diff --git a/src/lib/utils/url.test.ts b/src/lib/utils/url.test.ts
index 8619aaa4..cdc56165 100644
--- a/src/lib/utils/url.test.ts
+++ b/src/lib/utils/url.test.ts
@@ -63,6 +63,7 @@ const {
   isShortLinkOrigin,
   isValidRedirectURL,
   isValidRedirectParam,
+  isValidTokenRedirectUri,
   sanitizeRedirectSearchParam,
   gotoQueryRedirectOrFallback,
   REDIRECT_QUERY_PARAM,
@@ -698,3 +699,39 @@ describe('isValidRedirectParam — additional', () => {
     expect(isValidRedirectParam('/\\evil.com')).toBe(false);
   });
 });
+
+describe('isValidTokenRedirectUri', () => {
+  it('accepts a custom application scheme', () => {
+    expect(isValidTokenRedirectUri('shockosc://callback?token=%')).toBe(true);
+  });
+
+  it('accepts http loopback targets', () => {
+    expect(isValidTokenRedirectUri('http://localhost:1234/cb?t=%')).toBe(true);
+    expect(isValidTokenRedirectUri('http://[::1]:8080/cb?t=%')).toBe(true);
+  });
+
+  it('accepts remote https origins', () => {
+    expect(isValidTokenRedirectUri('https://127.0.0.1/cb?t=%')).toBe(true);
+    expect(isValidTokenRedirectUri('https://shockalarmclock.app/cb?t=%')).toBe(true);
+    expect(isValidTokenRedirectUri('https://evil.com/grab?t=%')).toBe(true);
+    expect(isValidTokenRedirectUri('https://localhost@evil.com/?t=%')).toBe(true);
+  });
+
+  it('rejects remote cleartext http origins', () => {
+    expect(isValidTokenRedirectUri('http://localhost.insecure.com/?t=%')).toBe(false);
+    expect(isValidTokenRedirectUri('http://insecure.com/cb?t=%')).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  it('rejects dangerous schemes', () => {
+    expect(isValidTokenRedirectUri('javascript:alert(1)')).toBe(false);
+    expect(isValidTokenRedirectUri('data:text/html,<script>1</script>')).toBe(false);
+    expect(isValidTokenRedirectUri('vbscript:msgbox(1)')).toBe(false);
+    expect(isValidTokenRedirectUri('file:///etc/passwd')).toBe(false);
+    expect(isValidTokenRedirectUri('blob:https://localhost/abc')).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  it('rejects non-URL values', () => {
+    expect(isValidTokenRedirectUri('not a url')).toBe(false);
+    expect(isValidTokenRedirectUri('')).toBe(false);
+  });
+});
diff --git a/src/lib/utils/url.ts b/src/lib/utils/url.ts
index 0cc50628..0e174068 100644
--- a/src/lib/utils/url.ts
+++ b/src/lib/utils/url.ts
@@ -182,6 +182,54 @@ export function isValidRedirectParam(value: string): boolean {
   }
 }
 
+/**
+ * URL schemes that must never be used as a token redirect target. Navigating
+ * `window.location` to any of these can execute script or render
+ * attacker-controlled content in the page's origin.
+ */
+const DANGEROUS_REDIRECT_SCHEMES = new Set(['javascript:', 'data:', 'vbscript:', 'file:', 'blob:']);
+
+/** Loopback hostnames permitted for local `http(s)` token redirect targets. */
+const LOOPBACK_HOSTNAMES = new Set(['localhost', '127.0.0.1', '[::1]', '::1']);
+
+/**
+ * Validates a `redirect_uri` for the external-application API-token grant flow.
+ *
+ * In that flow a freshly minted token is handed to an external app by
+ * navigating the browser to its redirect URI, so this is deliberately more
+ * permissive than {@link isValidRedirectParam} — it allows custom application
+ * schemes (e.g. `shockosc://callback`) and remote `https` origins (for
+ * web-based integrations). To prevent the token from being exfiltrated it
+ * rejects:
+ *  - dangerous schemes that can execute script or render HTML
+ *    (`javascript:`, `data:`, …)
+ *  - remote cleartext `http` origins — a token must never travel unencrypted
+ *    to a remote origin; `http` is only allowed for loopback addresses (for
+ *    local apps)
+ *
+ * @param value - The raw `redirect_uri` query parameter
+ * @returns Whether the value is a safe token redirect target
+ */
+export function isValidTokenRedirectUri(value: string): boolean {
+  let url: URL;
+  try {
+    url = new URL(value);
+  } catch {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  if (DANGEROUS_REDIRECT_SCHEMES.has(url.protocol)) return false;
+
+  // Cleartext http may only target loopback — a token must never travel
+  // unencrypted to a remote origin. https and custom (application) schemes are
+  // allowed through, since https keeps the token confidential in transit.
+  if (url.protocol === 'http:') {
+    return LOOPBACK_HOSTNAMES.has(url.hostname);
+  }
+
+  return true;
+}
+
 /**
  * Strips an invalid redirect query parameter from the current URL bar.
  *
diff --git a/src/routes/(app)/settings/api-tokens/new/+page.svelte b/src/routes/(app)/settings/api-tokens/new/+page.svelte
index 7143ce57..003d797c 100644
--- a/src/routes/(app)/settings/api-tokens/new/+page.svelte
+++ b/src/routes/(app)/settings/api-tokens/new/+page.svelte
@@ -46,6 +46,7 @@
   import * as Card from '$lib/components/ui/card/index.js';
   import { handleApiError } from '$lib/errorhandling/apiErrorHandling';
   import { registerBreadcrumbs } from '$lib/state/breadcrumbs-state.svelte';
+  import { isValidTokenRedirectUri } from '$lib/utils/url';
   import CircleCheck from '@lucide/svelte/icons/circle-check';
   import KeyRound from '@lucide/svelte/icons/key-round';
   import { toast } from 'svelte-sonner';
@@ -97,6 +98,15 @@
     redirectUri = params.get('redirect_uri');
     const external = redirectUri !== null;
 
+    // Reject redirect targets that could exfiltrate the freshly minted token to
+    // an attacker (remote http(s) origins, javascript:/data: schemes, …).
+    if (redirectUri !== null && !isValidTokenRedirectUri(redirectUri)) {
+      redirectUri = null;
+      parseError =
+        'The provided redirect_uri is not allowed. Only loopback addresses or custom application schemes are permitted.';
+      return;
+    }
+
     const qName = params.get('name');
     const qPermissions = params.get('permissions');
 
@@ -174,7 +184,9 @@
 
   function redirectBack() {
     if (!tokenSecret || !redirectUri) return;
-    const target = redirectUri.replace('%', tokenSecret);
+    // redirectUri was validated in parseQueryParams; encode the token so it
+    // can't alter the URL structure of the (trusted) redirect target.
+    const target = redirectUri.replace('%', encodeURIComponent(tokenSecret));
     window.location.href = target;
   }