Merge branch 'for-next/ghostbusters' into for-next/core

Fix and subsequently rewrite Spectre mitigations, including the addition
of support for PR_SPEC_DISABLE_NOEXEC.

(Will Deacon and Marc Zyngier)
* for-next/ghostbusters: (22 commits)
  arm64: Add support for PR_SPEC_DISABLE_NOEXEC prctl() option
  arm64: Pull in task_stack_page() to Spectre-v4 mitigation code
  KVM: arm64: Allow patching EL2 vectors even with KASLR is not enabled
  arm64: Get rid of arm64_ssbd_state
  KVM: arm64: Convert ARCH_WORKAROUND_2 to arm64_get_spectre_v4_state()
  KVM: arm64: Get rid of kvm_arm_have_ssbd()
  KVM: arm64: Simplify handling of ARCH_WORKAROUND_2
  arm64: Rewrite Spectre-v4 mitigation code
  arm64: Move SSBD prctl() handler alongside other spectre mitigation code
  arm64: Rename ARM64_SSBD to ARM64_SPECTRE_V4
  arm64: Treat SSBS as a non-strict system feature
  arm64: Group start_thread() functions together
  KVM: arm64: Set CSV2 for guests on hardware unaffected by Spectre-v2
  arm64: Rewrite Spectre-v2 mitigation code
  arm64: Introduce separate file for spectre mitigations and reporting
  arm64: Rename ARM64_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR to ARM64_SPECTRE_V2
  KVM: arm64: Simplify install_bp_hardening_cb()
  KVM: arm64: Replace CONFIG_KVM_INDIRECT_VECTORS with CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE
  arm64: Remove Spectre-related CONFIG_* options
  arm64: Run ARCH_WORKAROUND_2 enabling code on all CPUs
  ...

Author: willdeacon

arch/arm64/Kconfig

@@ -1172,32 +1172,6 @@ config UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0
 
 	  If unsure, say Y.
 
-config HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR
-	bool "Harden the branch predictor against aliasing attacks" if EXPERT
-	default y
-	help
-	  Speculation attacks against some high-performance processors rely on
-	  being able to manipulate the branch predictor for a victim context by
-	  executing aliasing branches in the attacker context.  Such attacks
-	  can be partially mitigated against by clearing internal branch
-	  predictor state and limiting the prediction logic in some situations.
-
-	  This config option will take CPU-specific actions to harden the
-	  branch predictor against aliasing attacks and may rely on specific
-	  instruction sequences or control bits being set by the system
-	  firmware.
-
-	  If unsure, say Y.
-
-config ARM64_SSBD
-	bool "Speculative Store Bypass Disable" if EXPERT
-	default y
-	help
-	  This enables mitigation of the bypassing of previous stores
-	  by speculative loads.
-
-	  If unsure, say Y.
-
 config RODATA_FULL_DEFAULT_ENABLED
 	bool "Apply r/o permissions of VM areas also to their linear aliases"
 	default y

arch/arm64/include/asm/cpucaps.h

@@ -31,13 +31,13 @@
 #define ARM64_HAS_DCPOP				21
 #define ARM64_SVE				22
 #define ARM64_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0		23
-#define ARM64_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR		24
+#define ARM64_SPECTRE_V2			24
 #define ARM64_HAS_RAS_EXTN			25
 #define ARM64_WORKAROUND_843419			26
 #define ARM64_HAS_CACHE_IDC			27
 #define ARM64_HAS_CACHE_DIC			28
 #define ARM64_HW_DBM				29
-#define ARM64_SSBD				30
+#define ARM64_SPECTRE_V4			30
 #define ARM64_MISMATCHED_CACHE_TYPE		31
 #define ARM64_HAS_STAGE2_FWB			32
 #define ARM64_HAS_CRC32				33

arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h

@@ -698,30 +698,6 @@ static inline bool system_supports_tlb_range(void)
 		cpus_have_const_cap(ARM64_HAS_TLB_RANGE);
 }
 
-#define ARM64_BP_HARDEN_UNKNOWN		-1
-#define ARM64_BP_HARDEN_WA_NEEDED	0
-#define ARM64_BP_HARDEN_NOT_REQUIRED	1
-
-int get_spectre_v2_workaround_state(void);
-
-#define ARM64_SSBD_UNKNOWN		-1
-#define ARM64_SSBD_FORCE_DISABLE	0
-#define ARM64_SSBD_KERNEL		1
-#define ARM64_SSBD_FORCE_ENABLE		2
-#define ARM64_SSBD_MITIGATED		3
-
-static inline int arm64_get_ssbd_state(void)
-{
-#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_SSBD
-	extern int ssbd_state;
-	return ssbd_state;
-#else
-	return ARM64_SSBD_UNKNOWN;
-#endif
-}
-
-void arm64_set_ssbd_mitigation(bool state);
-
 extern int do_emulate_mrs(struct pt_regs *regs, u32 sys_reg, u32 rt);
 
 static inline u32 id_aa64mmfr0_parange_to_phys_shift(int parange)

arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_asm.h

@@ -9,9 +9,6 @@
 
 #include <asm/virt.h>
 
-#define	VCPU_WORKAROUND_2_FLAG_SHIFT	0
-#define	VCPU_WORKAROUND_2_FLAG		(_AC(1, UL) << VCPU_WORKAROUND_2_FLAG_SHIFT)
-
 #define ARM_EXIT_WITH_SERROR_BIT  31
 #define ARM_EXCEPTION_CODE(x)	  ((x) & ~(1U << ARM_EXIT_WITH_SERROR_BIT))
 #define ARM_EXCEPTION_IS_TRAP(x)  (ARM_EXCEPTION_CODE((x)) == ARM_EXCEPTION_TRAP)
@@ -102,11 +99,9 @@ DECLARE_KVM_HYP_SYM(__kvm_hyp_vector);
 #define __kvm_hyp_init		CHOOSE_NVHE_SYM(__kvm_hyp_init)
 #define __kvm_hyp_vector	CHOOSE_HYP_SYM(__kvm_hyp_vector)
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_INDIRECT_VECTORS
 extern atomic_t arm64_el2_vector_last_slot;
 DECLARE_KVM_HYP_SYM(__bp_harden_hyp_vecs);
 #define __bp_harden_hyp_vecs	CHOOSE_HYP_SYM(__bp_harden_hyp_vecs)
-#endif
 
 extern void __kvm_flush_vm_context(void);
 extern void __kvm_tlb_flush_vmid_ipa(struct kvm_s2_mmu *mmu, phys_addr_t ipa,

arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_emulate.h

@@ -383,20 +383,6 @@ static inline unsigned long kvm_vcpu_get_mpidr_aff(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	return vcpu_read_sys_reg(vcpu, MPIDR_EL1) & MPIDR_HWID_BITMASK;
 }
 
-static inline bool kvm_arm_get_vcpu_workaround_2_flag(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
-{
-	return vcpu->arch.workaround_flags & VCPU_WORKAROUND_2_FLAG;
-}
-
-static inline void kvm_arm_set_vcpu_workaround_2_flag(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
-						      bool flag)
-{
-	if (flag)
-		vcpu->arch.workaround_flags |= VCPU_WORKAROUND_2_FLAG;
-	else
-		vcpu->arch.workaround_flags &= ~VCPU_WORKAROUND_2_FLAG;
-}
-
 static inline void kvm_vcpu_set_be(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
 	if (vcpu_mode_is_32bit(vcpu)) {

arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_host.h

@@ -631,46 +631,6 @@ static inline void kvm_set_pmu_events(u32 set, struct perf_event_attr *attr) {}
 static inline void kvm_clr_pmu_events(u32 clr) {}
 #endif
 
-#define KVM_BP_HARDEN_UNKNOWN		-1
-#define KVM_BP_HARDEN_WA_NEEDED		0
-#define KVM_BP_HARDEN_NOT_REQUIRED	1
-
-static inline int kvm_arm_harden_branch_predictor(void)
-{
-	switch (get_spectre_v2_workaround_state()) {
-	case ARM64_BP_HARDEN_WA_NEEDED:
-		return KVM_BP_HARDEN_WA_NEEDED;
-	case ARM64_BP_HARDEN_NOT_REQUIRED:
-		return KVM_BP_HARDEN_NOT_REQUIRED;
-	case ARM64_BP_HARDEN_UNKNOWN:
-	default:
-		return KVM_BP_HARDEN_UNKNOWN;
-	}
-}
-
-#define KVM_SSBD_UNKNOWN		-1
-#define KVM_SSBD_FORCE_DISABLE		0
-#define KVM_SSBD_KERNEL		1
-#define KVM_SSBD_FORCE_ENABLE		2
-#define KVM_SSBD_MITIGATED		3
-
-static inline int kvm_arm_have_ssbd(void)
-{
-	switch (arm64_get_ssbd_state()) {
-	case ARM64_SSBD_FORCE_DISABLE:
-		return KVM_SSBD_FORCE_DISABLE;
-	case ARM64_SSBD_KERNEL:
-		return KVM_SSBD_KERNEL;
-	case ARM64_SSBD_FORCE_ENABLE:
-		return KVM_SSBD_FORCE_ENABLE;
-	case ARM64_SSBD_MITIGATED:
-		return KVM_SSBD_MITIGATED;
-	case ARM64_SSBD_UNKNOWN:
-	default:
-		return KVM_SSBD_UNKNOWN;
-	}
-}
-
 void kvm_vcpu_load_sysregs_vhe(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
 void kvm_vcpu_put_sysregs_vhe(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
 

arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_mmu.h

@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@
 
 #include <asm/page.h>
 #include <asm/memory.h>
+#include <asm/mmu.h>
 #include <asm/cpufeature.h>
 
 /*
@@ -430,19 +431,17 @@ static inline int kvm_write_guest_lock(struct kvm *kvm, gpa_t gpa,
 	return ret;
 }
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_INDIRECT_VECTORS
 /*
  * EL2 vectors can be mapped and rerouted in a number of ways,
  * depending on the kernel configuration and CPU present:
  *
- * - If the CPU has the ARM64_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR cap, the
- *   hardening sequence is placed in one of the vector slots, which is
- *   executed before jumping to the real vectors.
+ * - If the CPU is affected by Spectre-v2, the hardening sequence is
+ *   placed in one of the vector slots, which is executed before jumping
+ *   to the real vectors.
  *
- * - If the CPU has both the ARM64_HARDEN_EL2_VECTORS cap and the
- *   ARM64_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR cap, the slot containing the
- *   hardening sequence is mapped next to the idmap page, and executed
- *   before jumping to the real vectors.
+ * - If the CPU also has the ARM64_HARDEN_EL2_VECTORS cap, the slot
+ *   containing the hardening sequence is mapped next to the idmap page,
+ *   and executed before jumping to the real vectors.
  *
  * - If the CPU only has the ARM64_HARDEN_EL2_VECTORS cap, then an
  *   empty slot is selected, mapped next to the idmap page, and
@@ -452,19 +451,16 @@ static inline int kvm_write_guest_lock(struct kvm *kvm, gpa_t gpa,
  * VHE, as we don't have hypervisor-specific mappings. If the system
  * is VHE and yet selects this capability, it will be ignored.
  */
-#include <asm/mmu.h>
-
 extern void *__kvm_bp_vect_base;
 extern int __kvm_harden_el2_vector_slot;
 
-/*  This is called on both VHE and !VHE systems */
 static inline void *kvm_get_hyp_vector(void)
 {
 	struct bp_hardening_data *data = arm64_get_bp_hardening_data();
 	void *vect = kern_hyp_va(kvm_ksym_ref(__kvm_hyp_vector));
 	int slot = -1;
 
-	if (cpus_have_const_cap(ARM64_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR) && data->fn) {
+	if (cpus_have_const_cap(ARM64_SPECTRE_V2) && data->fn) {
 		vect = kern_hyp_va(kvm_ksym_ref(__bp_harden_hyp_vecs));
 		slot = data->hyp_vectors_slot;
 	}
@@ -481,76 +477,6 @@ static inline void *kvm_get_hyp_vector(void)
 	return vect;
 }
 
-/*  This is only called on a !VHE system */
-static inline int kvm_map_vectors(void)
-{
-	/*
-	 * HBP  = ARM64_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR
-	 * HEL2 = ARM64_HARDEN_EL2_VECTORS
-	 *
-	 * !HBP + !HEL2 -> use direct vectors
-	 *  HBP + !HEL2 -> use hardened vectors in place
-	 * !HBP +  HEL2 -> allocate one vector slot and use exec mapping
-	 *  HBP +  HEL2 -> use hardened vertors and use exec mapping
-	 */
-	if (cpus_have_const_cap(ARM64_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR)) {
-		__kvm_bp_vect_base = kvm_ksym_ref(__bp_harden_hyp_vecs);
-		__kvm_bp_vect_base = kern_hyp_va(__kvm_bp_vect_base);
-	}
-
-	if (cpus_have_const_cap(ARM64_HARDEN_EL2_VECTORS)) {
-		phys_addr_t vect_pa = __pa_symbol(__bp_harden_hyp_vecs);
-		unsigned long size = __BP_HARDEN_HYP_VECS_SZ;
-
-		/*
-		 * Always allocate a spare vector slot, as we don't
-		 * know yet which CPUs have a BP hardening slot that
-		 * we can reuse.
-		 */
-		__kvm_harden_el2_vector_slot = atomic_inc_return(&arm64_el2_vector_last_slot);
-		BUG_ON(__kvm_harden_el2_vector_slot >= BP_HARDEN_EL2_SLOTS);
-		return create_hyp_exec_mappings(vect_pa, size,
-						&__kvm_bp_vect_base);
-	}
-
-	return 0;
-}
-#else
-static inline void *kvm_get_hyp_vector(void)
-{
-	return kern_hyp_va(kvm_ksym_ref(__kvm_hyp_vector));
-}
-
-static inline int kvm_map_vectors(void)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-#endif
-
-#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_SSBD
-DECLARE_PER_CPU_READ_MOSTLY(u64, arm64_ssbd_callback_required);
-
-static inline int hyp_map_aux_data(void)
-{
-	int cpu, err;
-
-	for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) {
-		u64 *ptr;
-
-		ptr = per_cpu_ptr(&arm64_ssbd_callback_required, cpu);
-		err = create_hyp_mappings(ptr, ptr + 1, PAGE_HYP);
-		if (err)
-			return err;
-	}
-	return 0;
-}
-#else
-static inline int hyp_map_aux_data(void)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-#endif
-
 #define kvm_phys_to_vttbr(addr)		phys_to_ttbr(addr)
 
 /*

arch/arm64/include/asm/mmu.h

@@ -48,7 +48,6 @@ struct bp_hardening_data {
 	bp_hardening_cb_t	fn;
 };
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR
 DECLARE_PER_CPU_READ_MOSTLY(struct bp_hardening_data, bp_hardening_data);
 
 static inline struct bp_hardening_data *arm64_get_bp_hardening_data(void)
@@ -60,21 +59,13 @@ static inline void arm64_apply_bp_hardening(void)
 {
 	struct bp_hardening_data *d;
 
-	if (!cpus_have_const_cap(ARM64_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR))
+	if (!cpus_have_const_cap(ARM64_SPECTRE_V2))
 		return;
 
 	d = arm64_get_bp_hardening_data();
 	if (d->fn)
 		d->fn();
 }
-#else
-static inline struct bp_hardening_data *arm64_get_bp_hardening_data(void)
-{
-	return NULL;
-}
-
-static inline void arm64_apply_bp_hardening(void)	{ }
-#endif	/* CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR */
 
 extern void arm64_memblock_init(void);
 extern void paging_init(void);