diff --git a/.cursor/hooks.json b/.cursor/hooks.json
index efd8a19..fa7594e 100644
--- a/.cursor/hooks.json
+++ b/.cursor/hooks.json
@@ -4,18 +4,18 @@
     "beforeShellExecution": [
       {
         "command": "python3 .cursor/hooks/guard-shell.py",
-        "failClosed": false
+        "failClosed": true
       },
       {
         "command": "python3 .cursor/hooks/guard-network.py",
         "matcher": "curl|wget|scp|nc ",
-        "failClosed": false
+        "failClosed": true
       }
     ],
     "beforeMCPExecution": [
       {
         "command": "python3 .cursor/hooks/guard-mcp.py",
-        "failClosed": false
+        "failClosed": true
       }
     ],
     "beforeReadFile": [
diff --git a/.cursor/hooks/_common.py b/.cursor/hooks/_common.py
index b5294ae..9e9671b 100755
--- a/.cursor/hooks/_common.py
+++ b/.cursor/hooks/_common.py
@@ -203,7 +203,7 @@ def is_sensitive_file(path: str) -> bool:
 # --- Destructive data-layer detection (shared by shell + MCP guards) --------
 # Narrow, high-confidence patterns for irreversible data/disk destruction that
 # can arrive either as a shell command or as serialized MCP tool arguments
-# (e.g. a database MCP running DROP). Fail-open nets, not boundaries.
+# (e.g. a database MCP running DROP). Narrow denylists, not product PDPs.
 DATA_DESTRUCTIVE: list[tuple[re.Pattern[str], str]] = [
     (re.compile(r"\b(drop\s+database|drop\s+table|truncate\s+table)\b", re.IGNORECASE),
      "Destructive SQL (DROP / TRUNCATE)."),
diff --git a/.cursor/hooks/guard-mcp.py b/.cursor/hooks/guard-mcp.py
index 22f4398..638e4c4 100755
--- a/.cursor/hooks/guard-mcp.py
+++ b/.cursor/hooks/guard-mcp.py
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
 
 Why this exists: MCP tools can mutate real systems (databases, cloud, files)
 and their *output* is untrusted data, never instructions. This hook is a
-fail-open net (failClosed:false): it logs every MCP call for observability and
+fail-closed launch (failClosed:true): if this hook cannot start, the MCP call is denied. It logs every MCP call for observability and
 denies only a narrow, high-confidence set of irreversible data-layer actions
 (DROP / TRUNCATE / unfiltered DELETE / mkfs / dd-to-device) found in the
 serialized tool arguments. It is NOT a security boundary.
diff --git a/.cursor/hooks/guard-network.py b/.cursor/hooks/guard-network.py
index fda1794..40df8a0 100755
--- a/.cursor/hooks/guard-network.py
+++ b/.cursor/hooks/guard-network.py
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 """beforeShellExecution: ask before high-confidence outbound exfil patterns.
 
 Matcher-scoped in hooks.json (curl|wget|scp|nc). Returns permission: ask, not deny,
-so legitimate API work can proceed after user review. failClosed:false — secondary net.
+so legitimate API work can proceed after user review. failClosed:true — launch failure denies the matched command.
 """
 from __future__ import annotations
 
diff --git a/.cursor/hooks/guard-shell.py b/.cursor/hooks/guard-shell.py
index 863d747..1f8d8da 100755
--- a/.cursor/hooks/guard-shell.py
+++ b/.cursor/hooks/guard-shell.py
@@ -1,10 +1,9 @@
 #!/usr/bin/env python3
 """beforeShellExecution: deny a narrow set of clearly destructive commands.
 
-Secondary denylist net (failClosed:false), NOT the security boundary — Cursor 2.0's
-OS sandbox (workspace-scoped, no internet by default on macOS) is primary. This hook
-catches a narrow set of high-confidence destructive patterns hooks can see. A
-fail-closed launch config would only add brick-risk without closing unlisted commands.
+Secondary denylist (failClosed:true on launch). Not the product security boundary —
+Cursor's OS sandbox is primary. This hook catches a narrow set of high-confidence
+destructive patterns. If the hook cannot start, the shell command is denied.
 Tuned to avoid false positives (e.g. `rm -rf node_modules`).
 """
 import os
diff --git a/.cursor/hooks/protect-secrets.py b/.cursor/hooks/protect-secrets.py
index 9c5bbca..ea6f84c 100755
--- a/.cursor/hooks/protect-secrets.py
+++ b/.cursor/hooks/protect-secrets.py
@@ -1,10 +1,9 @@
 #!/usr/bin/env python3
 """beforeReadFile: keep secret files out of the model's context.
 
-Guarded semantics (failClosed:false in hooks.json):
-- Missing interpreter / launch failure -> Cursor fails OPEN (a vanished python3
-  never bricks all file reads).
-- A detected secret file -> explicit `deny` (effective fail-closed on detection).
+Guarded semantics (failClosed:true in hooks.json):
+- Missing interpreter / launch failure -> Cursor denies the read.
+- A detected secret file -> explicit `deny`.
 - An internal error while deciding -> `deny`, rather than risk leaking a file we
   failed to classify.
 """
diff --git a/.cursor/hooks/scan-prompt.py b/.cursor/hooks/scan-prompt.py
index 28b837f..04df7ba 100755
--- a/.cursor/hooks/scan-prompt.py
+++ b/.cursor/hooks/scan-prompt.py
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
 Blocks only on high-confidence secret patterns to avoid friction.
 Output uses {"continue": bool} per the beforeSubmitPrompt contract.
 
-Guarded semantics (failClosed:false): launch failure -> fail OPEN; a detected
+Guarded semantics (failClosed:true): launch failure denies the prompt; a detected
 secret or an internal scan error -> {"continue": false}.
 """
 import os