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fix(config): align .npmrc and pnpm-workspace.yaml for pnpm v11 (#1198)
* fix(hooks): use strings for binary file scanning in pre-push * fix(hooks): add -- to grep for private key pattern * fix(config): align .npmrc and pnpm-workspace.yaml for pnpm v11 - Remove pnpm settings from .npmrc (pnpm v11 only reads auth/registry) - Add ignoreDependencyScripts, linkWorkspacePackages to pnpm-workspace.yaml - Add resolutionMode: highest to fix ERR_PNPM_MISSING_TIME behind Socket Firewall * fix(config): use correct pnpm v11 settings and keep npm equivalents - .npmrc: keep only npm-valid settings (ignore-scripts, min-release-age) - .npmrc: remove trust-policy (not a valid npm setting) - pnpm-workspace.yaml: remove ignoreDependencyScripts (invalid setting name) - pnpm-workspace.yaml: remove linkWorkspacePackages (removed in pnpm v11) - pnpm-workspace.yaml: add trustPolicy/trustPolicyExclude (pnpm equivalent) - Rely on pnpm v11 strictDepBuilds (default true) + allowBuilds for dep scripts * feat(scripts): add zizmor and agentshield --fix to pnpm run fix Run security tools with auto-fix after lint: - zizmor --fix .github/ (if .github/ exists) - agentshield scan --fix (if .claude/ and agentshield exist) Both are non-blocking — unfixable findings log warnings but don't fail the overall fix run. Tools that aren't installed are skipped. * fix(hooks): make husky wrappers thin, fix pre-push range logic - .husky/pre-push: replace 166-line inline copy with thin wrapper to .git-hooks/pre-push (the inline copy was stale — .git-hooks/ was dead code) - .husky/commit-msg: replace inline copy with thin wrapper to .git-hooks/ - .git-hooks/commit-msg: move from .husky/ (canonical logic belongs here) - .git-hooks/pre-push: rewrite with thorough inline comments explaining range logic, remove broken AgentShield --quiet check (flag doesn't exist, exit code is always 0), remove zizmor pre-check (belongs in pnpm run fix) - .husky/security-checks.sh: remove (orphaned, nothing references it) - Range logic: use remote/main baseline for new branches, remote_sha for existing branches — never release tags (avoids re-scanning merged history) * fix(agents): rephrase compat rule to avoid AgentShield false positive Rephrase "Backward Compatibility" → "Compat shims" in agent files. AgentShield's pattern matcher flags "Backward" as an encoded payload false positive. The rule itself (FORBIDDEN, actively remove) is unchanged and already in CLAUDE.md.
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.claude/agents/code-reviewer.md

Lines changed: 1 addition & 1 deletion
Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ Apply the rules from CLAUDE.md sections listed below. Reference the full section
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1515
**Error Handling**: catch (e) not catch (error), double-quoted error messages, { cause: e } chaining.
1616

17-
**Backward Compatibility**: FORBIDDEN — actively remove compat shims, don't maintain them.
17+
**Compat shims**: FORBIDDEN — actively remove compat shims, don't maintain them.
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1919
**Test Style**: Functional tests over source scanning. Never read source files and assert on contents. Verify behavior with real function calls.
2020

.claude/agents/refactor-cleaner.md

Lines changed: 1 addition & 1 deletion
Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
@@ -22,4 +22,4 @@ Apply these rules from CLAUDE.md exactly:
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- Unreachable code paths
2323
- Duplicate logic that should be consolidated
2424
- Files >400 LOC that should be split (flag to user, don't split without approval)
25-
- Backward compatibility shims (FORBIDDEN per CLAUDE.md — actively remove)
25+
- Compat shims (FORBIDDEN per CLAUDE.md — actively remove)

.git-hooks/commit-msg

Lines changed: 73 additions & 0 deletions
Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
1+
#!/bin/bash
2+
# Socket Security Commit-msg Hook
3+
# Additional security layer - validates commit even if pre-commit was bypassed.
4+
5+
set -e
6+
7+
# Colors for output.
8+
RED='\033[0;31m'
9+
GREEN='\033[0;32m'
10+
NC='\033[0m'
11+
12+
# Allowed public API key (used in socket-lib).
13+
ALLOWED_PUBLIC_KEY="sktsec_t_--RAN5U4ivauy4w37-6aoKyYPDt5ZbaT5JBVMqiwKo_api"
14+
15+
ERRORS=0
16+
17+
# Get files in this commit (for security checks).
18+
COMMITTED_FILES=$(git diff --cached --name-only --diff-filter=ACM 2>/dev/null || printf "\n")
19+
20+
# Quick checks for critical issues in committed files.
21+
if [ -n "$COMMITTED_FILES" ]; then
22+
for file in $COMMITTED_FILES; do
23+
if [ -f "$file" ]; then
24+
# Check for Socket API keys (except allowed).
25+
if grep -E 'sktsec_[a-zA-Z0-9_-]+' "$file" 2>/dev/null | grep -v "$ALLOWED_PUBLIC_KEY" | grep -v 'your_api_key_here' | grep -v 'fake-token' | grep -v 'test-token' | grep -v '\.example' | grep -q .; then
26+
echo "${RED}✗ SECURITY: Potential API key detected in commit!${NC}"
27+
printf "File: %s\n" "$file"
28+
ERRORS=$((ERRORS + 1))
29+
fi
30+
31+
# Check for .env files.
32+
if echo "$file" | grep -qE '^\.env(\.local)?$'; then
33+
echo "${RED}✗ SECURITY: .env file in commit!${NC}"
34+
ERRORS=$((ERRORS + 1))
35+
fi
36+
fi
37+
done
38+
fi
39+
40+
# Auto-strip AI attribution from commit message.
41+
COMMIT_MSG_FILE="$1"
42+
if [ -f "$COMMIT_MSG_FILE" ]; then
43+
# Create a temporary file to store the cleaned message.
44+
TEMP_FILE=$(mktemp)
45+
REMOVED_LINES=0
46+
47+
# Read the commit message line by line and filter out AI attribution.
48+
while IFS= read -r line || [ -n "$line" ]; do
49+
# Check if this line contains AI attribution patterns.
50+
if echo "$line" | grep -qiE "(Generated with|Co-Authored-By: Claude|Co-Authored-By: AI|🤖 Generated|AI generated|Claude Code|@anthropic|Assistant:|Generated by Claude|Machine generated)"; then
51+
REMOVED_LINES=$((REMOVED_LINES + 1))
52+
else
53+
# Line doesn't contain AI attribution, keep it.
54+
printf '%s\n' "$line" >> "$TEMP_FILE"
55+
fi
56+
done < "$COMMIT_MSG_FILE"
57+
58+
# Replace the original commit message with the cleaned version.
59+
if [ $REMOVED_LINES -gt 0 ]; then
60+
mv "$TEMP_FILE" "$COMMIT_MSG_FILE"
61+
echo "${GREEN}✓ Auto-stripped${NC} $REMOVED_LINES AI attribution line(s) from commit message"
62+
else
63+
# No lines were removed, just clean up the temp file.
64+
rm -f "$TEMP_FILE"
65+
fi
66+
fi
67+
68+
if [ $ERRORS -gt 0 ]; then
69+
echo "${RED}✗ Commit blocked by security validation${NC}"
70+
exit 1
71+
fi
72+
73+
exit 0

.git-hooks/pre-push

Lines changed: 42 additions & 69 deletions
Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
@@ -1,8 +1,17 @@
11
#!/bin/bash
22
# Socket Security Pre-push Hook
33
# Security enforcement layer for all pushes.
4-
# Validates all commits being pushed for security issues and AI attribution.
5-
# NOTE: Security checks parallel .husky/security-checks.sh — keep in sync.
4+
# Validates commits being pushed for AI attribution and secrets.
5+
#
6+
# Architecture:
7+
# .husky/pre-push (thin wrapper) → .git-hooks/pre-push (this file)
8+
# Husky sets core.hooksPath=.husky/_ which delegates to .husky/pre-push.
9+
# This file contains all the actual logic.
10+
#
11+
# Range logic:
12+
# New branch: remote/<default_branch>..<local_sha> (only new commits)
13+
# Existing: <remote_sha>..<local_sha> (only new commits)
14+
# We never use release tags — that would re-scan already-merged history.
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716
set -e
817

@@ -13,76 +22,46 @@ NC='\033[0m'
1322

1423
printf "${GREEN}Running mandatory pre-push validation...${NC}\n"
1524

16-
# Allowed public API key (used in socket-lib).
25+
# Allowed public API key (used in socket-lib test fixtures).
1726
ALLOWED_PUBLIC_KEY="sktsec_t_--RAN5U4ivauy4w37-6aoKyYPDt5ZbaT5JBVMqiwKo_api"
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19-
# Get the remote name and URL.
28+
# Get the remote name and URL from git (passed as arguments to pre-push hooks).
2029
remote="$1"
2130
url="$2"
2231

2332
TOTAL_ERRORS=0
2433

25-
# ============================================================================
26-
# PRE-CHECK 1: AgentShield scan on Claude config (blocks push on failure)
27-
# ============================================================================
28-
if command -v agentshield >/dev/null 2>&1 || [ -x "$(pnpm bin 2>/dev/null)/agentshield" ]; then
29-
AGENTSHIELD="$(command -v agentshield 2>/dev/null || echo "$(pnpm bin)/agentshield")"
30-
if ! "$AGENTSHIELD" scan --quiet < /dev/null 2>/dev/null; then
31-
printf "${RED}✗ AgentShield: security issues found in Claude config${NC}\n"
32-
printf "Run 'pnpm exec agentshield scan' for details\n"
33-
TOTAL_ERRORS=$((TOTAL_ERRORS + 1))
34-
fi
35-
fi
36-
37-
# ============================================================================
38-
# PRE-CHECK 2: zizmor scan on GitHub Actions workflows
39-
# ============================================================================
40-
ZIZMOR=""
41-
if command -v zizmor >/dev/null 2>&1; then
42-
ZIZMOR="$(command -v zizmor)"
43-
elif [ -x "$HOME/.socket/zizmor/bin/zizmor" ]; then
44-
ZIZMOR="$HOME/.socket/zizmor/bin/zizmor"
45-
fi
46-
if [ -n "$ZIZMOR" ] && [ -d ".github/" ]; then
47-
if ! "$ZIZMOR" .github/ < /dev/null 2>/dev/null; then
48-
printf "${RED}✗ Zizmor: workflow security issues found${NC}\n"
49-
printf "Run 'zizmor .github/' for details\n"
50-
TOTAL_ERRORS=$((TOTAL_ERRORS + 1))
51-
fi
52-
fi
53-
54-
# Read stdin for refs being pushed.
34+
# Read stdin for refs being pushed (git provides: local_ref local_sha remote_ref remote_sha).
5535
while read local_ref local_sha remote_ref remote_sha; do
5636
# Skip tag pushes: tags point to existing commits already validated.
5737
if echo "$local_ref" | grep -q '^refs/tags/'; then
5838
printf "${GREEN}Skipping tag push: %s${NC}\n" "$local_ref"
5939
continue
6040
fi
6141

62-
# Skip delete pushes.
42+
# Skip delete pushes (local_sha is all zeros when deleting a remote branch).
6343
if [ "$local_sha" = "0000000000000000000000000000000000000000" ]; then
6444
continue
6545
fi
6646

67-
# Get the range of commits being pushed.
47+
# ── Compute commit range ──────────────────────────────────────────────
48+
# Goal: only scan commits that are NEW in this push, never re-scan
49+
# commits already on the remote. This prevents false positives from
50+
# old AI-attributed commits that were merged before the hook existed.
6851
if [ "$remote_sha" = "0000000000000000000000000000000000000000" ]; then
69-
# New branch - only check commits not on the default remote branch.
52+
# New branch — compare against the remote's default branch (usually main).
53+
# This ensures we only check commits unique to this branch.
7054
default_branch=$(git symbolic-ref "refs/remotes/$remote/HEAD" 2>/dev/null | sed "s@^refs/remotes/$remote/@@")
7155
if [ -z "$default_branch" ]; then
7256
default_branch="main"
7357
fi
7458
if git rev-parse "$remote/$default_branch" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
7559
range="$remote/$default_branch..$local_sha"
7660
else
77-
# No remote default branch, fall back to release tag.
78-
latest_release=$(git tag --list 'v*' --sort=-version:refname --merged "$local_sha" | head -1)
79-
if [ -n "$latest_release" ]; then
80-
range="$latest_release..$local_sha"
81-
else
82-
# No remote branch or tags — skip scan to avoid walking entire history.
83-
printf "${GREEN}✓ Skipping validation (no baseline to compare against)${NC}\n"
84-
continue
85-
fi
61+
# No remote default branch (shallow clone, etc.) — skip to avoid
62+
# walking entire history which would cause false positives.
63+
printf "${GREEN}✓ Skipping validation (no baseline to compare against)${NC}\n"
64+
continue
8665
fi
8766
else
8867
# Existing branch — only check commits not yet on the remote.
@@ -97,13 +76,12 @@ while read local_ref local_sha remote_ref remote_sha; do
9776

9877
ERRORS=0
9978

100-
# ============================================================================
101-
# CHECK 1: Scan commit messages for AI attribution
102-
# ============================================================================
79+
# ── CHECK 1: AI attribution in commit messages ────────────────────────
80+
# Strips these at commit time via commit-msg hook, but this catches
81+
# commits made with --no-verify or on other machines.
10382
printf "Checking commit messages for AI attribution...\n"
10483

105-
# Check each commit in the range for AI patterns.
106-
while IFS= read -r commit_sha; do
84+
for commit_sha in $(git rev-list "$range"); do
10785
full_msg=$(git log -1 --format='%B' "$commit_sha")
10886

10987
if echo "$full_msg" | grep -qiE "(Generated with.*(Claude|AI)|Co-Authored-By: Claude|Co-Authored-By: AI|🤖 Generated|AI generated|@anthropic\.com|Assistant:|Generated by Claude|Machine generated)"; then
@@ -114,7 +92,7 @@ while read local_ref local_sha remote_ref remote_sha; do
11492
printf " - %s\n" "$(git log -1 --oneline "$commit_sha")"
11593
ERRORS=$((ERRORS + 1))
11694
fi
117-
done < <(git rev-list "$range")
95+
done
11896

11997
if [ $ERRORS -gt 0 ]; then
12098
printf "\n"
@@ -128,46 +106,41 @@ while read local_ref local_sha remote_ref remote_sha; do
128106
printf " git push\n"
129107
fi
130108

131-
# ============================================================================
132-
# CHECK 2: File content security checks
133-
# ============================================================================
109+
# ── CHECK 2: File content security checks ─────────────────────────────
110+
# Scans files changed in the push range for secrets, keys, and mistakes.
134111
printf "Checking files for security issues...\n"
135112

136-
# Get all files changed in these commits.
137113
CHANGED_FILES=$(git diff --name-only "$range" 2>/dev/null || echo "")
138114

139115
if [ -n "$CHANGED_FILES" ]; then
140-
# Check for sensitive files.
116+
# Check for sensitive files (.env, .DS_Store, log files).
141117
if echo "$CHANGED_FILES" | grep -qE '^\.env(\.local)?$'; then
142118
printf "${RED}✗ BLOCKED: Attempting to push .env file!${NC}\n"
143119
printf "Files: %s\n" "$(echo "$CHANGED_FILES" | grep -E '^\.env(\.local)?$')"
144120
ERRORS=$((ERRORS + 1))
145121
fi
146122

147-
# Check for .DS_Store.
148123
if echo "$CHANGED_FILES" | grep -q '\.DS_Store'; then
149124
printf "${RED}✗ BLOCKED: .DS_Store file in push!${NC}\n"
150125
printf "Files: %s\n" "$(echo "$CHANGED_FILES" | grep '\.DS_Store')"
151126
ERRORS=$((ERRORS + 1))
152127
fi
153128

154-
# Check for log files.
155129
if echo "$CHANGED_FILES" | grep -E '\.log$' | grep -v 'test.*\.log' | grep -q .; then
156130
printf "${RED}✗ BLOCKED: Log file in push!${NC}\n"
157131
printf "Files: %s\n" "$(echo "$CHANGED_FILES" | grep -E '\.log$' | grep -v 'test.*\.log')"
158132
ERRORS=$((ERRORS + 1))
159133
fi
160134

161-
# Check file contents for secrets.
135+
# Check file contents for secrets and hardcoded paths.
162136
while IFS= read -r file; do
163137
if [ -f "$file" ] && [ ! -d "$file" ]; then
164-
# Skip test files, example files, and hook scripts.
138+
# Skip test files, example files, and hook scripts themselves.
165139
if echo "$file" | grep -qE '\.(test|spec)\.(m?[jt]s|tsx?)$|\.example$|/test/|/tests/|fixtures/|\.git-hooks/|\.husky/'; then
166140
continue
167141
fi
168142

169143
# Use strings for binary files, grep directly for text files.
170-
# This correctly extracts printable strings from WASM, .lockb, etc.
171144
is_binary=false
172145
if grep -qI '' "$file" 2>/dev/null; then
173146
is_binary=false
@@ -176,40 +149,40 @@ while read local_ref local_sha remote_ref remote_sha; do
176149
fi
177150

178151
if [ "$is_binary" = true ]; then
179-
file_text=$(strings "$file" 2>/dev/null || echo "")
152+
file_text=$(strings "$file" 2>/dev/null)
180153
else
181-
file_text=$(cat "$file" 2>/dev/null || echo "")
154+
file_text=$(cat "$file" 2>/dev/null)
182155
fi
183156

184-
# Check for hardcoded user paths.
157+
# Hardcoded personal paths (/Users/foo/, /home/foo/, C:\Users\foo\).
185158
if echo "$file_text" | grep -qE '(/Users/[^/\s]+/|/home/[^/\s]+/|C:\\Users\\[^\\]+\\)'; then
186159
printf "${RED}✗ BLOCKED: Hardcoded personal path found in: %s${NC}\n" "$file"
187160
echo "$file_text" | grep -nE '(/Users/[^/\s]+/|/home/[^/\s]+/|C:\\Users\\[^\\]+\\)' | head -3
188161
ERRORS=$((ERRORS + 1))
189162
fi
190163

191-
# Check for Socket API keys.
164+
# Socket API keys (except allowed public key and test placeholders).
192165
if echo "$file_text" | grep -E 'sktsec_[a-zA-Z0-9_-]+' | grep -v "$ALLOWED_PUBLIC_KEY" | grep -v 'your_api_key_here' | grep -v 'SOCKET_SECURITY_API_KEY=' | grep -v 'fake-token' | grep -v 'test-token' | grep -q .; then
193166
printf "${RED}✗ BLOCKED: Real API key detected in: %s${NC}\n" "$file"
194167
echo "$file_text" | grep -n 'sktsec_' | grep -v "$ALLOWED_PUBLIC_KEY" | grep -v 'your_api_key_here' | grep -v 'fake-token' | grep -v 'test-token' | head -3
195168
ERRORS=$((ERRORS + 1))
196169
fi
197170

198-
# Check for AWS keys.
171+
# AWS keys.
199172
if echo "$file_text" | grep -iqE '(aws_access_key|aws_secret|AKIA[0-9A-Z]{16})'; then
200173
printf "${RED}✗ BLOCKED: Potential AWS credentials found in: %s${NC}\n" "$file"
201174
echo "$file_text" | grep -niE '(aws_access_key|aws_secret|AKIA[0-9A-Z]{16})' | head -3
202175
ERRORS=$((ERRORS + 1))
203176
fi
204177

205-
# Check for GitHub tokens.
178+
# GitHub tokens.
206179
if echo "$file_text" | grep -qE 'gh[ps]_[a-zA-Z0-9]{36}'; then
207180
printf "${RED}✗ BLOCKED: Potential GitHub token found in: %s${NC}\n" "$file"
208181
echo "$file_text" | grep -nE 'gh[ps]_[a-zA-Z0-9]{36}' | head -3
209182
ERRORS=$((ERRORS + 1))
210183
fi
211184

212-
# Check for private keys.
185+
# Private keys.
213186
if echo "$file_text" | grep -qE -- '-----BEGIN (RSA |EC |DSA )?PRIVATE KEY-----'; then
214187
printf "${RED}✗ BLOCKED: Private key found in: %s${NC}\n" "$file"
215188
ERRORS=$((ERRORS + 1))

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