diff --git a/docs/adr/0016-no-prometheus-as-a-source.md b/docs/adr/0016-no-prometheus-as-a-source.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..01c069d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/adr/0016-no-prometheus-as-a-source.md
@@ -0,0 +1,94 @@
+# 0016. Prometheus is not a data source — not as an option, not for backfill
+
+Date: 2026-08-20
+Status: Accepted
+
+Supersedes the framing of Prometheus in [ADR 0006](0006-usage-collection-kubelet-rollups.md)
+§Context, which rejected it for the usage path while leaving it standing as "a
+side channel present in most clusters". ADR 0006 is otherwise unchanged: its
+kubelet sources, merge property, and window contract stand.
+
+## Context
+
+The security document advertised a Prometheus integration the agent has never
+had: a row in the network-access table (`query` / `query_range`, "historical
+metrics over the retention window; enables a report on installation day"), a
+mention in the `metrics-only` profile, and §10.1 "Prometheus is a side channel",
+which disclosed its tenancy weakness as an accepted compromise.
+
+Nothing in the code reads Prometheus. So the document promised a capability that
+did not exist — the mirror image of the §10.2 defect closed in ADR 0015, where
+the code fell short of the promise. Both are the same failure: a customer-facing
+claim not pinned to a decision.
+
+The pull to build it is real, and it always arrives phrased as temporary — a
+day-one report needs history, the agent has none until it has run, and the
+customer's Prometheus already holds months of it.
+
+**The reason to refuse is not that Prometheus data is low quality. It is that
+its quality is unmeasurable.** A `query_range` response is a series of numbers
+with no provenance attached. Recording rules, downsampling, and
+`metric_relabel_configs` all shape it, and none of them leaves a trace in the
+response. The agent cannot tell whether a series is raw, five-minute-averaged, or
+dropped and re-derived; it cannot tell whether a workload is missing because it
+did not exist or because a relabel rule discarded it. Every safeguard this agent
+has built exists to prevent exactly that: ADR 0012 makes each payload declare its
+provenance, ADR 0013 makes a measured payload declare how much of the window it
+observed and whether each signal was seen at all. A Prometheus series can satisfy
+none of those, so it would have to enter as a class whose completeness is
+permanently unknown — and be joined, under the same natural keys, with data whose
+completeness is exact.
+
+There is also a tenancy problem, which the old §10.1 already admitted: a
+Prometheus endpoint typically serves all namespaces regardless of the caller's
+Kubernetes permissions, so the customer's namespace filters would become a soft,
+agent-side boundary on that path — while every other path in this agent enforces
+them at collection (ADR 0015).
+
+## Decision
+
+**Prometheus is not a source of agent data. Not as a default, not as an opt-in,
+not as a one-time backfill.** No configuration key, no Helm value, no profile
+enables it. The agent's measurements come from the kubelet counters of ADR 0006
+and nothing else.
+
+The prohibition is on Prometheus as a *source of data about the customer's
+workloads*. It does not touch:
+
+- **the `github.com/prometheus/*` Go modules in `go.mod`**, which parse the
+  kubelet's own `/metrics/cadvisor` text exposition. That is the kubelet's
+  format, not a Prometheus server, and the counters are ours to read directly.
+- **the customer running Prometheus.** They usually do; the agent simply does not
+  read it. Its own resource use may of course be scraped by it.
+- **exposing agent metrics** in the exposition format, if that is ever wanted.
+  That is data flowing outward, and it carries no claim about a workload.
+
+**What we give up, stated plainly: the agent knows nothing about the time before
+it was installed.** A first-day report is therefore built from what is true at
+install time and needs no history — declared requests and limits, QoS,
+topology and placement, probe configuration, the object journal (conditions,
+restart counts, ReplicaSet revisions, Job timings) — not from backfilled
+measurements. Everything that genuinely requires observation says how long it has
+been observing (`covered_nanoseconds`, ADR 0013) and is worth exactly that much.
+
+## Consequences
+
+**Easier.** Every measured number in the protocol has a known provenance and a
+known completeness, with no exceptions to carve out downstream. Namespace filters
+stay enforced at collection on every path. One fewer external dependency, one
+fewer endpoint in the network table, one fewer credential.
+
+**Harder / given up.** No historical backfill, ever. A cluster installed today
+has no usage rollups for yesterday, and a report that depends on a long window
+must wait for that window. This is the cost, it is accepted deliberately, and
+"just this once, to seed the account" is the exact request this ADR exists to
+refuse — recording it now, while nothing is built, is the whole point.
+
+**Cost of the decision itself: zero code.** No Prometheus client was ever
+written. This ADR removes three claims from `docs/security.md` and adds a
+sentence a future reader can point at. It is being recorded at the cheapest
+moment it will ever be available.
+
+This ADR records a decision implemented in the same pull request — here, as
+documentation and a prohibition rather than code — per the process in
+[`README.md`](README.md).
diff --git a/docs/adr/README.md b/docs/adr/README.md
index e3d927f..4a2b5c6 100644
--- a/docs/adr/README.md
+++ b/docs/adr/README.md
@@ -55,3 +55,4 @@ stays in place.
 - [0013. Observation completeness: measured payloads carry what the agent saw](0013-observation-completeness.md)
 - [0014. Facts of a different scope than the record's key are nested, not flattened](0014-scoped-facts-are-nested.md)
 - [0015. The node asks the controller which pods it may scan, and fails closed](0015-node-scan-scope.md)
+- [0016. Prometheus is not a data source — not as an option, not for backfill](0016-no-prometheus-as-a-source.md)
diff --git a/docs/security.md b/docs/security.md
index 3eb78ef..a7d8117 100644
--- a/docs/security.md
+++ b/docs/security.md
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ marked **TBD** are being verified and will be resolved before GA.
 One binary, two roles:
 
 ```
-runtime-agent controller   # StatefulSet, 1 replica — talks to k8s API, Prometheus,
+runtime-agent controller   # StatefulSet, 1 replica — talks to k8s API and
                            #   pod pprof endpoints; sole egress point
 runtime-agent node         # DaemonSet (optional)   — eBPF profiling and Go binary
                            #   detection on the node; talks only to the controller
@@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ your goals; profiles can be upgraded later.
 
 | Profile | Components | Node privileges | What you get |
 |---|---|---|---|
-| `metrics-only` | controller | none | Cost and efficiency findings from usage metrics (kubelet counters via the API server, ADR 0006; Prometheus as a side-channel for history) |
+| `metrics-only` | controller | none | Cost and efficiency findings from usage metrics (kubelet counters via the API server, ADR 0006) and workload metadata |
 | `pprof` | controller | none | Above + CPU/heap profiles pulled from services that already expose `/debug/pprof` |
 | `ebpf` | controller + node DaemonSet | see [§7](#7-node-privileges) | Above + CPU profiles for services without pprof endpoints |
 
@@ -125,7 +125,6 @@ read, never a write.
 
 | Access | Direction | Why | Notes |
 |---|---|---|---|
-| Prometheus HTTP API (`query`, `query_range`) | controller → your Prometheus | Historical metrics over the retention window; enables a report on installation day | Read-only query API. Endpoint set in Helm values. See [§10.1](#101-prometheus-is-a-side-channel) |
 | Pod pprof endpoints | controller → pods | Pull `/debug/pprof/profile` and `/debug/pprof/heap` from Go services that already expose them | Only pods that pass the workload filters are probed; ports taken from `containerPorts`, never blind scans. `pprof`/`ebpf` profiles only |
 | kubelet stats, proxied | controller → API server | Poll `/stats/summary` and `/metrics/cadvisor` on every kubelet for usage counters (ADR 0006) | Goes through the API server proxy (`nodes/proxy`, §4) — the agent opens **no direct connection to kubelets**. A direct-kubelet transport for very large clusters would be a documented change here, not a silent one |
 | Backend egress | controller → one fixed domain | Ship aggregated rollups and filtered profiles | mTLS, pinned domain. The only cross-boundary connection in the system. A NetworkPolicy restricting controller egress to this domain plus in-cluster targets is shipped with the chart |
@@ -511,6 +510,10 @@ Stated explicitly so it does not have to be asked:
 - No cloud provider credentials, IAM roles, or billing API access. Node
   pricing uses a static price table plus your stated discount.
 - No external egress from nodes — only the controller crosses the boundary.
+- No access to your monitoring stack. The agent does not query Prometheus,
+  Thanos, Mimir, or any other metrics store — not as an option and not to
+  backfill history at install time (ADR 0016, [§10.1](#101-the-agent-knows-nothing-about-the-time-before-it-was-installed)).
+  It measures what it measures itself.
 - No API access from the node role at all — its ServiceAccount holds zero RBAC,
   and the only token it mounts is audience-bound to the controller, which the
   API server rejects ([§7](#7-node-privileges), ADR 0009/0010). The default API
@@ -522,15 +525,32 @@ Stated explicitly so it does not have to be asked:
 
 ## 10. Known limitations and honest disclosures
 
-### 10.1 Prometheus is a side channel
-
-Kubernetes RBAC does not govern what the agent can read from your Prometheus:
-a Prometheus endpoint typically serves metrics for all namespaces regardless
-of the caller's Kubernetes permissions. If you install namespace-scoped, be
-aware that the metrics path is only constrained by the agent's own namespace
-filters (soft boundary, auditable in the ConfigMap) unless your Prometheus
-deployment enforces tenancy itself (e.g. a tenant-scoped query frontend). If
-you have a scoped query endpoint, point the agent at it.
+### 10.1 The agent knows nothing about the time before it was installed
+
+Every measurement the agent reports it made itself, from the kubelet counters
+of ADR 0006. It does **not** read your Prometheus — not as an option, not for a
+one-time backfill (ADR 0016) — so a cluster installed today has no usage data
+for yesterday, and a finding that needs a long observation window has to wait
+for that window.
+
+This is a deliberate refusal, not an unbuilt feature. A Prometheus response
+carries no record of what shaped it: recording rules, downsampling and
+`metric_relabel_configs` all alter a series and leave no trace in the answer, so
+the agent could not tell a raw series from a five-minute average, nor a workload
+that did not exist from one a relabel rule discarded. Everything else in this
+agent's protocol declares its provenance and how completely it was observed
+([§8](#8-data-collected-and-data-leaving-the-cluster)); imported series could
+declare neither, and would end up joined with exact data under the same keys.
+There is also a tenancy asymmetry: a Prometheus endpoint typically serves all
+namespaces regardless of the caller's Kubernetes permissions, so your namespace
+filters would be enforced only inside the agent on that path, while every other
+path enforces them at collection.
+
+What does not need history still works on day one: declared requests and limits,
+QoS, topology and placement, probe configuration, and the object journal
+(conditions, restart counts, ReplicaSet revisions, Job timings) are all true at
+install time. What genuinely needs observation reports how long it has been
+observing, so its weight is visible rather than assumed.
 
 ### 10.2 Node-level visibility cannot be namespace-scoped