nil {
+		config.Logger().Printf("[web] could not create config dir %s: %v", dir, merr)
+	} else if werr := os.WriteFile(path, []byte(gen), 0o600); werr != nil {
+		// Non-fatal: fall back to a session-scoped token (auth still enforced).
+		config.Logger().Printf("[web] could not persist web token to %s: %v", path, werr)
+	}
+	return gen, true, nil
+}
+
+// generateWebToken returns 32 cryptographically-random bytes as a URL-safe
+// base64 string (no padding).
+func generateWebToken() (string, error) {
+	var b [32]byte
+	if _, err := rand.Read(b[:]); err != nil {
+		return "", err
+	}
+	return base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(b[:]), nil
+}
+
+func runWebServer(port int, host string, openBrowser bool, authToken string) error {
 	// Check if we need setup (no providers configured).
 	needsSetup := config.NeedsSetup()
 
@@ -540,6 +602,18 @@ func runWebServer(port int, host string, openBrowser bool) error {
 		}, nil
 	}
 
+	// Resolve the web auth token. Auth is enforced when bound to a non-loopback
+	// host (exposed to the network) or when a token was explicitly provided.
+	webToken, requireAuth, err := resolveWebToken(host, authToken)
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	if requireAuth {
+		fmt.Printf("\n🔐 Web access token (required when reaching %s):\n   %s\n", host, webToken)
+		fmt.Printf("   Open http://%s:%d/ and paste this token to sign in.\n\n", host, port)
+		config.Logger().Printf("[web] token auth enabled for non-loopback bind %q", host)
+	}
+
 	// Bootstrap engine for the initial task.
 	bootEC, err := buildWebTask("", pwd, startupMode.String(), nil, false)
 	if err != nil {
@@ -588,6 +662,8 @@ func runWebServer(port int, host string, openBrowser bool) error {
 		TokenUsage:         bootEC.TokenUsage,
 		ContextBreakdownFn: bootEC.BreakdownFn,
 		Automations:        autoStore,
+		AuthToken:          webToken,
+		RequireAuth:        requireAuth,
 	})
 
 	// Start the periodic automation scheduler. A single process owns periodic
 
@@ -0,0 +1,147 @@
+package web
+
+import (
+	"crypto/subtle"
+	"net"
+	"net/http"
+	"strings"
+)
+
+// wsAuthSubprotocol is the WebSocket subprotocol name under which the bearer
+// token rides on handshakes. Browsers cannot set custom headers on WebSocket
+// connections, so the frontend sends ["jcode-auth", "<token>"] and the token is
+// read from the second value. The server also advertises this subprotocol on
+// the upgrader so gorilla echoes the protocol name back and the handshake
+// completes cleanly.
+const wsAuthSubprotocol = "jcode-auth"
+
+// IsLoopbackBind reports whether the given bind host is loopback-only.
+//
+// An empty host, "0.0.0.0", or "::" binds all interfaces and is treated as
+// exposed (non-loopback). "localhost" and any IP whose IsLoopback() is true are
+// loopback. A hostname we cannot resolve statically is conservatively treated as
+// exposed, so we fail safe (require auth) rather than fail open.
+func IsLoopbackBind(host string) bool {
+	switch host {
+	case "", "0.0.0.0", "::":
+		return false
+	case "localhost":
+		return true
+	}
+	if ip := net.ParseIP(host); ip != nil {
+		return ip.IsLoopback()
+	}
+	return false // unknown hostname → assume exposed, require auth
+}
+
+// extractToken pulls the bearer token from a request, in priority order:
+//  1. Authorization: Bearer <token>
+//  2. Sec-WebSocket-Protocol: jcode-auth, <token>  (browser WebSocket handshakes
+//     can't carry custom headers, so the token rides as the second subprotocol)
+//  3. ?token=<token>  (fallback for non-browser ws clients; discouraged because
+//     it lands in access logs, proxy logs and browser history)
+func extractToken(r *http.Request) string {
+	if h := r.Header.Get("Authorization"); strings.HasPrefix(h, "Bearer ") {
+		return strings.TrimSpace(strings.TrimPrefix(h, "Bearer "))
+	}
+	if protos := r.Header.Get("Sec-WebSocket-Protocol"); protos != "" {
+		parts := strings.Split(protos, ",")
+		for i, p := range parts {
+			if strings.TrimSpace(p) == wsAuthSubprotocol && i+1 < len(parts) {
+				return strings.TrimSpace(parts[i+1])
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	// The ?token= fallback exists only for non-browser WebSocket clients that can
+	// set neither a header nor a subprotocol. Restrict it to the WS endpoints so
+	// bearer tokens for normal HTTP APIs never land in access/proxy logs, the
+	// Referer header, or browser history.
+	if acceptsQueryToken(r.URL.Path) {
+		return r.URL.Query().Get("token")
+	}
+	return ""
+}
+
+// acceptsQueryToken reports whether the ?token= fallback is allowed for a path —
+// only the WebSocket endpoints (the main event stream and the PTY sockets).
+func acceptsQueryToken(path string) bool {
+	return path == "/api/ws" || (strings.HasPrefix(path, "/api/pty/") && strings.HasSuffix(path, "/ws"))
+}
+
+// IsValidWSSubprotocolToken reports whether s is usable as a WebSocket
+// subprotocol value (RFC 6455 / RFC 7230 token): non-empty, printable ASCII with
+// no spaces or separators. The frontend sends the token as the second WS
+// subprotocol, so an explicit token containing such characters would make the
+// browser's WebSocket constructor throw and break the connection at startup.
+func IsValidWSSubprotocolToken(s string) bool {
+	if s == "" {
+		return false
+	}
+	for _, r := range s {
+		if r < 0x21 || r > 0x7e {
+			return false // control chars, space, and non-ASCII
+		}
+		switch r {
+		case '(', ')', '<', '>', '@', ',', ';', ':', '\\', '"', '/', '[', ']', '?', '=', '{', '}':
+			return false // RFC 7230 separators
+		}
+	}
+	return true
+}
+
+// validToken compares the provided token against the expected one in constant
+// time. An empty expected or provided token never validates.
+func validToken(provided, expected string) bool {
+	if expected == "" || provided == "" {
+		return false
+	}
+	return subtle.ConstantTimeCompare([]byte(provided), []byte(expected)) == 1
+}
+
+// isAuthExempt reports whether a request may proceed without a token even when
+// auth is required. It is a POSITIVE allowlist rather than a "/api/* needs auth"
+// rule, so an unregistered /api path that falls through to the SPA handler can't
+// sneak past: anything under /api/ requires a token unless explicitly listed.
+func isAuthExempt(r *http.Request) bool {
+	if r.Method == http.MethodOptions {
+		return true // defensive: preflight is normally short-circuited by corsMiddleware
+	}
+	p := r.URL.Path
+	if r.Method == http.MethodGet && p == "/api/health" {
+		return true // the frontend probes this before it has a token
+	}
+	if r.Method == http.MethodPost && p == "/api/auth/verify" {
+		return true // the endpoint the login page calls to validate a typed token
+	}
+	// Everything outside /api/ is the SPA shell + embedded static assets: the
+	// login page itself must load before the user has a token.
+	return !strings.HasPrefix(p, "/api/")
+}
+
+// authMiddleware enforces token auth when requireAuth is set. corsMiddleware
+// MUST wrap this — corsMiddleware(s.authMiddleware(mux)) — so OPTIONS preflights
+// are answered by cors and never reach here without an Authorization header.
+func (s *Server) authMiddleware(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
+	return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+		if !s.requireAuth || isAuthExempt(r) {
+			next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
+			return
+		}
+		if !validToken(extractToken(r), s.authToken) {
+			writeJSON(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, map[string]string{"error": "unauthorized"})
+			return
+		}
+		next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
+	})
+}
+
+// handleAuthVerify lets the login page check a token the user typed in. It reads
+// the token the same way the middleware does and returns 200 on a match, 401
+// otherwise. When auth is not required it always succeeds.
+func (s *Server) handleAuthVerify(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+	if !s.requireAuth || validToken(extractToken(r), s.authToken) {
+		writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, map[string]any{"ok": true})
+		return
+	}
+	writeJSON(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, map[string]string{"error": "invalid token"})
+}